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ABSTRACT
The state immunity rule was founded upon such sound rationales as respect for the sovereign
equality of all states and non-interference with state functions. However, its application in the
international criminal justice system produces numerous problems. These include impunity for
violation of peremptory international legal norms (like the prohibitions on serious international
crimes) and violation of human rights. It also undermines the individual accountability and
justice administration missions of the system because it shields state officials from criminal
responsibility and subjects their victims to injustice. The international community has adopted
various legal mechanisms which attempt to respond to these problems by abolishing state
immunity for international crimes. However, some weaknesses, including external political
influence, selective justice, and lopsided implementation against developing states, render the
mechanisms sometimes ineffective. This thesis examines the problems arising from the rule‟s
application, evaluates the response mechanism‟s strengths and weaknesses, and suggests reforms
in the mechanisms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background Information
As a branch of international law, international criminal law and the international criminal

justice system have developed principally to prohibit and punish the commission of certain acts
considered so heinous as to amount to serious crimes against the international community. 1
These crimes include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of
aggression. Another mission of this branch of international law is to provide substantial justice to
victims of these crimes (mostly human beings) and also to protect these victims and
national/international societies from the scourge of the crimes. 2 An important goal from the
earliest beginning of the system has been to obviate the situation where state officials who
deliberately commit these crimes would escape liability by arguing that they acted as agents of
their state and that the state should, therefore, bear sole legal (state) responsibility for all their
acts.3
Despite the centrality of these goals, one of the challenges for the system is the
application of the rule of state immunity. 4 By virtue of this rule, a sovereign state is immune
(shielded) from civil and criminal judicial processes abroad in other states. Thus, it cannot be
sued in the courts or other judicial tribunals of another state without its (the former state‟s)

1

See, e.g., Currie, Robert J & Joseph Rikhof, International and Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin
Law Inc, 2013) at 4-13.
2
Damaska, Mirjan R, “What is the Point of International Criminal Justice” (2008) 83:1 Chicago-Kent L Rev 329 at
331-340.
3
Ibid at 331-333.
4
Wuerth, Ingrid, “International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case”
(2012) 13 Melbourne JIL 1; Foakes, Joanne, “Immunity for International Crimes? Developments in the Law on
Prosecuting Heads of State in Foreign Courts”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, International Law Programme,
November 2011, IL BP 2011/02; Akande, Dapo & Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International
Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts” (2011) 21:4 EJIL 815; Bankas, Ernest K, The State Immunity Controversy in
International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign States in Domestic Courts (Berlin: Springer, 2005).

1

consent.5 One basic rationale for the evolution of this rule of state immunity is respect for the
concept of the sovereign equality of states.6 By virtue of this concept, all sovereign states are
deemed legally equal in status, irrespective of variations in geographical size, military might, and
economic prowess. This rationale is aptly expressed in the Latin maxim: “par in parem non
habet imperium” (an equal has no authority over an equal). 7 Another rationale is the need for
non-interference with the smooth governance of states.8
However, these abstract entities called sovereign states cannot exercise their rights and
observe their obligations on their own. They must function through the instrumentality of natural
persons (individuals) who are their heads of state and/or government. State immunity protection
extends to these heads of state and/or government and to some other high-ranking officials
appointed to administer the state‟s official/public powers, e.g., foreign, defence, and other senior
cabinet ministers/secretaries.9 It can also extend to lower officials who act as state agents.10 In
Chuidian v Philippine National Bank11, the US Federal Court held that “it is generally
recognized that a suit against an individual acting in his official capacity is the practical
equivalent of a suit against the sovereign directly.”

5

See The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 7 Cranch 116 (1812) (“Schooner Exchange case”). See also Tomuschat,
Christian, “The International Law of State Immunity and Its Development by National Institutions” (2011) 44
Vanderbilt JTL 1105 at 1116-1127; Talmon, Stefan, “Hague International Tribunals: International Court of Justice:
Jus Cogens after Germany v. Italy: Substantive and Procedural Rules Distinguished” (2012) 25:04 LJIL 979 at 979981.
6
Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (“UN Charter”), art 2(1).
7
Schaack, Beth Van, “Par In Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression” (2012)
10:1 JICJ 133 at 149; Yang, Xiadong, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012) at 51; Trahan, Jennifer, “Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal Court‟s
Crime of Aggression? Considering the Problem of “Overzealous” National Court Prosecutions” (2013) 45 Cornell
Int‟l LJ 569 at 587-588.
8
These and such other rationales as the fundamental right rationale and the practical courtesy (“comity”) rationale,
are discussed in Chapter 2.
9
Murphy, Sean D, “Immunity Ratione Personae of Foreign Government Officials and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fifth
Session of the International Law Commission”, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-125; GWU
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-125.
10
This is distinct from diplomatic immunity which the thesis does not deal with.
11
912 F 2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) at 1101. See also Propend Finance Pty Ltd v Sing (1997) 111 ILR 611 at 669.

2

The UK Court of Appeal (per Diplock, LJ) had, much earlier, clearly emphasized this
position in Zoernsch v Waldock12 in the following words:
A foreign sovereign government, apart from personal sovereigns, can only act
through agents, and the immunity to which it is entitled in respect of its acts
would be illusory unless it extended also to its agents in respect of acts done
by them on its behalf. To sue an envoy in respect of acts done in his official
capacity would be, in effect, to sue his government irrespective of whether the
envoy had ceased to be „en poste‟ at the date of his suit.
Consequently, these high-ranking state officials and other state agents cannot be sued,
arrested, prosecuted, or subjected to other foreign judicial proceedings for their unlawful acts,
including (at least, in principle) the heinous international crimes noted above. This is so, whether
these officials committed the alleged crimes within the territory of their home state or within a
foreign state‟s territory, against their home state‟s nationals or foreigners, or against a foreign
state‟s governmental apparatuses and other vested interests. This is because these officials are
deemed the alter ego of their home state in the exercise of that state‟s public/official powers, in
the course of which their alleged unlawful acts are committed. 13 This state immunity rule
originated in customary international law.14 It has also been codified under some multilateral
international treaties15 and municipal statutes of some states.16

12

[1964] 1 WLR 675, at 692, per Diplock, LJ.
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State Case (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (2012) ICJ Reps 99 (“ICJ
Jurisdictional Immunities Case”).
14
The Schooner Exchange case, supra, note 5.
15
E.g., the European Convention on State Immunity, 1972, 1 ETS 74; 1495 UNTS 181; UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004, UN Doc A/59/508 (“UN Jurisdictional Immunities
Convention”).
16
US‟ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976); (1976) 15 ILM 1388; UK‟s
State Immunity Act, (1978) 17 ILM 1123; Singapore‟s State Immunity Act, 1979, as amended, online: <
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%221be1a8f7-0968-4fcc-ac26-3
9d3a51b7b70%22%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0>; Pakistan‟s State Immunity Ordinance, No VI,
1981, reproduced in Dickinson, Andrew et al (eds), State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) 496 ; South Africa‟s Foreign States Immunities Act 87, 1981, as amended by
Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act 48, 1985, also as amended by Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act
5, 1988, online: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/chiefstatelawadvicer/documents/acts/foreignstatesimmunitiesact.pdf>;
Canada‟s State Immunity Act, RSC 1982, c S-18; (1982) 21 ILM 798 ; and, Australia‟s Foreign States Immunities
Act, 1985, (1986) 25 ILM 715.
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3

1.2

Statement of Research Problems
Though the original rationales for the evolution of the state immunity rule may be

commendable, application of the rule in the international criminal justice system does more harm
than good to international society. Today, the rule unduly shields high-ranking state officials
from individual accountability for international crimes committed in both peacetime and armed
conflict situations. This is so, notwithstanding that international law deems perpetrators of these
crimes “hostis humani generis” (enemies of all humankind)17 and imposes on all states an
obligation “erga omnes” (owed to the whole world)18 to bring them to justice, because the crimes
offend the values of the international community.
In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate & Ors, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No. 3)19 (the “Pinochet case”), the UK House of Lords, while trying to disregard the immunity
of a former head of state, held that a serving head of state is still protected by state immunity
even in respect of serious international crimes like torture and crimes against humanity. Also, in
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium)20 (the “ICJ Arrest Warrant Case”), the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that an
incumbent foreign minister enjoys immunity from foreign criminal prosecution, even for torture,
war crimes and crimes against humanity. 21 Recently, the General Prosecutor of Paris, France
dismissed, on grounds of state immunity, legal proceedings commenced against Donald
Rumsfeld (a former US Defence Secretary) for war crimes and for torture on Iraqi prisoners at
17

Greene, Jody, “Hostis Humani Generis” (2008) 34: Critical Inquiry 683; Werkmeister, Andreas, “International
Criminal Law as a Means to Fight the „Hostes humani Generis‟? – On the Dangers of the Concept of Enemy
Criminal Law” (2013) 3 KULRB 1.
18
De Hoogh, Andre, Obligations Erga Omnes and International Crimes: A Theoretical inquiry into the
Implementation and Enforcement of the International Responsibility of States (The Hague: Kluwer Law Int‟l, 1996)
at 91-95. See also Tams, Christian J, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010).
19
(2000) 1 AC 147.
20
(2002) ICJ Reps 3.
21
See also Akande & Shah, op cit, note 4 at 819-820, footnotes 15-17.
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the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq and prisoners at the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.22 Other examples of such dismissals on grounds of state immunity include: Re Gaddafi23
before the French Cour de Cassation; Re Sharon & Yaron24 before the Belgian Cour de
Cassation; and, Re Mugabe25 before the English High Court.26
Consequent upon the protection accorded by this rule, the high-ranking officials who
benefit from it abuse the rule with such impunity that its continued observance in the
international criminal justice system poses a potential conflict with some peremptory norms of
general international law or “jus cogens”.27 Among these jus cogens norms are the prohibitions
on the commission of the above-stated and other forms of international crimes, and the ban on
the violation of other states‟ territorial integrity and political independence, i.e., breach of
international peace and security. 28
Today, high-ranking officials of one state could deliberately violate the sovereignty of
another state through such aggressive acts as unwarranted wars and still plead state immunity as
a bar to criminal proceedings against them for these acts.29

22

Centre for Constitutional Rights, “French War Crimes Complaint Against Donald Rumsfeld, et al.”, online: <
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/french-war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld,-et-al.>; Dobbie,
A et al (eds), “French Prosecutors Throw out Rumsfeld‟s Torture Case”, online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/P
olitics News/idUSL2381695200071123>.
23
Arrêt no. 1414, (2001) 125 ILR 456.
24
(2003) 42 ILM 596.
25
Reported in Warbrick, Collin, “Public International Law: I. Immunity and International Crimes in English Law”
(2004) 53:3 ICLQ 769.
26
See also Akande & Shah, op cit, note 4 at 819-820, footnotes 15-17.
27
Jus cogens or a peremptory norm of general international law means a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. See the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, (1969) 8 ILM 679, art 53.
28
UN Charter, supra, note 6, art 2(4).
29
See, e.g., Sawma, Gabriel, “Immunity of Heads of State under International Law”, online: <http://www. gabriel
sawma.blogspot.com>.
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Such impunity also encourages deliberate and indiscriminate violation of the municipal
laws of one state by the officials of another state30, and it can lead to deliberate and gross
violation of other important norms of the international legal order. These other norms include,
especially, human rights of individuals and groups protected under relevant international legal
instruments.31
Furthermore, application of the state immunity rule creates inequality between highranking state officials and other individuals who are not in the category of high-ranking state
officials as regards accountability for international crimes. These individuals have become
sacrificial “scapegoats” who must bear full legal responsibility for their international crimes,
while high-ranking state officials are treated as untouchable “sacred cows” who may never be
held accountable for their own crimes. 32 Consequently, the rule‟s application defeats the notion
of “equality before the law”, which is an essential component of the age-old doctrine of the “rule
of law”33 as codified in relevant international instruments.34
The state immunity rule‟s application in the international criminal justice system also
leads to injustice, as victims of the international crimes committed by high-ranking state officials

30

See Gardiner, Richard, International Law ((Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson Education Ltd, 2003) at 340.
E.g., the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (“Torture Convention”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221; American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 1144 UNTS
123; African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, 1981 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; (1982) 21 ILM 58.
32
See, e.g., Re Sharon & Yaron, supra, note 24. In this case, while the immunity rule shielded the Ist Defendant who
was a high-ranking state official, there was no similar shield for the 2 nd Defendant who did not qualify as such
official. Also, while the accused persons were exempted from foreign trial in Re Gaddafi, supra, note 23 and Re
Mugabe, supra, note 25, the defendant in R v Munyaneza, 2009 QCCS 2201 (an ordinary Rwandan citizen) was tried
and fully punished before the Canadian court for genocide committed in Rwanda.
33
See Lautenbach, Geranne, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 46; Merkel, Wolfang, “Measuring the Quality of Rule of Law: Virtues, Perils,
Results”, in Zurn, Michael et al (eds), Rule of Law Dynamics: In an Era of International and Transnational
Governance (New York: Cambribge University Press, 2012) 28 at 40; Silkenat, James R et al (eds), The Legal
Doctrines of the Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat) (Neu-Isenburg, Germany: 2014).
34
E.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, UNGA Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, UN Doc
A/810 (of 10 December 1948), arts 1 & 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS
171 (ICCPR), art 14.
31
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are denied justice, because the state officials who commit the crimes against them are unduly
shielded from prosecution by the rule of state immunity. 35
The application of the rule also leads to many other social, political, and economic
problems other than the aforementioned. One of these problems is political self-perpetuation.
Culpable state officials know that stepping out of political power means losing state immunity
protection, while remaining in power implies perpetual protection by immunity from judicial
scrutiny of their international crimes. As such, they often devise means, fair or foul, to hang on
to political power. Typical examples are Augusto Pinochet‟s self-conferred “Senator-for-life”
status in Chile with perpetual immunity from criminal prosecution, and Robert Mugabe‟s
unending presidency in Zimbabwe.36
In view of the foregoing, it will be argued here that application of the state immunity rule
in the international criminal justice system substantially undermines one of the principal
purposes of the United Nations. This purpose is: “To achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without
discrimination…”37
In order to overcome the foregoing and other problems and ensure compliance with
international criminal law norms, the international community has adopted some legal response
mechanisms. These mechanisms entail adoption of legal instruments that create certain
international or hybrid criminal tribunals and/or, expressly or impliedly, abolish state immunity

35

See, e.g., Roht-Arriaza, Naomi, “Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches”,
in Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (ed), Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995) 13 at 17-18.
36
Power, Robert C, “Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalization of Criminal Law” (2007) 39:1 GWILR 89 at 127133; Nzongola-Ntalaja, G, “Democratic Transitions in Africa” (2006) 1 The Constitution 1.
37
UN Charter, supra, note 6, art 1(3).
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in international criminal proceedings before these tribunals or before national courts.38 These
response mechanisms are described in this thesis as: the Old and New Ad hoc International
Criminal Tribunal Mechanisms, the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism, the
Hybrid/Internationalized Criminal Tribunal Mechanism, and the Permanent International
Criminal Court Mechanism.
However, these mechanisms have many weaknesses which essentially leave the
problems of state immunity in place. For example, the geographical and temporal jurisdictions of
the tribunals established under the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms,
respectively, are very limited. Thus, the tribunals cannot address many crimes committed by
state officials outside these geographical and temporal frameworks. 39 These tribunals‟
substantive jurisdictions were never uniform. Some lack jurisdiction to try some crimes that
others could try.40 Similarly, essential elements of a particular crime may differ under the
tribunals‟ respective legal instruments. Thus, an official may lose his or her immunity over a
given international crime before one tribunal, while a counterpart appearing before another
tribunal for the same act may not necessarily suffer the same fate.

38

These instruments include the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 1993,
UN Doc S/RES/827 (“ICTY Statute”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1994, UN Doc
S/RES/955 (“ICTR Statute”); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90 (“Rome
Statute” or “ICC Statute”); Statute of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2002, 2178 UNTS 138, 145 (“SCSL
Statute”); Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 2003 (2004) 42 ILM 231 (“IST Statute”); Statute of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, 2006, UN Doc S/RES/1757 (“STL Statute”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, 1945, 82 UNTS 279 (“Nuremberg Charter”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, 1946 (“Tokyo Charter”), annexed to Special Proclamation, Establishment of an International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, 19 January 1946, TIAS No 1589; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (“Genocide Convention”); and, the Torture Convention, supra, note 31.
39
See, e.g., the ICTY Statute, supra, note 38, art 8, and the ICTR Statute, supra, note 38, art 1.
40
See Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 38, art 6(a); Tokyo Charter, supra, note 38, art 5(1); ICTY Statute, supra,
note 38, art 4; and, ICTR Statute, supra, note 38, art 2.
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These tribunals are often alleged to be administering “victor‟s justice”, i.e., they are
mostly post-conflict institutions set up by the victorious parties to punish the vanquished. 41
Equally culpable high-ranking officials of the victorious parties are exempted from the
jurisdictions of these tribunals, while their counterparts from the vanquished parties have their
immunities removed and get tried and punished. 42
As for the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, there is some controversy as to the
scopes and limits of its anti-state-immunity potential. 43 For the permanent international criminal
court mechanism, the operation of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) established pursuant
to this mechanism and its efforts against state immunity have been so far selective. They have
focused almost exclusively on state officials from one region of the world (Africa) 44, despite
situations of commission of serious crimes under the ICC‟s jurisdiction by state officials in other
regions. In addition, the ICC‟s enabling legal instrument contains provisions that undermine its
efforts to disregard or abolish state immunity.

41

See Meernik, James, “Victors‟ Justice or the Law?: Judging and Punishing at the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” (2003) 47:2 JCR 140. See also Tanaka, Yuki et al (eds), Beyond Victors‟
Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); Waldorf, Lars, “A Mere Pretense
of Justice: Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victors‟ Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal” (2011) 33:4 Fordham Int‟l
LJ 1221 at 1224-1229.
42
See, e.g., Wald, Patricia M, “Running the Trial of the Century: The Nuremberg Legacy” (2006) 27:4 Cardozo LR
1559 at 1560. See also Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, online: <http://www.icty.org/sid/10052>; IAC, “European
Hearings on US NATO War Crimes Against Yugoslavia: Reports from Berlin, Rome, Paris, and Amsterdam”,
online: <http://www .iacenter.org/warcrime/eurowc99.htm>. See also Fenrick, WJ, “Targeting and Proportionality
during the NATO Bombing Campaign against Yugoslavia” (2001) 12 EJIL 489; Cohn, Marjorie, “NATO Bombing of
Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention or Crime Against Humanity” (2002) 15 IJSL 79; ICTY, “The Cases”, online:
<http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4>; Cameron, Hazel, Britain‟s Hidden Role in the Rwandan Genocide: The Cat‟s
Paw (New York: Routledge, 2013); Melvern, Linda R, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda‟s
Genocide (London: Zed Books, 2000); ICTR, “Status of Cases”, online: <http://www.unictr.org/cases/tabid/204/Def
ault.aspx>.
43
See Pinochet case, supra, note 19; the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, supra, note 20.
44
See, e.g., Ezennia, Celestine Nchekwube, “The International Criminal Court System: An Impartial or a Selective
Justice Regime?”, a research paper submitted to the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, April, 2014 at 20-37.
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1.3

Research Questions
In the light of the foregoing, the present thesis examines the following questions:
1) What is the scope and effect of the state immunity rule with respect to international
criminal law?
2) What is the usefulness of the state immunity rule to international criminal justice and the
sovereign equality of states?
3) How does the continued application of the state immunity rule in the international
criminal justice system ensure respect for other norms of international law, such as
ensuring international peace and security and respect for human rights?
4) What are the merits and demerits of the international mechanisms of legal response to the
problems of state immunity in the international criminal justice system and how could
these mechanisms be improved to more effectively counter the adverse consequences of
state immunity?
5) To what extent do the efforts to disregard state immunity in the international criminal
justice system reflect the sovereign equality of all states?
6) To what extent does the anti-state-immunity efforts of the international criminal justice
system ensure equal standard of justice for all individuals, states and regions of the
world?
7) How can the current legal response mechanisms be used in order to ensure that developed
states do not use them as post-colonial or racist agents against less developed states.
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1.4

Description of Research Argument
The present thesis argues that application of the state immunity rule in the international

criminal justice system leads to serious injustice and other problems. It also argues that existing
international legal response mechanisms have not been able to sufficiently address these
problems. It concludes that due to this situation, the problems sought to be overcome by these
mechanisms significantly continue, a fact that calls for serious reforms of the mechanisms.

1.5

Research Scope

This thesis examines the problems arising from the application of the international law rule of
state immunity in the international criminal justice system. It also analyses the operational
successes of the various legal mechanisms so far adopted by the international community to
overcome these problems. Furthermore, it examines the weaknesses of these mechanisms and
suggests reforms by recommending that some of the mechanisms should be reformed in order to
be more effective, while others should be scrapped outright.
Before doing these, it first traces the historical evolution of the state immunity rule and
conducts an overview of some other general issues relating to the rule. The thesis does not deal
with state immunity in civil proceedings, although some issues relevant to this area of state
immunity are addressed in the general overview mentioned above. Also, the thesis does not treat
diplomatic immunity or the immunity of international organization.
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1.6

Research Methodologies
A combination of research methodologies is employed in producing this thesis. First, a

doctrinal research methodology45 is adopted. In this regard, relevant provisions of pertinent
international instruments46 and municipal statutes47, as well as material decisions of relevant
international and national judicial tribunals are appraised. The aim of using this methodology is
twofold. The first is to show how far the provisions of some of these instruments and their
judicial interpretations have contributed to the aforementioned problems generated by the
application of the state immunity rule. The second is to show the extent to which the provisions
of the other instruments and the ratios of the other judicial decisions are disposed to disregarding
state immunity in appropriate cases and holding state officials accountable for their international
crimes high-ranking state officials who commit international crimes.
Also, this thesis adopts the postulations of different legal theories. First is the natural law
theory. This theory maintains that law gains its authority or legitimacy, and at least some of its
content, from certain immutable principles that are inherent in nature and morality and/or reason
(whether by virtue of God or not).48 Along these lines, the thesis maintains that the inherent

45

See Hutchinson, Terry & Nigel Duncan, “Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research”
(2012) 17:1 Deakin L Rev 83.
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These instruments include the European Convention on State Immunity, supra, note 15; the UN Jurisdictional
Immunities Convention, supra, note 15; Treaty of Versailles, 1919, 7 LNTS 332; the Nuremberg Charter, supra, note
38; the Tokyo Charter, supra, note 38; the Genocide Convention, supra, note 38; the ICTY Statute, supra, note 38;
the ICTR Statute, supra, note 38; the Rome Statute, supra, note 38; the SCSL Statute, supra, note 38; the IST Statute,
supra, note 38; and, Regulation No 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious
Criminal Offences (East Timor), 2000, UNTAET/REG/2000/15.
47
These include US‟ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra, note 16 ; UK‟s State Immunity Act, supra, note 16;
American Servicemembers‟ Protection Act, 2002, Pub L No 107-206, 116 Stat 820 (2002); International Crimes
(Tribunals) Act, 1973, as amended, online: <http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/print_sections_all.php?id=435>
(Bangladesh); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2004,
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Cambodia); Iraqi Higher Criminal Court Law, 2005, No (10), online: <http://www.law.case.e
du/sadamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official_english.pdf> (Iraq); and, Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment)
Law, No 5710, 1950, online: <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1950-1959/Pages/Nazis%20and%20Nazi%20C
ollaborators%20-Punishment-%20Law-%20571.aspx> (Israel).
48
Cryer, Robert et al, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Portland, USA: Hart Publishing,
2011) at 35-37.
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dignity and equality of human beings demand that all natural persons who commit international
crimes should be brought to justice without distinction as to political status. Thus, the thesis
argues against the discrimination which the state immunity rule engenders between state
officials, on the one hand, and ordinary individuals, on the other hand, as regards international
criminal accountability. It also argues that human victims of international crimes are the same
the world over and should be entitled to equality of justice, whether the crimes against them were
committed by ordinary persons or by state officials.
This natural law theory is also employed in the critique of the existing anti-stateimmunity response mechanisms. Here, the thesis argues that on the basis of the sovereign
equality of all states, the current disregard/abolition of state immunity in the international
criminal justice system should apply to culpable state officials in all states and regions of the
world equally and without any exemption. Since the sovereign equality of all states presupposes
the equality of all states‟ officials (who are also equal individuals), culpable officials of some
states should not be stripped of their immunity, while their counterparts in other states are not so
treated. Thus, there should be no selectivity or double standard. More so, since the international
criminal justice system is meant to protect all human beings and societies without discrimination,
and since the pains of international crimes are the same in all victims, notwithstanding the
particular state whose officials have committed the crimes or where they are committed.
The thesis also employs the postcolonial theory, which is particularly interested in a
critique of current international legal arrangements from the perspective that they reflect and
maintain colonial relations and are complicit in subordinating or silencing peoples and states
from the so-called “Global South” and “third world”. 49 To this end, the thesis argues that the
current efforts at disregarding/abolishing state immunity in the international criminal justice
49

Ibid at 69-71.
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system are lopsided. They are made in such a way as to target officials of the developing states.
This practice gives the erroneous impression that officials of these developing states are the only
political leadership-level violators of international criminal law norms, while their counterparts
in the “northern/western” hemisphere and the developed world are all innocent.
In addition, elements of the critical race theory (CRT) run through some parts of the
thesis that deal with critique of the current response mechanisms. CRT maintains that racism is
engrained in the system of the international society, and that international law and power
structures are based on white privilege and white supremacy, which perpetuate the
marginalization of people of colour. 50 Accordingly, the thesis maintains that the fact that all the
state officials so far stripped of immunity by the ICC are black African officials from African
states at least raises a question as to whether the ICC has become an instrument of racist
oppression against black African people and states.
Finally, the idealist approach also influences the present research. The idealism theory
maintains that ideas form and create systems and that the current international legal system
(including the state immunity rule) is founded on a state-based set of ideas which prevent the
system from better serving the interests of humanity as a whole. For this theory, since ideas are
the foundations of all social structures, to change ideas about how such structures ought to be
arranged will inevitably lead to changes in those structures.51 In tune with this theory, this thesis
advances the position that the state immunity rule was created to uphold the old and
controversial idea that international law was invented for sovereign states only and not for
individuals. The thesis further shows that in view of the human protection and individual
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UCLA School of Public Affairs / Critical Race Studies, “What is Critical Race Theory”, online: < http://spacrs.
wordpress.com/what-is-critical-race-theory/>; Delgado, Richard & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An
Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2011) at 6-9.
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accountability missions of the international criminal justice system, coupled with state
immunity‟s numerous problems, this idea of the state as the sole actor is ripe for change.

1.7

Chapter Breakdown
This thesis is made up of six chapters. Chapter 1 is titled “Introduction” and deals with

such preliminary issues as background information and statement of research problems. These
two sub-segments, put together, attempt to summarize the thematic preoccupation of this thesis.
They do this by providing a brief overview on the state immunity rule, the problems arising from
its application in the international criminal justice system, and the successes and failures of the
legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to these problems. The
chapter also contains the research questions raised by the thesis, as well as the research
argument. The research argument is to the effect that application of the rule in the international
criminal justice system results in serious injustice and significant social, political, economic, and
allied problems which existing international legal response mechanisms are not able to solve, a
situation that calls for reforms. It further highlights the research aims and objectives of the thesis,
the research scope, and the various research methodologies employed in writing the thesis.
Chapter 2 traces the historical evolution of the state immunity rule in international law by
examining different sources advanced by academics and judges as the origins of the rule. These
sources include the personal equality of sovereign heads of state, the old English feudal system,
the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, and the consensus of a great
majority of states. The chapter observes that despite the arguments as to the origin of the rule, it
has become an established and functional rule of international law. This chapter also performs a
general overview of various issues related to the rule, such as an exposition of its meaning and
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essence, an examination of the absolute and restrictive theories52 of the rule, and an analysis of
the entities protected by the rule. These entities range from the state itself to high-ranking state
officials like heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers. Besides, it discusses the
types of immunity available to foreign high-ranking state officials before the municipal courts of
the forum state, i.e., immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae, respectively. In
addition, the chapter assesses the arguments on whether state immunity operates as a substantive
defence or a procedural bar, and it supports the latter view. Again, it reviews the various
rationales put up in support of the state immunity rule in international law. These range from the
symbolic sovereignty and non-intervention rationale to the fundamental state right rationale, the
practical courtesy (comity) rationale, and to the functional necessity rationale. Finally, the
chapter discusses waiver of immunity.
Chapter 3 unfolds numerous problems generated by the application of the state immunity
rule in the international criminal justice system. It shows that despite the commendable rationales
for the rule and its usefulness in preserving the sovereign equality of states and ensuring noninterruption of their smooth governance, high-ranking officials protected by the rule grossly
abuse it. Consequently its application in the international criminal justice system causes a lot of
problems that essentially undermine the individual criminal accountability and justice
administration missions of the system, and, therefore, requires some reconsideration. These
problems include impunity for violation of peremptory norms of international law, such as the
prohibitions on the commission of heinous international crimes like genocide, war crimes,
torture, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression. Others are systematic violation of
internationally protected human rights and indiscriminate violation of the municipal laws of
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The distinctions between these two theories apply more prominently in civil cases, which are not the concern of
this thesis.
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other states, perpetuation of injustice to victims of international crimes committed by state
officials, and contradiction of the concept of equality before the law by discriminating between
state officials and ordinary individuals regarding accountability for international crimes. Yet
another problem discussed in the chapter is the fact that the state immunity rule indirectly leads
to the habit of political self-perpetuation among some high-ranking state officials.
The contributions of the various mechanisms of legal response which the international
community has adopted in order to overcome these problems are discussed in Chapter 4. These
mechanisms, as described in the thesis, include the old ad hoc international criminal tribunal
mechanism and the new ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, respectively. Under
these two mechanisms, the legal regimes of the following ad hoc international criminal tribunals
examined: the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (the “Nuremberg Tribunal”), the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”), the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”), and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (the “ICTR”). Another mechanism is the hybrid criminal tribunal
mechanism. The tribunals whose legal regimes are appraised under this include the UN Special
Court for Sierra Leone, the Iraqi Special Tribunal/ Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Furthermore, the chapter examines the
permanent international criminal court mechanism represented by the current International
Criminal Court (the “ICC”).
One major achievement of the foregoing mechanisms, as shown by the chapter, is that the
enabling legal instruments of all the relevant tribunals/courts expressly abolish the immunity rule
in international criminal proceedings before the tribunals/courts. Consequently, many highranking state officials who would have otherwise been shielded by the state immunity rule have
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been deservingly tried and punished by the foregoing tribunals for their international crimes.
Others have been indicted or are undergoing trials, especially before the ICC.
In addition, the chapter treats the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism under which
customary international law and, to some extent international treaties, confer jurisdiction on the
national courts of all states or all states parties, as the case may be, to try and punish any person
who commits any one of certain heinous international crimes. This jurisdiction may be exercised,
despite the perpetrator‟s nationality or official status, place of commission of the crime, or
absence of any other jurisdictional connection with the forum state. It is conferred on the ground
that the affected crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, torture, crimes against humanity, and the
crime of aggression) have attained the status of jus cogens and every state, therefore, has an
obligation erga omnes to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Chapter 5 examines the weaknesses that render these mechanisms ineffective to
overcome the problems referred to in Chapter 3. The peculiar weaknesses of each of the
mechanisms are discussed. In addition to these, some general weaknesses that are common to all
the mechanisms are addressed. These include the fact that the efforts at the disregard/abolition of
state immunity in the international criminal justice system are currently lopsided against the
developing states, while no significant action is taken against culpable officials of the developed
states, a situation that promotes the “North-South” divide in contemporary international relations
and politics. On the whole, the chapter concludes that all these weaknesses substantially
undermine the efforts and enable many state officials who commit international crimes to still
escape justice.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and makes some findings. It maintains that although the
state immunity rule is a useful tool in the maintenance of sovereign equality and mutual respect
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among states, its application in the international criminal justice system defeats the principal
aims of the system and leads to many social and allied problems. It finds that due to several
peculiar and general weaknesses, all the legal mechanisms adopted by the international
community to respond to these problems are not effective enough to achieve their goals, and
thus, high-ranking state officials still escape individual accountability for international crimes.
On this basis, the thesis suggests some reforms. These include the repeal of article 98 of the
Rome Statute that encourages the powerful states to conclude BIAs that shield their officials
from the ICC‟s jurisdiction, and the repeal of the provisions of the Rome Statute that vest in a
state party the discretion to reject or defer the commencement of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over
certain international crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory. 53 They also include
creation of permanent and jurisdictionally harmonized regional and sub-regional international
criminal tribunals54 in place of the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals, and
conferment of universal jurisdiction on the ICC over all crimes under the Rome Statute.

53

E.g., the Rome Statute, supra, note 38, art 124.
These tribunals should be similar to the regional and sub-regional courts operating under the international human
rights law, e.g., the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the African Court
of Human and Peoples‟ Rights, and the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States.
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CHAPTER 2
STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND GENERAL OVERVIEW
2.1

Introduction
In international law, every sovereign state has, as one of its principal attributes, the

jurisdiction (power) to affect people, property and circumstances within its territory by its
municipal law. This is called „state jurisdiction‟. It reflects the basic international law principles
of state sovereignty, equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of each state.1
In the words of David Harris:
State jurisdiction is the power of a state under international law to govern
persons and property by its municipal law. It includes both the power to
prescribe rules (prescriptive jurisdiction) and the power to enforce them
(enforcement jurisdiction). The latter includes both executive and
adjudicative powers of enforcement. Jurisdiction may be concurrent with
the jurisdiction of other states or it may be exclusive. It may be civil or
criminal. The rules of state jurisdiction identify the persons and the
property within the permissible range of a state‟s law and its procedures
for enforcing that law. They are not concerned with the content of a state‟s
law except in so far as it purports to subject a person to it or to prescribe
procedures to enforce it…2
This definition naturally leads to the division of the concept of state jurisdiction into
legislative jurisdiction, executive jurisdiction and, judicial jurisdiction, along the lines of the
three recognized organs of the government of each sovereign state (the legislature, the executive
and, the judiciary). 3

1

Bowett, DW, “Jurisdiction: Changing Problems of Authority over Activities and Resources” (1982) BYIL 1;
Akehurst M,“Jurisdiction in International Law” (1972-3) 46 BYIL 145; Ryngaert, Cedric, Jurisdiction in
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States, 1933, 165 LNTS 19; 49 Stat 3097, art 1; the United Nations Charter, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI (“UN
Charter”), art 2(1).
2
Harris, David J, Cases and Materials on International Law, 1st South Asian ed (London: Thomson Reuters, 2011)
at 227.
3
Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law, 6th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 645-646.
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This thesis concerns state immunity from judicial jurisdiction. Judicial jurisdiction is
concerned with the power of the courts and other judicial tribunals of a particular state to try
cases involving a foreign element and hand down judgments binding upon the parties thereto.4 In
turn, the courts of a state may claim to exercise this power on the basis of the heads of legislative
jurisdiction recognized in international law. In criminal matters, these grounds may range from:
the territorial principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the crime is
committed); the nationality principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or
national character of the person committing the crime); and, the protective principle (determining
jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the crime). Other grounds are: the
universality principle (determining jurisdiction by reference to the nature of the crime and the
custody of the person committing it); and, the passive personality principle (determining
jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the person injured by the
crime).5
As established as this concept of state jurisdiction is in international law, the state
immunity rule (already described in Chapter One) operates parallel to it.6 According to one
commentator, it follows from the rule of state immunity that since each sovereign state is, in
international law, deemed equal to every other sovereign state, no one state, its government or –
important for present purposes - its officials can be expected to submit to the courts and verdicts
of another.7

4

Ibid at 651.
Harris, David J, op cit, note 2 at 228-229. See also Currie, Robert J & Joseph Rikhof, International &
Transnational Criminal Law (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2013) at 61-84.
6
See, e.g., Wuerth, Ingrid, “International Law in Domestic Courts and the Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
Case” (2012) 13 Melbourne JIL 1 at 1.
7
Abegunde, Babalola, “Recasting Sovereignty and Federalism: The Way Forward in the Nigerian Political and
Constitutional Quagmire” (2007) 4:1 JLD 21.
5
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2.2

Meaning of State Immunity
From the outset, it is essential to define the terms “immunity” and “state immunity”,

respectively. Regrettably, none of the multilateral treaties and municipal statutes on the subjectmatter of state immunity8 has an express definition of any of these terms. They only provide
clues to the terms‟ meanings in the contexts of the acts deemed immune or non-immune under
the respective instruments. Thus, this thesis shall have regard to the dictionary meanings of the
terms and to academic and judicial comments on them.
According to Black‟s Law Dictionary9, “immunity” means “any exemption from a duty,
liability or service of process; especially, such an exemption granted to a public official.” L.B.
Curzon also defines “immunity” as “freedom or exemption from some obligation or penalty.”10
Similarly, David Walker refers to it as “a state of freedom from certain legal consequences or the
operation of certain legal rules.”11
Regarding “state immunity”, on the other hand, Chike Okosa, for example, has stated
thus:
The doctrine of [state] immunity is a judicial doctrine derived from the
rules of public international law. It precludes bringing a suit against a
foreign government in a local forum without its consent. It bars holding
the government or its subdivisions liable for breaches of its officers or

8

The European Convention on State Immunity, 1972, 1 ETS 74; 1495 UNTS 181; and, the UN Convention on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 2004, UN Doc A/59/508 (“UN Jurisdictional Immunities
Convention”); US‟ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976); (1976) 15 ILM
1388; UK‟s State Immunity Act, (1978) 17 ILM 1123; Singapore‟s State Immunity Act, 1979, as amended, online: <
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3A%221be1a8f7-0968-4fcc-ac2639d3a51b7b70 %22%20 Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0>; Pakistan‟s State Immunity Ordinance, No VI,
1981, reproduced in Dickinson, Andrew et al (eds), State Immunity: Selected Materials and Commentary (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004) 496 ; South Africa‟s Foreign States Immunities Act 87, 1981, as amended by
Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act 48, 1985, also as amended by Foreign States Immunities Amendment Act
5, 1988, online: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/chiefstatelawadvicer/documents/acts/foreignstatesimmunitiesact.pdf>;
Canada‟s State Immunity Act, RSC 1982, c S-18; (1982) 21 ILM 798 ; and, Australia‟s Foreign States Immunities
Act, 1985, (1986) 25 ILM 715.
9
Garner, BA (ed), Black‟s Law Dictionary, 7th ed (Minnesota: Pitman Group Publishing Co Ltd, 1999) at753.
10
Curzon, LB, A Dictionary of Law, 2nd ed (London: Pitman Publishing Ltd., 1986) at 387.
11
Walker, David M, The Oxford Companion to Law (London: Clarendon Press, 1980) at18.
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agents unless such immunity is expressly waived by statute or by
necessary inference from legislative enactment. 12
According to this commentator, state immunity extends to both direct actions against the
state or sovereign and indirect actions against its property, and, until relatively recently, foreign
states were afforded immunity not only with regard to government activities, but also with regard
to their commercial activities. 13
In the words of Ian Sinclair:
… The residual rule of [state] immunity precludes the courts of the state of
the forum from assuming jurisdiction in a case where a foreign state is
directly or indirectly impleaded and where the validity of acts which it has
performed in its sovereign capacity may be in issue. In other words, it
operates as a bar in limine to the continuance of the proceedings. 14
The earliest known judicial expression of the meaning of state immunity was laid down
in the old case of The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon15 by the United States Supreme Court.
Here, Chief Justice John Marshall threw light on the rule as follows:
The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of
every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power,
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their rights as its
objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of
his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction
of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an
express license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his
independent sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are
reserved by implication, and will be extended to him. 16
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Okosa, Chike B, “The Limits of Sovereignty and Diplomatic Immunity” (2004) 4:1 The Constitution 88 at 88.
Ibid.
14
Sinclair, Ian, “The Law of Sovereign Immunity: Recent Developments” (1980) 167 HR 113 at 117. See also
Abegunde, Babalola, “Irrelevance of Immunity for International Crimes Particularly Crimes under International
Humanitarian Law” (2007) 4:2 JLD at 1.
15
11 U.S. 7 Cranch 116 (1812) at 116.
16
See also Mighell v Sultan of Johore (1894) 1 QBD 149.
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In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service17 (a case involving, inter alia, a
claim of state immunity by a governor of a component unit of the Nigerian federation before a
UK court), the English High Court of Justice also affirmed that: “It is a basic principle of
international law that one sovereign state (the forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of
a foreign state. The foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the process of the forum
state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.”
In the light of the foregoing, one can safely assert that the rule of state immunity in
international law naturally flows from the inherent features of sovereign equality and political
independence of states. It operates as a procedural bar 18 and shields one sovereign state, its
government, administrative departments, property and high-ranking officials from the
adjudicatory powers of the judicial tribunals of another sovereign state with respect to the official
or public acts of the former state. It, therefore, exists as an exception to a sovereign state‟s
judicial jurisdiction.

2.3

Rationales for State Immunity in International Law
As referred to throughout the above discussion, various rationales have been proposed for

the application of the state immunity rule in international law. Some of the more important of
these are discussed in more detail below.

2.3.1 The Symbolic Sovereignty and Non-Intervention Rationale
According to this rationale, the justification for the grant of immunity to a foreign state
and its high-ranking officials is implicit in the very sovereignty of the state itself and the
17
18

(2007) 18 NWLR (Pt 1066) 423 at 436, paras E-G.
See Currie & Rikhof, op cit, note 5 at 576.
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consequent need for non-intervention in its internal affairs. This rationale is expressed in so
many

variations,

including:

“sovereign capacity”

or

simply

“being

a

sovereign”;

“independence”; “equality”; “dignity”; and their various permutations and combinations. 19
Sovereignty is the hallmark of statehood, and the forum state‟s exercise of jurisdiction
over the foreign state will not only defeat the very foundation of statehood on which the foreign
state is built, but also amount to interference in the foreign state‟s independence and internal
political administration. Thus, according to Akande and Shah 20:
A Head of State is accorded immunity ratione personae not only because
of the functions he performs, but also because of what he symbolizes: the
sovereign state. The person and position of the Head of State reflects the
sovereign quality of the state and the immunity accorded to him or her is
in part due to the respect for the dignity of the office and of the state which
that office represents. The principle of non-intervention constitutes a
further justification for the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction
for Heads of State. The principle is the „corollary of the principle of
sovereign equality of states, which is the basis for the immunity of states
from the jurisdiction of other states (par in parem non habet imperium).
To arrest and detain the leader of a country is effectively to change the
government of that state. This would be a particularly extreme form of
interference with the autonomy and independence of that foreign state.
The notion of independence means that a state has exclusive jurisdiction to
appoint its own government – and that other states are not empowered to
intervene in this matter. Were the rule of Head of State immunity relaxed
in criminal proceedings so as to permit arrests, such interference right at
the top of the political administration of a state would eviscerate the
principles of sovereign equality and independence.
However, this rationale is not viewed as very sound and convincing, and has, therefore,
been criticized in some quarters. According to Xiaodong Yang, for example, „sovereignty‟ is a
dubious concept to serve as the basis of immunity. The simple fact is that both the defendant
state and the forum state have sovereignty. If the defendant state has reason to claim immunity,
the forum state has even more reason to demand submission to jurisdiction. That is to say,
19

Yang, Xiaodong, State Immunity in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 46.
Akande, Dapo & Sangeeta Shah, “Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic
Courts” (2010) 21:4 EJIL 815 at 824.
20
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sovereignty can serve equally forcefully as the basis for immunity and the denial of immunity,
depending on from whose perspective the matter is approached. Thus, the idea that immunity is
derived from sovereignty is doctrinally self-contradictory and self-defeating, and this conclusion
with regard to sovereignty also applies to independence, equality, dignity or any other attribute
of statehood.21 For Yang, one way to avoid such difficulty, and apparently to be always on the
safe side, is to assert that all these qualities and attributes of statehood collectively serve as the
basis of state immunity. This amounts to saying that a state enjoys immunity because of the sum
total of all its attributes in the eyes of international law, because it stands as n amalgam of such
attributes. This is to say that a state enjoys immunity because it is a state.22
However, this line of argument is not convincing. There is no doubt that international law
recognizes the sovereignty of both the forum and the foreign state. The forum state is recognized
as sovereign within its own territory, likewise the foreign state. However, it could be argued that
part of the essence of the state immunity rule is to ensure that the sovereignty of one state does
not take supremacy over that of another. Consequently, while recognizing the forum state‟s
sovereignty, international law tries to ensure that the sovereignty of one state does not take
supremacy over that of another. Furthermore, the words and phrases such as “independence”,
“sovereign capacity”, and “being a sovereign”, it is arguable, are nothing but other ways of
expressing the word “sovereignty”. They are mere synonyms of “sovereignty” and do not convey
meanings different from this root word. Finally, such words as “equality” and “dignity” in the
context of state immunity could be seen as attributes or aspects of sovereignty and should not be
taken as conveying meanings parallel to or independent of “sovereignty”.

21
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Yang, Xiaodong, op cit, note 19 at 50.
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2.3.2 The Fundamental Right Rationale
For the proponents of this rationale 23, state immunity is a fundamental right of a state by
virtue of the principle of sovereign equality of states. 24 According to them, the traditional starting
point for this view is the maxim, “par in parem non habet imperium” (an equal has no power
over an equal).25
Theodore Giuttari (a major proponent of this rationale) explains the maxim‟s historical
origin in the classical period of international law as follows:
In this period, the state was generally conceived of as a juristic entity
having a distinctive personality and entitled to specific fundamental rights,
such as the rights of absolute sovereignty, complete and exclusive
territorial jurisdiction, absolute independence and legal equality within the
family of nations. Consequently, it appeared as a logical deduction from
such attributes to conclude that as all sovereign states were equal in law,
no single state should be subjected to the jurisdiction of another state.26
This rationale has been supported by the Italian Cour d‟ Cassation in Special
Representative of the Vatican v Piecinkiewiez27. Some publicists have also been among the
strongest supporters of this rationale. 28 For Sompong Sucharitkul, while acknowledging the basic
principle of territorial jurisdiction, a state‟s right to sovereign equality should also be
emphasized. According to Sucharitkul, the principle of state jurisdiction must give way to the
principle of sovereign equality to effectuate a state‟s right to immunity. 29
In the words of the Nigerian Court of Appeal:
23

These proponents include Peter Trooboff, Theodore Giuttari, Sompong Sucharitkul, Richard A Falk, Grigory I
Tunkin, and MM Boguslavskij. See Caplan, Lee M, “State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of
the Normative Hierarchy Theory” (2003) 97:4 AJIL 741 at 743 and 748-749.
24
See Bankas, Ernest K, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law: Private Suits Against Sovereign
States in in Domestic Courts (Berlin: Springer, 2005) at 43-45.
25
Garner, BA (ed), Black‟s Law Dictionary, op cit, note 9. See also Io Congreso del Partido case (1981) 2 All ER
10464.
26
Giuttarri, Theodore R, quoted in Caplan, Lee M, op cit, note 23 at 748.
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(1985) Italy B Int‟l 179.
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See, e.g., Trooboff, Peter D, “Foreign State Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles” (1986) 200 HR 235 at
266-267.
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Sucharitkul, Sompol, “Immunities of Foreign States Before National Authorities” (1976) 149 HR 87 at 117-119.
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The basis of which one state is considered to be immune from the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts of another country is expressed in the
Latin maxim, “par in parem imperium non habet” which literally means
that an equal has no authority over an equal. In other words and in legal
parlance it means that the sovereign or governmental acts of one state or
country are not matters on which the courts of another country will
adjudicate…30
This argument also appears to have been supported by the ICJ in the Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State Case (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening)31 (“ICJ Jurisdictional
Immunities Case”). According to the Court:
… the rule of State immunity occupies an important place in international
law and international relations. It derives from the principle of sovereign
equality of States, which, as Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the
United Nations makes clear, is one of the fundamental principles of the
international legal order. This principle has to be viewed together with the
principle that each State possesses sovereignty over its own territory and
that there flows from that sovereignty the jurisdiction of the State over
events and persons within that territory. Exceptions to the immunity of the
State represent a departure from the principle of sovereign equality.
Immunity may represent a departure from the principle of territorial
sovereignty and the jurisdiction which flows from it.
As to this line of argument, Xiaodong Yang says it is tempting to think that the basis of
state immunity is to be found in the Latin maxim “par in parem non habet imperium”. Yang
admits there is nothing wrong with such a notion, since the Latin maxim seems to be an almost
universally held belief within the circles of international law and beyond, as can be seen from
repeated references in national court decisions and in scholarly writings. 32
The thesis argues, however, that a state has no fundamental right to state immunity. The
fact that this Latin maxim “par in parem non habet imperium” appears to be universally
recognized does not imply a legal right in favour of a state. The rule of state immunity is
intended to act as a limitation on the adjudicatory powers of the forum state. It only makes
30
31
32

African Reinsurance Corp v AIM Consultants Ltd (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt 884) 223 at 242-243, paras G-A.
(2012) ICJ Reps 99 at 123-124, para 57.
Yang, Xiaodong, op cit, note 19 at 51.
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impleading a foreign state an exception to the forum state‟s exclusive territorial jurisdiction. This
rule, therefore, places an obligation on the forum state not to exercise its judicial powers over a
foreign state. This obligation does not necessarily translate into a legal right for the foreign state,
since an obligation without more does not create a right. According to David Lyons:
The pattern of relations between rights and obligations … does not seem
to be universal. When behavior is simply required or prohibited by law or
morals, without presupposing such special relations or transactions
between particular individuals …, we often say that “duties” or
“obligations” are imposed. But since these duties or obligations are not
“owed” to anyone in particular, we cannot determine who, if anyone, has
corresponding rights by noting to whom they are “owed.” Indeed,
although rights sometimes do correlate with such duties or obligations, we
cannot infer that there are such rights merely from the fact there are such
duties and obligations…. From the fact that the law requires that A be
treated in a certain way, it does not follow, without any further
assumptions, that A may be said to have a right to be treated in that way.
That is, rights do not follow from duties or obligations, or from
requirements or prohibitions, alone. Other conditions must be satisfied.33

2.3.3 The Practical Courtesy (“Comity”) Rationale
This rationale views the state immunity rule as evolving from a forum state‟s voluntary
desire to suspend its right to adjudicatory jurisdiction as a practical courtesy in order to facilitate
interstate relations. For supporters of this rationale, state immunity arises not out of a
fundamental right of a state, but rather as an exception to the principle of state jurisdiction and
justified on the desire to promote international comity. 34 The proponents of this rationale,
therefore, maintain that the state immunity rule does not constitute a truly binding legal rule. 35

33
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According to this rationale, state immunity is ascribed to practical necessity or
convenience and, particularly, the desire to promote goodwill and reciprocal courtesies among
nations. 36 The US is at the forefront of arguments in support of this rationale, and this is manifest
in a number of American judicial decisions. Chief Justice Marshall recognized this rationale in
the Schooner Exchange case37 when he stated that “intercourse” between nations and “an
interchange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require foster mutual
benefit”, and that “all sovereigns have consented to relaxation in practice … of that absolute
complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers” 38. In
Verlinden BV v Central Bank of Nigeria 39, the US Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the grant
of state immunity to a foreign state before the US Courts is “a matter of grace and comity on the
part of the United States”. The Court reached a similar decision in Republic of Austria v
Altmann40.
This rationale has, however been severely criticized as not representing the position of
international law. For Martin Dixon, for example, the assertion that the grant of state immunity
by one state to another is based on comity does not mean that the requirement of state immunity
is itself based on comity, as opposed to legal obligation. According to him, it is clear that a
territorial sovereign is under an international duty to grant immunity. Immunity derives from a
rule of binding law and not from some privilege freely granted.41
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2.3.4 The Functional Necessity Rationale
This rationale postulates that the essence of state immunity is not necessarily to shield
state officials from the forum state‟s domestic jurisdiction regarding their misconduct, but rather
to ensure that the functions of the foreign state are effectively carried out without unnecessary
hindrances.42 Thus, the benefit of the immunity does not accrue personally to the officials but to
the state they represent.43 According to Michael Tunks, for example:
Head-of-state immunity allows a nation‟s leader to engage in his official
duties, including travel to foreign countries, without fearing arrest,
detention, or other treatment inconsistent with his role as the head of a
sovereign state. Without the guarantee that they will not be subjected to
trial in foreign courts, heads of state may simply choose to stay at home
rather than assume the risk of engaging in international diplomacy. 44
The same rationale also applies to other high-ranking state officials that are also entitled
to immunity ratione personae. This was why the ICJ, in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case45,
concluded that though state officials have immunity under international law while serving in
office, the immunity is not granted to them for their own benefit, but given to ensure the
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective states. According to the
World Court:
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the
effective performance of their functions on behalf of their respective
States. In order to determine the extent of these immunities, the Court
must therefore consider the nature of the functions exercised by a Minister
for Foreign Affairs. He or she is in charge of his or her Government‟s
diplomatic activities and generally acts as its representative in
42
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international negotiations and intergovernmental meetings…. In the
performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel
internationally and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the
need should arise. 46
A similar argument in support of this rationale is that the grant of state immunity in
international law is justifiable on grounds of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other
states.47 For one proponent of this argument, there is no doubt that court proceedings against
foreign states may generate inter-state tensions and interfere with the conduct of international
relations. 48 Thus, in the words of Ian Brownlie, “the rationale rests equally on the dignity of the
foreign nation, its organs and representatives, and on the functional need to leave them
unencumbered in the pursuit of their mission.” 49
On this note, the thesis concludes its examination of the rationales for state immunity and
proceeds to the question of whether or not state immunity can be waived.

2.4

Historical Origin of State Immunity
State immunity is a rule of customary international law, and has evolved primarily

through the gradual accumulation of state practice in the form of domestic court decisions and
domestic legislation. 50 However, the historical origin of this rule has been traced by academic
scholars and judges to various sources. These sources are discussed below.
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2.4.1 The Personal Equality of Sovereign Heads of State
The rule of state immunity is said to have developed from the personal immunity of
sovereign heads of state. For Rosanne Van Alebeek, for instance, the rule according immunity to
heads of state “reflects remnants of the majestic dignity that once attached to kings and princes
as well as remnants of the idea of the incarnation of the state in its ruler.” 51
In the words of Lord Browne-Wilkinson of the UK House of Lords52,
It is a basic principle of international law that one sovereign state (the
forum state) does not adjudicate on the conduct of a foreign state. The
foreign state is entitled to procedural immunity from the process of the
forum state. This immunity extends to both criminal and civil liability.
State immunity probably grew from the historical immunity of the person
of the monarch. In any event, such personal immunity of a head of state
persists to the present day; a head of state is entitled to the same immunity
as the state itself … This immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power …
is a complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state … and
rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not
they relate to matters done for the benefit of the state …53
On the international plane, all sovereigns were considered equal and independent. It
would, therefore, be inconsistent if one sovereign could exercise authority over another. 54 This
immunity of sovereigns was traditionally expressed in the Latin maxim: “par in parem non habet
imperium” (an equal has no authority over an equal). 55
In medieval times, „ruler‟ and „state‟ were regarded as synonymous, and sovereignty was
regarded as a personalized concept. Furthermore, by the decision in the Schooner Exchange
case56, it was made clear that the sovereign had a representative character, and actions taken on
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behalf of the sovereign and in the name of the sovereign were capable of attracting the same
immunities. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall 57, the “perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns … have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is
understood to waive the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction,
which has been stated to be the attribute of every nation.”
These notions of equality and immunity of sovereign heads of state later accrued to the
states themselves, thus, making the contemporary rule of state immunity a derivative of the
sovereign equality of states. In international law, the basic rule is that all sovereign states (bigger
and smaller, mightier and weaker) are legally equal, and none is supreme over the other.58 One of
the logical consequences of this rule, as Richard Gardiner observes, is that a sovereign state
cannot be impleaded in the courts of another sovereign state without the former state‟s consent. 59
Otherwise, it would be an affront to the interest and integrity of the former state. Similarly, the
British House of Lords has held, per Lord Millet, in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe60 as follows:
State immunity … is a creature of customary international law and derives
from the equality of sovereign states. It is not a self-imposed restriction on
the jurisdiction of its courts which the United Kingdom has chosen to
adopt. It is a limitation imposed from without upon the sovereignty of the
United Kingdom itself. 61
This historical development of the equality and immunity of sovereigns would explain
why the phrase “state immunity” is used interchangeably with “sovereign immunity” in some
quarters today.62
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2.4.2 The English Feudal system
Another view situates the origin of the rule of state immunity in the ancient notion of the
immunity of the English monarch from suits in his own courts. 63 According to Babalola
Abegunde:
Sovereign immunity is an English doctrine of great antiquity originating
from the old feudalistic structure of the English society. One concept
which some people in positions of power have used to escape judicial as
well as criminal sanctions is the concept of sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity was anchored on the belief that the King, being the
great overlord of all and at the apex of the English feudal pyramid, could
not be sued either in his own court or in the court of any of his vassals.
Similarly, the notion that „the King can do no wrong‟ implies that no act
or omission of the sovereign was open to impeachment, investigation or
condemnation on the ground that it was wrongful or tortuous…64

2.4.3 Non-interference in Domestic Affairs
Another view holds that the evolution of the rule of state immunity in international law is
linked to the international law prohibition on one sovereign state interfering in the internal affairs
of another.65 In Buck v Attorney-General66, the English Court of Appeal was called upon to
determine the validity of certain provisions of the Constitution of Sierra Leone. The court
declined jurisdiction. In his judgment, Diplock, LJ stated, inter alia:
The only subject-matter of this appeal is an issue as to the validity of a law
of a foreign independent sovereign state … As a member of the family of
nations, the government of the United Kingdom observes the rules of
comity … the accepted rules of mutual conduct as between state and state
which each state adopts in relation to other states and expects other states
to adopt in relation to itself. One of those rules is that it does not purport to
63
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exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of any other independent
state, or to apply measures of coercion to it or its property, except in
accordance with the rules of public international law. One of the
commonest applications of this rule … is the well known doctrine of
sovereign immunity.

2.4.4 International Consensus
A fourth view on the origin of the state immunity rule maintains that it originated from
the consensus of the civilized nations. According to this view, majority of states agree upon this
rule, and so it becomes part of the law of nations. 67
However, this notion of consensus has been dismissed in some quarters as a mere fiction.
This dismissal is based, inter alia, on the differences in the mode of application of the rule among
states. In the words of Lord Alfred Denning, MR:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on international law. It is one
of the rules of international law that a sovereign state should not be
impleaded in the courts of another sovereign state against its will. Like all
rules of international law, this rule is said to arise out of the consensus of
the civilized nations of the world. All nations agree upon it. So it is part of
the law of nations. To my mind, this notion of a consensus is a fiction. The
nations are not in the least agreed upon the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. The courts of every country differ in their application of it.
Some grant absolute immunity. Others grant limited immunity, with each
defining the limits differently. There is no consensus whatever. Yet this
does not mean that there is no rule of international law on the subject. It
only means that we differ as to what that rule is. Each country delimits for
itself the bounds of sovereign immunity. Each creates for itself the
exceptions from it. It is, I think, for the courts of this country [UK] to
define the rule as best they can, seeking guidance from the decisions of the
courts of other countries, from the jurists who have studied the problem,
from treaties and conventions and, above all, defining the rule in terms
which are consonant with justice rather than adverse to it….68
From this statement, it appears that Lord Denning‟s dismissal of the notion of consensus
is based on the differences in the approaches to this rule that states have developed over the
67
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years. 69 Thus, although the rule is agreed upon, its parameters remain uncertain. 70 However, it
could be argued that Denning‟s perception of the notion of consensus in this case appears
misconceived. All nations need not agree on a particular practice before it attains an international
custom. It is sufficient if a strong majority of states accepts the practice as binding. The test of
“general practice”71 required for the formation of an international custom does not imply
unanimity or universality. 72

2.4.5 The „Sovereign Equality versus Exclusive Territorial Jurisdiction‟ Conflict
Fifth, the rule of state immunity in international law is said to have been borne out of a
tension or conflict between two international law norms, namely, sovereign equality of states, on
the one hand, and each state‟s exclusive territorial jurisdiction, on the other.73 Schooner
Exchange74 itself presents a classic example of this theoretical conflict. In 1812, while sailing off
the American coast, the commercial schooner, Exchange, owned by two citizens of Maryland,
USA, was seized by the French navy. By a general order of the French Emperor, Napoleon
Bonaparte, the French navy converted the Schooner into a ship of war. When bad weather forced
the ship into the port of Philadelphia, USA, the original owners brought an action in a US
District Court against the ship for recovery of their property. The French government resisted the
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action, arguing that as a ship of war, the Exchange was an arm of the Emperor and was entitled
to the same immunity privilege as the Emperor himself. 75
On appeal to the US Supreme Court, Marshall, CJ identified the theoretical dilemma in
issue. On the one hand, he observed that international law dictated that “the jurisdiction of the
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute.” 76 According to this longestablished principle, at the moment the Exchange entered US territorial waters it became subject
exclusively to the national authority of the US government, an authority that encompassed the
US District Court‟s initiation of adverse legal proceedings against the Exchange. On the other
hand, he took notice of another fundamental principle of international law, i.e., that the world is
comprised of distinct nations, each endowed with “equal rights and equal independence.” 77 This
principle of sovereign equality, the Chief Justice believed, discouraged one sovereign from
standing in judgment over another sovereign‟s conduct. The result in this case was that sovereign
equality took pre-eminence over exclusive territorial jurisdiction.
For Sompong Sucharitkul,
… contact between two states may result in a clash between two
fundamental principles of international law, namely, the principle of
territoriality or territorial sovereignty, and, the principle of state or
national sovereignty…. Normally, the principles of territorial jurisdiction
and sovereign equality work individually and often collectively – to
promote order and fairness in the international legal system. The former
serves to delineate each state‟s authority to govern a single geographical
area of the world, while the later guarantees to all states, regardless of size,
power or wealth, equal capacity for rights under international law. 78
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According to this view, this conflict arises any time a forum state seeks legitimately to
exercise its right of jurisdiction under international law over a foreign state defendant, regardless
of the physical location of the foreign state‟s representatives. An example usually cited in this
regard is where a plaintiff sues a foreign state in domestic proceedings for alleged human rights
abuses that occurred outside the forum state.79
Notwithstanding the various opinions as to its origin, state immunity is an established and
functional rule that governs inter-state relations under international law. This leads to a
discussion of the theories of its application.

2.5

Theories of State Immunity
In the history of the application of the state immunity rule, two theories have developed.

These theories are (a) the absolute immunity theory; and (b) the restrictive immunity theory.

2.5.1 The Absolute Immunity Theory
Until the end of the nineteenth century, state immunity was absolute, total and
complete.80 This is called the absolute immunity theory, and it posits that immunity attaches to
all actions of foreign states, irrespective of the nature and circumstances of the actions. 81
Commenting on this theory, Richard Gardiner states that:
The notion of sovereignty in an international context means absolute
authority subject only to the rules of international law. The natural
consequence of this concept would be that a state‟s activities and assets
could in no circumstances be the subject of legal proceedings or any
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enforcement action in another state. This approach attracts the identifier
„absolute immunity‟. 82
The theory of absolute immunity arose from the relatively uncomplicated role of the
sovereign and of government in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 83 As noted above, the
earliest known judicial expression of this theory is the Schooner Exchange case84. At the peak of
this theory in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the UK was one of its leading
proponents. Its position was established in a number of important judicial decisions. In the
leading case of The Parlement Belge85, the English Court of Appeal affirmed that every state
“declines to exercise by means of its courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person of
any sovereign …of any other state, or over the public property of any state which is destined to
public use …though such sovereign, … or property be within its jurisdiction.”86
The hardship occasioned by the absolute immunity rule on individuals and other entities
necessitated a change to a more liberal theory. Consequently, the restrictive theory was founded.

2.5.2 The Restrictive Immunity Theory
In the course of time, states‟ engagement in commercial and allied activities increased.
Furthermore, the process of globalization led to a situation where states no longer confine
themselves to purely sovereign acts, but also engage in activities ordinarily belonging to the
domain of private persons. As a result, states started shifting from the theory of absolute
immunity to that of restrictive (qualified) immunity. This remains the more popular theory today.
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By virtue of this later theory, immunity attaches only to acts of a foreign state which are
of a strictly public or governmental nature (acts jure imperii). For acts of a commercial or other
private nature (acts jure gestionis), state immunity is denied. On this development, David J
Harris87 observes that:
Since the 1920s, socialist states and others have come to engage in trading
activities (acts jure gestionis) as well as exercising the public functions
traditionally associated with states (acts jure imperii). In response, many
states have moved in their practice to a doctrine of restrictive immunity by
which a foreign state is allowed immunity for acts jure imperii only. A …
study shows that the courts of a great majority of states in which the
matter has been considered in recent years … now favour the doctrine of
restrictive immunity.
This theory remains the more popular theory of state immunity today, as can be seen
from the plethora of judicial decisions from various jurisdictions 88, multilateral treaties89, and
national statutes90 that approve it. A major worrisome factor, however, is that the restrictive
immunity regimes of these judicial decisions, treaties and statutes only apply to civil cases and
not to criminal proceedings. Consequently, it could be safely concluded that the absolute-theoryrestrictive-theory shift is only in relation to state immunity in civil proceedings. As regards
criminal prosecution of state officials for international crimes, the rule of state immunity under
87
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customary international law still continues to apply. 91 The continued application of this
customary international law version of this rule without codification leads to inconsistent results
among national courts.92 In circumstances where the courts of one state may grant immunity, the
courts of another may deny it.
Having discussed the two theories of state immunity, the next sub-section will deal with
an examination of the entities to whom the protection of the state immunity rule accrues.

2.6

Entities Entitled to State Immunity Protection
In the application of the state immunity rule (whether absolute or restrictive, and whether

in civil or criminal proceedings), one preliminary but vital issue is the determination of the exact
classes of entities entitled to immunity protection. These entities could be either instrumentalities
of government and integral parts of the foreign state, on the one hand, or government figures
(high-ranking officials of the state), on the other hand.

2.6.1 Instrumentalities and Parts of the State
In international law, for a foreign entity to be entitled to the protection of state immunity
before the domestic courts or other judicial tribunals of a forum state, the entity must be the
government or constitute an integral part of the government of the foreign state. It must be so
closely connected with the government as to be an organ or department of the foreign state, one
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through which the foreign state carries out part of its governmental functions. 93 In this situation,
a department or agency of a foreign state is entitled to state immunity, though it has a separate
legal personality under the domestic law of the foreign state.94
An area of controversy under this aspect of the state immunity rule is entitlement to
immunity of component units of federal states. 95 In contemporary times, the determining factors
appear to be twofold. The first is the degree of independence and autonomy enjoyed by the said
component units within the federal arrangement in question. The second is the ability of these
units to conduct international relations on their own under the relevant constitutional
arrangement of the federal state in question. In Mellenger v New Brunswick Development
Corporation96, one of the questions for determination by the English Court of Appeal was
entitlement to state immunity of the Province of New Brunswick, a component unit of the
Canadian federation. The Court observed, inter alia, that under the Canadian Constitution, “Each
provincial government, within its own sphere, retains its independence and autonomy directly
under the Crown … it follows that the Province of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its
own right and entitled, if it so wishes, to claim sovereign immunity.”97
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In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service98, the issue arose before the English
High Court as to whether Bayelsa State, a component unit of the Nigerian federation, could, on
its own, be entitled to state immunity under international law. On this, the court held thus:
… there is no authority that the federal unit of the state, which is what
Bayelsa State is, can in certain circumstances, partake of the sovereignty
of the state as a whole and obtain state immunity… it does not follow that
every part of a federal state is entitled to immunity from criminal
proceedings, but it is a case-sensitive decision if a particular member of a
federal state can be regarded as a separate state so that its head becomes
entitled to immunity from criminal proceedings.99
In Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Price Waterhouse100, Justice Laddie of
the English High Court held that the head of a member of a federation, in that case the Ruler of
Abu Dhabi, was not entitled to immunity, while the President of the federal state of which Abu
Dhabi formed part, i.e., the United Arab Emirates, was entitled to state immunity.
A vivid explanation for this approach can be found in Oppenheim‟s International Law101,
where the learned authors are of the view that:
Where, as happens frequently, a federal state assumes in every way the
external representation of its member states, so far as international
relations are concerned, the member states make no appearance at all….
Here the member states are sovereign too, but only with regard to internal
affairs. All their external sovereignty being absorbed by the federal state,
they are not international persons at all.
Some relevant municipal statutes and multilateral treaties have also adopted this trend of
according immunity to independent and autonomous federal component units. 102
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2.6.2 Government Figures
In international law, treaty and judicial practice have established that the following highranking state officials may benefit from state immunity before the courts of foreign states:

2.6.2.1 Heads of State and/or Government
The most senior public figures of a state to whom the protection of state immunity is
most readily accorded in international law are serving heads of state and/or government. 103 In
line with this position, the courts of various states have declined jurisdiction in both civil and
criminal cases instituted against heads of state and/or government of other states.104 In Re
Gaddafi105 (which dealt with alleged complicity in acts of terrorism), the French Cour de
Cassation held that a serving head of state (former Libyan leader – Muammar Gaddafi) is
immune from prosecution in national courts, even in relation to serious acts of terrorism. In Re
Castro106, the Spanish Audiencio Nacional reached a similar conclusion. It held that the Spanish
courts had no jurisdiction to try Fidel Castro, the then Cuban President, even for international
crimes, since he enjoyed state immunity, as long as he was serving in his capacity as head of
state. Also, in Tachiona v Mugabe107, a US court held that the US‟ Torture Victim Protection
Act108 did not override the traditional immunity given to heads of state. In Application for Arrest
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Warrant against Robert Mugabe109 (“Re Mugabe”), an English court held that a warrant could
not be issued for the arrest of the Zimbabwean President on charges of international crimes on
the basis that he was a serving head of state at the time the proceedings were brought.
The immunity of heads of state and/or government may become relevant in many
different ways before foreign courts. It may concern current heads of state and/or government
officially visiting another state or leading an official mission or, regardless of their physical
presence in the forum state, it may arise in connection with acts carried out by them in their
home states.110 In Saltany v Regan111, a US District Court granted head of state immunity to the
UK Prime Minister in an action in tort for personal injuries and damage to property brought by
some civilian residents of Libya in the aftermath of the US bombing of Libya. The claimants
alleged that the UK Prime Minister had allowed military bases in the UK to be used by the US
air force for the operation against Libya.
Surprisingly, head of state immunity has also been granted by a US Court to Prince
Charles, Prince of Wales, as the heir to the British throne, even though he is not yet the British
Monarch. 112

2.6.2.2 Foreign Ministers
Like heads of state and/or government, foreign ministers may, under contemporary
international law, enjoy state immunity. This is mainly due to the nature of their functions as the
principal link between their states and other members of the international community of states.
As Rohan Perera put it:
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… heads of states, heads of governments and ministers of foreign affairs
constitute the „basic threesome‟ or the triumvirate of state officials who
enjoy personal immunity. Under international law, it is these three
categories of officials who are accorded special status by virtue of their
office and their functions…113
Speaking specifically on the immunity of foreign ministers, he continued:
The centrality of his role in the conduct of international affairs on behalf
of the sovereign would demand that the minister of foreign affairs be
treated on par with the head of state, with regard to the scope and extent of
the jurisdictional immunities he would enjoy. The basic rationale which
underlined the according of jurisdictional immunities to a head of state
would apply with equal force to a foreign minister, given the
representative character and functional role of the latter.114
The ICJ has expressly endorsed the immunity of the foreign minister in its judgment in
the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case115. In this case, a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against Mr.
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the then serving Foreign Affairs Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). The DRC initiated proceedings against Belgium in the ICJ, arguing,
inter alia, that Belgium‟s non-recognition of the immunity of the DRC‟s serving Foreign Affairs
Minister was a violation of international law. In its judgment, the Court upheld the Minister‟s
immunity. It found that Belgium had failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and the inviolability which the DRC‟s foreign minister enjoyed under international law.
It appears that, apart from the nature of their office, the special position of foreign
ministers in this regard also has a treaty foundation. Under article 7(2) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties116, the foreign minister is considered to represent his or her state and to
have authority to perform all acts relating to a treaty without the need for full powers. In
confirming this special position, the ICJ stated that “A Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible
113
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for the conduct of his or her State‟s relations with all other States, occupies a position such that,
like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under international
law as representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He or she does not have to
present letters of credence.”117 The consequence of such status was, on the facts before the Court,
to confer personal inviolability and immunity from criminal jurisdiction, the Court stating that no
distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a serving foreign minister in an „official‟
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a „private‟ capacity.

2.6.2.3 Other Persons of High Rank
For this class of persons, it appears that their entitlement to state immunity in
international law is still controversial. 118 These persons may include the defence minister or head
of the armed forces, trade minister, and other senior cabinet members of the government of a
sovereign state.119 For example, in Belhas v Ya‟alon120, a US Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal
of criminal charges for, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity leveled on General
Moshe Ya‟alon, the retired Head of Intelligence of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The charges
stemmed from General Ya‟alon‟s alleged involvement in the IDF‟s April 1996 shelling of a UN
peacekeepers‟ compound in Qana, South Lebanon, in which several hundred Lebanese civilians
suffered injury or death. The complainants contended that Ya‟alon‟s failure to prevent the
shelling violated principles of international law and, inter alia, constituted war crimes, extrajudicial killing and crimes against humanity, in that General Ya‟alon bore command
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responsibility. However, a US District Court dismissed these charges on grounds of state
immunity for General Ya‟lon. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal.
In considering the immunity of these other persons of high rank, it must be noted that
important international treaties 121 acknowledge the existence of a category of “other persons of
high rank” without elucidating the category. The ICJ judgment in the ICJ Arrest Warrant
Case122, while confirming the existence of such category, does not proceed beyond this. It seems
clear, however, that the ICJ had in mind holders of offices of similar ranks and political
significance to those of the traditional triad of heads of state, heads of government, and foreign
ministers. In practice, such immunity is likely, therefore, to be confined to senior officials at
„cabinet level‟ (including, presumably, vice-president or deputy prime minister) who frequently
represent their states internationally and arrest or detention of whom could reasonably be
construed as a serious interference with the government of the foreign state concerned. 123 This is
consistent with the view of the International Law Commission‟s (ILC‟s) Special Rapporteur,
who has stated that such immunity is confined to “a narrow circle of high-ranking state
officials”.124
Some other judicial pronouncements on this position do not also offer a clear solution. In
Application for Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz (“Re Mofaz”)125, for instance,
District Judge Pratt of the English Magistrate Court stated thus:
The function of various Ministers will vary enormously depending upon
their sphere of responsibility. I will think it very unlikely that ministerial
121
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appointments such as Home Secretary, Employment Minister,
Environment Minister, Culture, Media and Sports Minister would
automatically acquire a label of state immunity. However, I do believe that
the Defence Minister may be a different matter.126
The distinction drawn by the judge in this case between the Defence Minister and other
ministers is difficult to accept. In contemporary international affairs where many ministers
represent their states internationally on official matters affecting their respective portfolios, it is
difficult to imagine why these ministers should not qualify for state immunity like their Defence
counterpart. Rohan Perera127 thinks that the right approach should be criteria-based rather than
enumerative. For him,
It would … be more productive and useful to embark on a process of
identification and defining of applicable criteria, in according
jurisdictional immunities to high ranking officials, paying due regard to
the functional and representative character principles. This process by
identifying specific indispensable part of the functions of the officials
should be paramount.128
In line with this reasoning, it may be argued that in view of the enormous state powers
that that many other cabinet members of a modern government exercises in their different fields,
they may, in some circumstances, benefit from state immunity like the traditional triumvirate of
heads of state, heads of government, and foreign ministers. For example, the exercise of the
powers of the defence minister, particularly in the conduct of armed conflicts, stationing of
troops on foreign soil, or other activities relating to military alliances, may necessitate taking
holders of such offices as “other high-ranking state officials” for state immunity purposes. In this
connection, it needs also to be recognized that the defence and foreign policies of the modern
state are inextricably linked, and their line of demarcation could be tenuous. Another example
relates to the powers of the interior minister in the co-ordination of the state‟s police.
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This argument appears vindicated by a relatively recent event in France. Here, the Paris
Prosecutors‟ Office dismissed a suit accusing Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, a former US Defence
Secretary, of torture.129 The reason for the dismissal, according to the Prosecutors‟ Office, was
that Mr. Rumsfeld benefited from a “customary” immunity from prosecution granted to heads of
state and government and foreign ministers. 130 In Re Mofaz131 and Re Ehud Barak132,
respectively, the English Magistrate Court granted immunity to defence ministers. This court has
also accorded the same immunity to a minister of commerce and international trade. 133 However,
in Bat v Investigating Judge of the German Federal Court & Ors134, the English High Court held
that the secretary of the executive office of the National Security Council of Mongolia fell
clearly outside the circle of high officials entitled to such immunity, describing him as an
administrator far removed from the narrow circle of those who hold the high-ranking office to be
equated with the state they personify and from those identified by the ICJ.135
The ICJ‟s decision in the Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Rwanda) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility of the
Claim)136, though not based on state immunity, could be said to have impliedly approved the
grounds suggested above for the extension of immunity to “other persons of high rank”. In that
129
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case the ICJ, while recognizing the powers of the triumvirate of heads of state, heads of
government, and foreign ministers to represent the state and make statements that bind the state,
also took note of similar powers of finance ministers. The World Court further stated thus:
… with increasing frequency in modern international relations other
persons representing a State in specific fields may be authorized by that
State to bind it by their statements in respect of matters falling within their
purview. This may be true, for example, of holders of technical ministerial
portfolios exercising powers in their field of competence in the area of
foreign relations, and even of certain officials. 137

2.6.2.4 Members of Foreign Armed Forces
Tim Hillier asserts that this category of persons usually enjoys limited immunity from
local jurisdiction while in the territory of a foreign state. 138 Such immunity only applies where
the forces are present with the consent of the host state, and the nature and extent of the
immunity generally depends on the circumstances under which the forces were admitted,
although simple admission itself can produce legal consequences. The receiving state impliedly
agrees not to exercise jurisdiction in such a way as to impair the integrity and efficiency of the
forces. 139
Under a status of forces agreement, the commander of visiting forces ofr the courts of the
sending state have primacy of jurisdiction over offences committed within the area where the
forces are stationed or while members of the forces are on duty. Usually, the status and immunity
of foreign troops is the subject of specific agreement. Thus, under the Agreement Regarding the
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Status of Forces of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty140, the sending state has the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over NATO troops stationed in other states. 141

2.6.2.5 Heads of Component Units of Federal States
Another area of controversy is whether the head of a component unit of a federal state is
entitled to state immunity under international law. As earlier observed, a component unit of a
federation is entitled to state immunity if it enjoys independence and autonomy within the federal
arrangement in question and can, on its own, enter into international relations with foreign
states.142
It, therefore, logically follows that the head of a component unit of a federal state (e.g., a
state governor in the US and Nigeria, a provincial premier in Canada or a Canton head in
Switzerland) is not entitled to state immunity in international law, unless his or her component
unit is independent and autonomous within the federation and can, on its own, conduct
international relations with foreign states. As noted earlier, Laddie, J. of the English High Court,
apparently gave effect to this position (in a civil claim) in Bank of Credit and Commerce
International v Price Waterhouse. 143 He held that the head of a component member of a
federation (the Ruler of Abu Dhabi) was not entitled to state immunity, while the head of the
federation of which Abu Dhabi formed part (the United Arab Emirates) was so entitled.
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In Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution Service144, the English High Court extended
this proposition to criminal matters (money laundering) when it denied immunity from criminal
prosecution in the UK to the then governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria, Mr. Diepreye Solomon
Peter Alamieyeseigha. Part of the court‟s conclusion was that Bayelsa State does not qualify as a
state in international law and does not have the competence to conduct international relations or
external affairs under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria145. Consequently, the
governor of Bayelsa State does not qualify as a head of state [or a high-ranking state official] and
is, therefore, not entitled to state immunity in international law.
Part of the difference here may be that in some jurisdictions, such as Canada, the sub-unit
gets its immunity not as a “state” but as a component part of the state.
In view of the above analysis regarding the classes of state officials entitled to the
protection of state immunity, the next sub-heading of this thesis examines the types of immunity
available in international law to these classes of officials.

2.7

Types of Immunity of State Officials
In international law, the state immunity available to high-ranking state officials is divided

into two types according to the categories of the officials. These types of immunity are:
immunity ratione persona (personal immunity or status-based immunity), and immunity ratione
materiae (functional immunity or function-based immunity). 146 This is a particularly important
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point here, as the effect of this classification is more felt in international criminal proceedings
against these state officials.

2.7.1 Immunity Ratione Personae (Personal Immunity)
This type of immunity attaches to a restricted class of high-ranking state offices.
According to the ICJ, these offices are those of the triad of heads of state, heads of government,
and foreign ministers, and possibly, a limited category of other very high-ranking state
representatives.147 The ICJ, however, failed to define the state officials that belong to this limited
category of other very high-ranking state representatives. This lapse, it is argued, will certainly
lead to confusion and inconsistent practice among national courts of states. In criminal cases,
while an incumbent occupies any of these offices, he is personally immune and inviolable and,
therefore, cannot be detained, arrested, or prosecuted by the authorities of a state other than his
home state.148
The effect of immunity ratione personae before national courts is uncontroversial. It
absolutely bars from criminal prosecution – including procedural steps such as arrest - an
incumbent of a protected office (provided he has not left office) in respect of both his official and
personal acts, whether done before or during the incumbency of his office. 149 In the ICJ Arrest
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Warrant Case150, for example, the Court held that the absolute nature of the immunity ratione
personae enjoyed by a serving foreign minister subsists even upon allegations of his commission
of international crimes and applies even when the foreign minister is abroad on a private visit. As
well, the ICJ admitted that it “has been unable to deduce . . . that there exists under customary
international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.” 151 For the court:
… the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout
the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and
that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of
authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the
performance of his or her duties. In this respect, no distinction can be
drawn between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an
"official" capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a "private
capacity", or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person
concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts
committed during the period of office. Thus, if a Minister for Foreign
Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge, he or she is
clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her
office. The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those
official functions are equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister
for Foreign Affairs was, at the time of arrest, present in the territory of the
arresting State on an "official" visit or a "private" visit, regardless of
whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed before the person
became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while in
office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts
performed in an "official" capacity or a "private" capacity. Furthermore,
even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State a
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal
proceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when
required to do so for the purposes of the performance of his or her official
functions. 152
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Although broad in its substantive application, this type of immunity is limited both
temporally and as to the category of office-holders to whom it may apply. Once the individual
has left office, he or she ceases to be entitled to such immunity. 153
In summarizing the general nature of this type of immunity, Dapo Akande and Sangeeta
Shah state as follows:
It is clear that senior officials who are accorded immunity ratione
personae will be hindered in the exercise of their international functions if
they are arrested and detained whilst in a foreign state. For this reason, this
type of immunity, where applicable, is commonly regarded as prohibiting
absolutely the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by states. The absolute
nature of the immunity ratione personae means that it prohibits the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction not only in cases involving the acts of
these individuals in their official capacity but also in cases involving
private acts. Also, the rationale for the immunity means that it applies
whether or not the act in question was done at a time when the official was
in office or before entry to office. What is important is not the nature of
the alleged activity or when it was carried out, but rather whether the legal
process invoked by the foreign state seeks to subject the official to a
constraining act of authority at the time when the official was entitled to
the immunity. Thus, attempts to arrest or prosecute these officials would
be a violation of the immunity …. However, since this type of immunity is
conferred … in order to permit free exercise by the official of his or her
international functions, the immunity exists for only as long as the person
is in office.154

2.7.2 Immunity Ratione Materiae (Functional Immunity)
Immunity ratione materiae or functional immunity, unlike immunity ratione personae,
applies to a much broader class of persons but to a much more restricted category of acts. As a
matter of customary international law, it may accrue to all state officials, irrespective of their
hierarchy in the state. Thus, this type of immunity can apply to bar foreign criminal prosecution
153
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of the official acts of other cabinet ministers, as well as officials of other agencies and
instrumentalities of a state. While personal immunity attaches to particular offices, functional
immunity immunizes certain official acts. 155 Functional immunity covers the official acts of all
state officials (including heads of state) and is determined by reference to the nature of the acts in
question rather than the particular office of the official who performed them. 156
Functional immunity is derived from the traditional rules of international law, in which
official actions are attributable to the state rather than the individuals that perform them. 157 This
conduct-based immunity may be relied on by former officials in respect of official acts
performed while in office, as well as by serving state officials. It may also be relied on by
persons or bodies that are not state officials or entities but have acted on behalf of the state.158
In Prosecutor v Blaskic159, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) shed some light on the application of this type of immunity in
the international criminal justice system. In the words of the Chamber:
[State] officials are mere instruments of a State and their official action
can only be attributed to the State. They cannot be the subject of sanctions
or penalties for conduct that is not private but undertaken on behalf of the
State. In other words, State officials cannot suffer the consequences of
wrongful acts which are not attributable to them personally but to the State
on whose behalf they act: they enjoy so-called „functional immunity‟. This
is a well established rule of customary international law going back to the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, restated many times since.
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One condition precedent, however, to the applicability of this type of immunity is that the
individual who performed the act sought to be immunized must at all relevant times be acting in
an official capacity on behalf of the state. Thus, any act not performed on behalf of the state or
not constituting an official act does not qualify for state immunity protection. In the words of
Robert Currie and Joseph Rikhof, “In order for immunity ratione materiae to apply, the
individual must be acting in an official capacity. In other words, the acts protected are acts
performed on behalf of the state. This requirement of official capacity operates to exclude from
protection those acts which were not performed on behalf of the state.”160

2.8

Nature of State Immunity in International Law
Over the years, there has been controversy as to the true nature of the state immunity rule

in international law, i.e., whether state immunity constitutes a procedural bar or a substantive
defence. Some scholars argue that it constitutes both a procedural bar and a substantive
defence. 161 Others maintain that the rule only operates as a procedural bar to actions (civil and
criminal) against a foreign state and its high-ranking officials. 162
Those that contend that state immunity constitutes both a procedural bar and a
substantive defence maintain that as a procedural plea, there is a closer identification of the
official‟s immunity with that enjoyed by the state itself. However, they warn that this close
identification may cause any exception to the state‟s immunity, such as that for commercial
transactions, to apply equally to the official and to render the act performed by the official non160
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immune.163 These scholars further argue that to treat state immunity as a substantive defence
automatically implies the imputability of the official‟s act to the state, and this might mistakenly
merge two separate and distinct issues.164
According to Akande and Shah, two related policies underlie the conferment of immunity
ratione materiae in international law. First, this type of immunity constitutes (or, perhaps more
appropriately, gives effect to) a substantive defence, in that it indicates that the individual official
is not to be held legally responsible for acts which are, in effect, those of the state. Such acts are
imputable only to the state and immunity ratione materiae is a mechanism for diverting
responsibility to the state.165
Secondly, Akande and Shah maintain that the immunity of state officials in foreign courts
prevents the circumvention of the immunity of the state through proceedings brought against
those who act on behalf of the state. In this sense, they argue that the immunity operates as a
jurisdictional or procedural bar and prevents courts from indirectly exercising control over the
acts of the foreign state through proceedings against the official who carried out the act. 166
On the other side of the divide, Currie and Rikhof, for example, argue that state
immunity, whether functional or personal, is procedural in nature. For them, immunity does not
relieve an individual from substantive legal responsibility, but simply prevents a court from
adjudicating. 167
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It appears that relevant judicial decisions have endorsed the position that state immunity
(both in civil and criminal proceedings) operates as a procedural bar and not a substantive
defence. In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case, for example, the ICJ states as follows:
… immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they may enjoy impunity in respect of
any crimes that they may have committed, irrespective of the gravity.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility
are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in
nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law.
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar criminal prosecution for a certain
period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it
applies from all criminal responsibility. 168
In similar and much clearer language, the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) held
in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom169 that “[t]he grant of [state] immunity is to be seen not as
qualifying a substantive right but as a procedural bar on the national court‟s power to determine
the right.”
Again, in Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia170, the UK House
of Lords maintained this position by holding, inter alia, that:
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national
court. It does not go to substantive law171; it does not contradict a
prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach
of it to a different method of settlement. Arguably then, there is no
substantive content in the procedural plea of State immunity upon which a
jus cogens mandate can bite.
It seems that the better view is that the state immunity rule operates as a procedural bar,
and not as a substantive defence. This is because state immunity is raised to preclude a court
seized of a case from entertaining the substance of the case, while a substantive defence is
considered after the court‟s treatment of the substance of a case. Again, immunity is raised to
168
169
170
171

Supra, note 45 at para 60.
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 752 at para 48.
[2006] UKHL 26 at para 24, per concurring judgment of Lord Hoffman.
Emphasis supplied.

61

deny the court jurisdiction, while a substantive defence is pleaded to exonerate a party that has
either admitted the commission of some alleged wrongdoing or been found guilty of same by the
court. Thus, immunity operates to shield from trial or prosecution, while a substantive defence
seeks to vindicate from guilt or mitigate sanctions. A strong support for this position can be
found in a recent ICJ judgment. In the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case172, the World Court
addressed the issue as follows: “… the law of immunity is essentially procedural in nature …. It
regulates the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of particular conduct and is thus entirely distinct
from the substantive law which determines whether that conduct is lawful or unlawful ….”
Having discussed the nature of the state immunity rule under the present sub-heading, it
becomes necessary to examine the possible grounds upon which the application of this rule could
be justified. Thus, the next sub-heading deals with various rationales for state immunity in
international law.

2.9

Waiver of State Immunity
A state to which the benefit of immunity accrues can, nevertheless, waive the said

immunity or that of its high-ranking official. This waiver may be either express or implied. 173
An express waiver may occur upon submission to the jurisdiction of a foreign court either
by a prior written agreement or after a particular dispute has arisen. It could be by a clear and
express language in a contract agreement.174 For an implied or deemed waiver, a state is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign court where the state has instituted proceedings
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or has intervened, or has taken steps in proceedings before such a court.175 A submission to
proceedings is also deemed a submission to any counter-claim arising out of the same legal
relationship or facts as the main claim. 176 Furthermore, a state which has agreed in writing to
submit a dispute to arbitration under the laws of a foreign state is not immune from proceedings
in the courts of the foreign state in respect of the arbitration. 177
In criminal proceedings, since the immunity enjoyed by a foreign state official before the
municipal courts of the forum state belongs to the official‟s state and not to the official
individually178, the official‟s state may decide to waive this immunity. If the immunity is so
waived, the official cannot claim it on his own but is liable to face the proceedings before the
forum state.179 However, waiver of immunity in criminal proceedings is a very rare occurrence.
It appears that if a state ratifies a treaty that provides for exercise of jurisdiction over an
international crime by national courts, the municipal courts of other states parties may exercise
jurisdiction over high-ranking officials of the ratifying state in disregard of the state immunity
rule. How express this waiver via treaty must be, however, has been a matter of contention. 180 In
the Pinochet case181, a majority of the House of Lord viewed Chile‟s ratification of the Torture
Convention182 as negating any claims to immunity ratione personae by Chilean officials. Lord
Saville held that:
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It is also said that any waiver by states of immunities must be express, or
at least unequivocal. I would not dissent from this as a general proposition,
but it seems to me that the express and unequivocal terms of the Torture
Convention fulfill any such requirement. To my mind these terms
demonstrate that the states who have become parties have clearly and
unambiguously agreed that official torture should now be dealt with in a
way which would otherwise amount to an interference in their
sovereignty183
Specifically, it may be stated that if the home state of the official fails to notify the forum
state of the official‟s immunity, this may constitute a waiver of such official‟s immunity before
the municipal courts of the forum state. This position appears to follow from the ICJ‟s position in
the Case Concerning Certain Questions of Mutual Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters
(Djibouti v France) 184. In this case, the ICJ suggested that, in the case of functional immunity, it
is for the official‟s home state to notify the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction and that the
latter is not obliged to raise or consider the matter of its own accord.

2.10

Conclusion
By way of necessary background, the foregoing discussion has attempted an overview of

the significance, history, nature, and rationales for the state immunity rule. It has also examined
the entities entitled to its protection, as well as the types of state immunity available to state
officials. Consequently, this thesis will proceed in the next chapter to an exposition of various
problems arising from the application of this rule in the international criminal justice system.
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CHAPTER 3
APPLICATION OF THE STATE IMMUNITY RULE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: PROBLEMS ARISING
3.1

Introduction
Chapter 2 of this thesis has, inter alia, examined the rationales advanced for the state

immunity rule. Despite the commendable nature of these rationales, the rule‟s application in the
international criminal justice system gives rise to a number of problems which substantially
undermine its value. These problems, which range from impunity for flagrant violation of
peremptory norms of international law to perpetuation of injustice, are examined below.

3.2

Impunity for Flagrant Violation of Peremptory Norms of International Law
In contemporary international law, certain norms are so fundamental that they have

attained the status of “peremptory norms” or “jus cogens”. These norms cannot, therefore, be
derogated from by any entity – sovereign states, state officials, or private persons. The Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties1 defines a “peremptory norm” as follows:
… a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.2
Among these peremptory norms3 are the international prohibitions on the commission of
some heinous international crimes. These crimes are prohibited both under customary
1

1969, 1155 UNTS 339, art 53.
See also Costello, Daniel G, “Political Constructivism and Reasoning about Peremptory Norms of International
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YJIL 331 at 331-332; Orakhelashvili, Alexander, Peremptory Norms in International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009); De Wet, Erika, “Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes”, in Shelton, Dinah (ed), The
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 541 at 541-548.
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international law and international treaties. 4 A jus cogens rule is widely accepted as having a
superior status to other international law rules that have not attained a jus cogens quality. In the
event of a conflict, it takes supremacy over these other rules as described here. First, when a rule
of jus cogens is shown to be in conflict with a rule of ordinary international law relative to some
specific case or state of affairs, the former shall prevail. Second, when a rule of jus cogens is
shown to be in conflict with a treaty or a single treaty provision, the treaty or the single provision
– if severable from the remainder of the treaty – shall be considered void. Third and more
significantly, when a rule of jus cogens is shown to be in conflict with a rule of ordinary
customary international law, the customary rule shall be considered void. 5

Press, 2005) at 202-203; Bianchi, Andrea, “Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens” (2008) 19:3 EJIL 491 at
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Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 13 at 26 and 29. Caplan, Lee M, “State Immunity, Human Rights,
and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory” (2003) 17:4 AJIL 741; McGregor, Lorna, “State
Immunity and Jus Cogens” (2006) 55 ICLQ 437.
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Law of the Sea, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, art 105; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
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Of special note is the fact that the rule of state immunity in international law has not
attained jus cogens status. In fact, it is universally accepted that the state immunity rule is
inferior to jus cogens rules in the hierarchy of international law norms. 6 According to the
normative hierarchy theory, international law norms are of different hierarchies, depending on
how fundamental their nature may be. Thus, when a higher international legal norm (jus cogens)
conflicts with a lower norm, the higher norm prevails. 7 On this ground, it would logically follow
that where there is a conflict between the state immunity rule and the jus cogens constituted by
the prohibition on any of the foregoing international crimes, the state immunity rule should give
way. It could, therefore, be argued in this regard that, at least, the courts of various states should
apply the theory that a violation of jus cogens norm constitutes an implicit waiver of state
immunity. 8
However, the reality today is that under international law, foreign state immunity with
respect to acts committed in the exercise of official powers seems to remain the rule, even when
these acts are committed in violation of a norm which has the character of jus cogens.9 In the ICJ
Jurisdictional Immunities Case10, for example, Italy argued, inter alia, that the massacres carried
out by German armed forces in Greece amounted to breaches of international humanitarian law
6
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and, therefore, violations of jus cogens. For Italy, these violations displaced the applicability of
any rule of immunity for Germany before Italian and other foreign courts. However, the ICJ
rejected this argument, holding that even if the acts of the German armed forces involved
violations of jus cogens rules, the applicability of the customary international law on state
immunity was not affected.11
The implication of this practice in the international criminal justice system is the creation

of a culture of impunity in high-ranking state officials as regards the violation of these
peremptory norms. 12 Even the UN official definition of the word “impunity” shows that state
immunity is the principal cause of impunity among perpetrators of international crimes. For
example, the preamble to the UN Economic and Social Council‟s Set of Principles for the
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity13 defines
“impunity” thus:
“Impunity” means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the
perpetrators of violations to account - whether in criminal, civil,
administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to
any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if
found guilty, sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to making
reparations to their victims.14
According to principle 1 of these Principles,
Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure that
they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the inalienable
right to know the truth about violations; and to take other necessary steps
to prevent a recurrence of violations.
11
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The various forms of violations of jus cogens norms arising from the application of the
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system are discussed below.

3.2.1 Systematic Commission of International Crimes
In international law, certain acts are outlawed as crimes against the international
community as a whole. These, as referred to above, include genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, torture, and the crime of aggression. 15 Consequently, universal international treaties
have been concluded that expressly prohibit and punish these crimes. States have, over the years,
universally accepted prohibitions on the commission of these crimes without objection. By virtue
of this universal state practice and opinio juris16, these crimes are outlawed under customary
international law binding on all states and individuals. Also, because of their non-derogable
nature, the prohibition on these crimes has attained the status of jus cogens. 17
Perpetrators of these crimes are regarded under customary international law as “hostes
humani generis” (enemies of all humankind), whom all states have an obligation erga omnes
(owed to the whole world community) to bring to justice.18 Consequently, the principle of
universal jurisdiction was developed in international criminal law. By virtue of this principle, all
states have jurisdiction to prosecute these international crimes. This jurisdiction is exercised
15
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irrespective of whether the crimes are committed in the prosecuting state‟s territory, and
regardless of the accused person‟s nationality, state of residence, or any other relationship with
the prosecuting state.19 Under this principle, the prosecuting state justifies its claim to
jurisdiction on the grounds that these crimes are committed against all and against the very
foundation of the international community and are, therefore, too serious to tolerate. 20 This
universal jurisdiction under customary international law is complemented by multilateral treaties
for some crimes, e.g., genocide 21, war crimes22, and torture23.
Despite the international prohibition and the conferment of universal jurisdiction on the
courts of all states to try and punish the perpetrators, state immunity still continues to bar trials of
high-ranking state officials for these crimes before foreign national courts. For example, in the
Application for Arrest Warrant against Robert Mugabe24 (“Re Mugabe”), a UK High Court held
that a warrant could not be issued in the UK for the arrest of Mr. Robert Mugabe (the
Zimbabwean President) on charges of international crimes. This decision, according to the court,
was based on the grounds that he was a serving head of state at the time the proceedings were
brought. A similar decision was reached by a UK Magistrate‟s Court in the Application for
Arrest Warrant against General Shaul Mofaz25 (“Re Mofaz”). Here, the court rejected, on
grounds of state immunity, an application for a warrant for the arrest of General Mofaz (then
19
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Israeli defence minister) in relation to allegations of torture and war crimes. In Re Gaddafi26, the
former Libyan head of state (Muammar Gaddafi) was charged in France with multiple murder
for his complicity in a terrorist action (in circumstances that also amounted to crimes against
humanity). The French Cour de‟ Cassation, however, declined jurisdiction and dismissed the
case on the basis of the state immunity rule. 27
Also, in Re Sharon & Yaron28, a number of survivors of the 1982 massacre in Sabra and
Shatila Palestinian refugee camps (Lebanon) lodged a criminal complaint with a Belgian court.
The complaint was against Ariel Sharon (Israeli defence minister at the time of the massacre and
Prime Minister at the time of the complaint) and Amos Yaron (commander of an Israeli army
unit at the gates of the refugee camps). The complaint accused the two Israeli officials of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, the Belgian Cour de Cassation
dismissed the complaint against Sharon on grounds of immunity. 29
As well, in the Re Castro30, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional dismissed, on grounds of
state immunity, international criminal proceedings against Fidel Castro (former Cuban President)
in Spain. Also, in Re Kagame31, the same Spanish Audiencia Nacional dismissed, on grounds of
state immunity, criminal charges leveled against Paul Kagame (the incumbent Rwandan Prime
Minister) for genocide and other species of international crimes.
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The decision of the ICJ in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case32 essentially encourages this
culture of impunity. Here, the ICJ held that serving heads of state, heads of government and
foreign ministers enjoy a broad personal immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic
courts, including immunity from prosecution for international crimes. The court made it clear
that such immunity subsists even where it is alleged that an international crime has been
committed.33 It should be noted that many of the national courts that dismissed the foregoing
cases against heads of state and heads of government 34 on grounds of state immunity actually did
so in the footsteps of this ICJ decision, i.e., on the grounds that immunity ratione personae
absolutely bars foreign criminal proceedings. 35 The ICJ may be right in this case, in view of its
limited ability, i.e., the fact that it does not create customary international law, but finds it in state
practice. 36
However, one of the major problems arising from the application of the state immunity
rule in such circumstances is that state officials perpetrating or intent on perpetrating these
crimes are emboldened to do so. Some of them are shielded from criminal prosecutions in their
states‟ domestic courts by the executive immunity provisions of their states‟ municipal
constitutions and amnesty laws.37 Even in states where there are no such municipal constitutional
immunity and/or amnesty laws, the fact that these officials are in control of the government
apparatuses of their states makes it extremely difficult for charges of international crimes to be
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pressed against them domestically. 38 A further exemption of these officials from international
criminal proceedings before foreign courts by the state immunity rule, therefore, produces no
deterrence and defeats the ends of the international criminal justice system. To this extent, I
agree with Antonio Cassese when he states that:
It is state officials . . . that commit international crimes . . . . They order,
plan, instigate, organize, aid and abet, or culpably tolerate or acquiesce, or
willingly or negligently fail to prevent or punish international crimes . . . .
To allow these state agents go scot-free only because they acted in an
official capacity . . . would mean to bow to traditional concerns of the
international community (chiefly, respect for state sovereignty). In the
present international community respect for human rights and the demand
that justice be done whenever human rights have been seriously and
massively put in jeopardy, override the traditional principle of respect for
state sovereignty. The new thrust towards the protection of human dignity
has shattered the shield that traditionally protected state agents.39
Consequent upon the above judicial practice, these crimes continue to be committed
without any fear of punishment, at least from foreign courts‟ exercise of jurisdiction. In the
words of Osita Nnamani Ogbu, “the doctrine of sovereign immunity gave rise to sovereign
impunity as it shields sovereigns from being answerable for their crimes in international law.”40
No doubt, the rule is one of the norms that sustains mutual respect and cordial relations among
states and thus maintains relative peace and balance of power in the international society.
However, the high level of impunity it induces in state officials regarding commission of these
crimes undermines its positive roles.
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How this immunity-induced impunity, and the sense of security that goes with it,
manifests regarding a number of international crimes is set out below. The specific crimes
discussed seriatim are torture, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

3.2.1.1 Torture
As noted earlier, torture is an international crime prohibited by the Torture Convention 41.
Articles 5 to 7 of the Convention provide for some limited form of universal jurisdiction by
conferring on the contracting states jurisdiction to prosecute or extradite to another state an
alleged torturer found within their respective territories. These provisions supplement the
established position that torture has become a crime under customary international law and is,
therefore, susceptible to universal jurisdiction by the domestic courts of all states. In R v Bow
Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 42 (“Pinochet
case”) for example, counsel for the appellants maintained that systematic torture is to be
considered a violation of jus cogens. For the counsel43:
In showing an international intention to prohibit an express practice, such
as torture, it is not necessary that each country prohibits it in the same
way, nor is it necessary that each state‟s law prohibits torture wherever it
occurs. The various laws of states considered in the light of the fact that
every recent human rights treaty has prohibited torture provide evidence
that customary international law prohibited torture before the Torture
Convention and that, under customary international law, torture was an
international crime if committed by a public official. There was no head of
state exception and states other than the state where the offence took place
were entitled to exercise jurisdiction.44 The Torture Convention codified
existing customary law norms prohibiting torture, but added a duty to
41
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exercise the jurisdiction which existed under customary international law.
No signatory to that Convention can object to the exercise of the
jurisdiction by another state as being an interference with the signatory‟s
internal affairs. Accordingly, either the Torture Convention establishes
that the applicant can have no immunity from prosecution for acts of
torture or alternatively the prohibition against torture has the status of jus
cogens and he can be prosecuted under customary international law….45
If it is necessary to show that torture was a crime under international law
in 1973 when the acts occurred that requirement is satisfied because it was
a crime under customary international law at that time….
In the American case of Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina46, the US Federal
Court held that alleged acts of official torture committed in 1976 before the conclusion of the
Torture Convention violated international law because the prohibition of official torture had
attained the status of jus cogens.
Notwithstanding this elevated status of the international legal norm against torture, some
domestic and international judicial bodies and other relevant authorities still uphold the
supremacy of state immunity over this peremptory norm prohibiting torture. In Re Rumsfeld47,
the General Prosecutor of Paris, for example, dismissed a criminal complaint filed in France
against Donald Rumsfeld (a former US Defence Secretary). The complaint accused Rumsfeld of
torture and authorizing interrogation techniques that led to serious human rights abuses. The
grounds for the complaint were allegations by Iraqi prisoners at the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq, and
by prisoners at the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, of physical abuse and sexual
humiliation by US soldiers under Rumsfeld‟s command. This complaint was filed during
Rumsfeld‟s visit to France. Despite the severity of these allegations, the Paris Prosecutors‟
Office dismissed the action, ruling that Rumsfeld benefitted from a “customary” immunity from
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prosecution granted to heads of state and government and foreign ministers, even after they had
left office. An appeal to the General Prosecutor of Paris was dismissed on the same grounds,
despite the fact that Rumsfeld was no longer in office as Defence Secretary. 48 It could be argued
that these rulings appear misleading. They fail to clearly state the type of immunity to which
Rumsfeld was entitled in the circumstance. If the French authorities meant immunity ratione
personae, he was no more a sitting state official and should, therefore, not have been entitled to
it. If they meant immunity ratione materiae, the position had already emerged that torture does
not qualify as an official act for which a state official will be entitled to immunity after leaving
office.49
Even in the Pinochet case50, the UK House of Lords, while unprecedentedly disregarding
the immunity of a former head of state for serious international crimes, nevertheless held that a
head of state is still protected while in office by immunity even in respect of serious international
crimes. According to the Law Lords, a serving head of state can still claim immunity ratione
personae if charged for torture. For the House of Lords, the nature of the charge is irrelevant: the
official‟s immunity is personal and absolute.51 No doubt, this is a correct statement of the
customary international law position. However, the problems that could emanate from it and
similar decisions in other cases are subsequently discussed.
In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case52, Belgium had passed a law conferring on its courts
universal jurisdiction over international crimes committed by anyone anywhere (even if the
perpetrator was not present in Belgium) and denying all immunities for such crimes. Pursuant to
48
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this law, on April 11, 2000, a Belgian judge issued an international arrest warrant against Mr.
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, who was at the time serving as the foreign affairs minister of the
DRC. The warrant was, inter alia, on charges of torture, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Consequently, the DRC initiated judicial proceedings against Belgium in the ICJ. The DRC
argued that Belgium‟s non-recognition of the immunity of a serving foreign affairs minister was
a violation of international law.
By 13 votes to 3, the ICJ ruled that Belgium had violated a legal obligation toward the
DRC. The court vehemently rejected Belgium‟s contention that, having regard to developments
in contemporary international law, a serving foreign minister is not entitled to claim immunity
before national courts on charges of international crimes. For the ICJ, immunity before national
courts was not affected by the existence of treaties such as the Torture Convention. The court
finally held that Belgium had failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability which the incumbent DRC foreign minister enjoyed under international law. 53 In its
words54:
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to
deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international
law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs,
where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity….55 It should further be noted that the rules governing
the jurisdiction of national courts must be carefully distinguished from
those governing jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply
absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not imply
53
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jurisdiction. Thus, although various international conventions on the
prevention and punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States
obligations of prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend
their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects
immunities under customary international law, including those of
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of
a foreign state, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under
these conventions.56
With a view to justifying this legal position, the ICJ gave reasons why the absolute
immunity and inviolability of a foreign minister for international crimes before national courts
should not be seen as leading to impunity:
The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction
enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that
they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed,
irrespective of their gravity.57 Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a
question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate
the person to whom it applies from al1 criminal responsibility.
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to
criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.
First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law
in their own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in
accordance with the relevant rules of domestic law.
Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction
if the State which they represent or have represented decides to waive that
immunity.
Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign
Affairs, he or she will no longer enjoy al1 of the immunities accorded by
international law in other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under
international law, a court of one State may try a former Minister for
Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts committed prior or
subsequent to his or her period of office, as wel1 as in respect of acts
committed during that period of office in a private capacity.
Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be
56
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subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal
courts, where they have jurisdiction….58
However interesting the ICJ‟s reasons may seem on their face, these reasons, in reality,
appear unsound and unconvincing and have the potential to lead to the impunity the court is
trying to avoid. Regarding the first and second reasons, it is obvious that in some states, these
state officials are in absolute control of government apparatuses. Besides, international crimes
are often committed by state officials as part of state policy, and so governments do not routinely
prosecute their own officials engaged in the implementation of such policies. 59 Consequently, the
idea of their prosecution for these international crimes in their home courts is far-fetched, as no
one would incriminate or punish himself. Besides, it should be noted that in many states, there
exist domestic constitutional immunities, amnesties and allied laws barring criminal prosecution
of sitting high-ranking state officials. 60 Similarly, the option of waiver of immunity in such a
circumstance would amount to the officials deliberately handing themselves over to foreign
states for international criminal prosecution. This, again, amounts to expecting the impossible.
In respect of the ICJ‟s third reason (where officials cease holding office), it is obvious
that in many states, some high-ranking officials to whom immunity ratione personae attaches
could legitimately or illegitimately hold office for life. 61 This is especially the case with many
heads of state. For example, Queen Elizabeth II has been the UK head of state since 1952 and
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will most likely remain so for life. 62 Robert Mugabe‟s presidency in Zimbabwe since 1980 has
no end in sight, just like Yoweri Museveni‟s in Uganda since 1986, Paul Biya‟s in Cameroon
since 1982, Jose Eduardo Dos Santos‟ in Angola since 1979, and Teodoro Obiang Nguema‟s in
Equatorial Guinea since 1979. 63 Another example is Kim Jong-Un who, in 2011, succeeded his
father Kim Jong-Il and his grandfather Kim Il-Sung (both of whom died in office). As head of
state of the Democratic Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-Un is meant to remain in this position for
life. 64 Bashar al-Assad, in 2000, also succeeded his father, Hafez al-Assad, as the President of
Syria and has no plan to quit, despite national and international pressure to do so. 65 There are
also many other examples, past and present.66 According to Joanne Foakes, “It is notable that
not all republics have heads of State who are elected. Some have Presidents who hold office „for
life‟ and, in some cases, even where some form of constitutional election or appointment is
ostensibly applied, it is clear that there is a degree of de facto inheritance or dynastic continuity
in the succession of one head of state to another.” 67
Finally, on the ICJ‟s fourth reason (prosecution before international criminal courts),
contemporary realities show that due to the interplay of political, economic, logistic, and
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jurisdictional factors, international criminal courts may, in many cases, not be effective in trying
high-ranking state officials, especially those of powerful states. 68
The reasons given by the ICJ in the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case in relation to the crime of
torture generate the following questions: (1) Can the ICJ find this approach in custom or
convention? (2) If immunity ratione personae should continue to shield state officials from
prosecution for this crime, who, then, should be held responsible for the crime, when it is clear
that the Torture Convention‟s definition of “torture” envisages its commission by state officials?
(3) What effect and respect would the peremptory norm against the commission of this
international crime then command and how would it achieve its objective(s)? (4) How would the
protection of the dignity of human beings, which is one of the principal aims of the United
Nations, be accomplished? (5) Finally, what would serve as a deterrent to other high-ranking
state officials intending to commit this crime in the future, when previous culprits were not
subjected to any form of accountability? How safe are men and women all over the world in the
hands of repressive state regimes and high-ranking officials?
It is, therefore, clear that if immunity ratione personae of high-ranking state officials
from prosecutions for torture remains absolute even against international instruments that confer
universal jurisdiction on torture and disregard immunity, the implication is that impunity over
this crime would endlessly thrive. On this count, Judge Al-Khasawneh‟s dissenting opinion in
the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case69 is relevant. For this Judge70:
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A more fundamental question is whether high State officials are entitled
to benefit from immunity even when they are accused of having committed
exceptionally grave crimes recognized as such by the international
community. In other words, should immunity become de facto impunity for
criminal conduct as long as it was in pursuance of State policy? 71 The
Judgment sought to circumvent this morally embarrassing issue by
recourse to an existing but artificially drawn distinction between immunity
as a substantive defence on the one hand and immunity as a procedural
defence on the other…. The effective combating of grave crimes has
arguably assumed a jus cogens character reflecting recognition by the
international community of the vital community interests and values it
seeks to protect and enhance. Therefore when this hierarchically higher
norm comes into conflict with the rules on immunity, it should prevail.72
Even if we are to speak in terms of reconciliation of the two sets of rules,
this would suggest to me a much more restrictive interpretation of the
immunities of high-ranking officials than the Judgment portrays.
Incidentally, such a restrictive approach would be much more in
consonance with the now firmly established move towards a restrictive
concept of State immunity, a move that has removed the bar regarding the
submission of States to jurisdiction of other States often expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium. It is difficult to see why States
would accept that their conduct with regard to important areas of their
development be open to foreign judicial proceedings but not the criminal
conduct of their officials.73
Although this dissenting opinion may not accord with the law, it, arguably, accords much
more with the ends of justice, the individual accountability mission of the international criminal
justice system, and the fight against impunity in the system. The dissenting judgments of some
of the UK House of Lords members in the earlier Pinochet case74 also support this position.
According to Lord Millet, for instance:
The definition of torture … is in my opinion entirely inconsistent with the
existence of a plea of immunity ratione materiae. The offence can be
committed only by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. The official or governmental nature of the act, which forms the
basis of the immunity, is an essential ingredient of the offence. No rational
system of criminal justice can allow an immunity which is coextensive
71
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with the offence…. The international community had created an offence
for which immunity ratione materiae could not possibly be available.
International law cannot be supposed to have established a crime having
the character of a jus cogens and at the same time to have provided an
immunity which is coextensive with the obligation it seeks to impose.
Obviously, Lord Millet‟s statement relates to immunity ratione materiae. However, it is
arguable that the same position should be adopted regarding immunity ratione personae,
especially in the light of the extreme impunity that this type of immunity creates in high-ranking
state officials entitled to it. No doubt, this will be difficult to do, in view of states‟ tenacious
desire to preserve the dignity of their incumbent high-ranking officials and to ensure continuity
of their national governance.
However, stronger reasons exist against this position maintained by states. First,
international crimes shock the conscience of all humanity and affect the very foundation of the
international community as a whole. Thus, the dignity of a single culpable state official should
not take supremacy over the welfare of all humanity and the peace and safety of the whole
international community. Second, it may be possible in some states for high-ranking state
officials to step down from their offices when charged with national crimes. Thus, there is no
justification for such officials not to do so, at least temporarily, when charged with international
crimes that shock all humanity and threaten the safety of the whole international community.

3.2.1.2 Genocide
From inception, the crime of genocide has always been recognized as of heinous
magnitude in international law.75 Francis Deng describes it as “one of the most heinous of
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international crimes against which all humanity must unite to prevent is reoccurrence and punish
those responsible.”76
Right from the end of the Second World War and the advent of the UN, relevant
international legal instruments have expressly prohibited genocide and made it a serious crime
with individual responsibility. These treaties include the Genocide Convention77 and, recently,
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court78 (the “Rome Statute”). Besides, before the
adoption of these treaties, the UN General Assembly, in 1946, had already affirmed that
genocide is a crime bearing individual responsibility under customary international law.79
Nowadays, it is universally accepted that the prohibition on genocide has not only
become a rule of customary international law, but has also attained the status of jus cogens. In
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment80, the ICJ clearly affirmed this
position. In its words:
The Court will begin by reaffirming that the principles underlying the
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation and
that a consequence of that conception is the universal character both of the
condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required „in order to
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liberate mankind from such an odious scourge‟. 81
In its advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case82, the ICJ
emphasized that the crime of genocide “shocks the conscience of mankind, results in great losses
to humanity … and is contrary to moral law and the spirit and aims of the United Nations.” In the
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro))83, the ICJ further
emphasized that the rights and obligations contained in the Genocide Convention are rights and
obligations erga omnes. Accordingly, the crime is susceptible to universal jurisdiction. Thus, it is
argued that the state immunity rule should not be a bar to prosecution in foreign courts of
culpable high-ranking state officials. 84
Irrespective of the gravity of this crime in international law and the strength of the
peremptory norm against its commission, there have been many instances of perpetration of the
crime by high-ranking state officials since the later part of the twentieth century. 85 These include
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the genocide in Yugoslavia86 and those that occurred in Rwanda and Burundi87. Other examples
are the genocides in Darfur, Sudan88, and in Tibet in northern China89.
To worsen this situation, criminal proceedings against culpable high-ranking state
officials before the judicial tribunals of other states are stifled by the state immunity rule. For
example, on January 11, 2006, it was reported that the Spanish High Court would investigate
whether seven former Chinese state officials, including the former President, Jiang Zemin, and
former Premier, Li Peng, participated in genocide in Tibet. This proposed investigation followed
the Spanish Constitutional Court‟s ruling that Spanish courts have universal jurisdiction to try
genocide cases. The proceedings in this investigation were opened by the Spanish Judge on June
6, 2006. On the same day, China denounced the Spanish court‟s investigation into the claims of
genocide in Tibet as an interference in China‟s internal affairs. Eventually, the case was
dismissed on grounds of state immunity. 90 In Re Sharon & Yaron91, charges of genocide leveled
against Ariel Sharon (then Israeli Prime Minister) before the Belgian court was dismissed on
grounds of state immunity. In the Re Kagame92, the Spanish Audiencia Nacional also dismissed,
on grounds of state immunity, criminal charges commenced against Paul Kagame (the incumbent
Rwandan Prime Minister) for genocide and allied international crimes.
It is not out of place to state that in the event of total absence of immunity ratione
personae for some sitting state officials, some overzealous domestic courts would misuse and
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abuse this jurisdiction to try and “rule the world”. 93 However, it is obvious that the absolute and
indiscriminate bar it constitutes would, most likely, continue to set free high-ranking state
officials charged for this crime, even when there is clear and irresistible evidence of their
culpability. Inferences of this likelihood could be drawn from the ratios of relevant judicial
decisions regarding the general effect of state immunity on international criminal proceedings
before foreign national courts. In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case94, for example, Belgium argued,
inter alia, that while foreign ministers in office enjoy immunity from foreign criminal
jurisdiction, such immunity applies to acts carried out in their official capacity and cannot protect
them in respect of private acts (including international crimes).95 Belgium also argued that the
DRC foreign minister was not acting in an official capacity at the time he committed the alleged
international crimes. However, the ICJ held thus:
… the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout
the duration of his or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. That immunity and
that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of
authority of another state …. In this respect, no distinction can be drawn
between acts performed by a Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official"
capacity, and those claimed to have been performed in a "private”
capacity, or, for that matter, between acts performed before the person
concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts
committed during the period of office…. The Court has … been unable to
deduce … that there exists under customary international law any form of
exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability to incumbent Ministers of Foreign Affairs …. 96
It is arguable that, although this may be the current legal position, this judicial trend
could encourage high-ranking state officials to continue committing genocide with endless
93

See, e.g., Lemaitre, Roemer, “Belgium Rules the World*: Universal Jurisdiction over Human Rights Atrocities”,
online: <https://www.law.kuleuven.be/jura/art/37n2/lemaitre.htm>; Jouet, Mugambi, “Spain‟s Expanded Universal
Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights Abuses in Latin America, China and Beyond” (2007) 35 GA. J. INT‟L &
COMP. L. 495.
94
Supra, note 9.
95
Ibid at 20, paras 49-50.
96
Ibid at 22, paras 54-58. Emphasis supplied.

87

impunity. These officials know that it is almost impossible to prosecute them in the national
courts of their home states for this crime. Consequently, according them indiscriminate immunity
before foreign courts vested with universal jurisdiction amounts to giving them a sense of
perpetual freedom from accountability for this crime. Obviously, this does not only perpetuate
danger to prospective victims of this crime; it also undermines the ends of justice which
international legal regulation must uphold. This is so, although there is some possibility of abuse
of this jurisdiction by some national courts.97

3.2.1.3 War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
From early times, war crimes have been viewed as very serious, and have, as such, been
strictly prohibited in international law, including under various treaties. 98 These treaties include
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg (the “Nuremberg Charter”)99, the
four Geneva “Red Cross” Conventions100 and their Additional Protocols101, and the Rome
Statute102.
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Crimes against humanity have been prohibited by the Nuremberg Charter103 and the
Rome Statute104. These crimes are defined under these treaties. 105 The treaties also provide for
individual criminal responsibility and removal of immunity in the prosecution of those guilty of
this crime, irrespective of their official status.106
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter107, which deals with the prohibition of „war crimes‟,
„crimes against peace‟ and „crimes against humanity‟, has been confirmed by the UN General
Assembly as representing customary international law. 108 One of the effects of this confirmation
is that the courts of all states posses unlimited universal jurisdiction to try perpetrators of these
crimes, despite their nationalities, official statuses and the places of violation. Thus, state
immunity should not avail them in such trials, even if their home states are/were not parties to
the prohibiting treaties. This is because by article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties109, “Nothing … precludes a rule set out in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third

103

Supra, note 99, art 6(c); See also Theodorakis, Nikos & David P Farrington, “Emerging Challenges for
Criminology: Drawing the Margins of Crimes Against Humanity” (3013) 6:2 IJCST 1150; Ntoubandi, Faustin Z,
Amnesty for Crimes Against Humanity under International Law (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007) at 50.
104
Supra, note 78, art 7; See also Badar, Mohamed Elewa, “From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute:
Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity”, online: <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1196/4/Fro
m%2Bthe%2BNuremberg%2BCharter%2Bto%2Bthe%2BRome%2BStatute%2BDefining%2Bthe%2BElements%2
Bof%2BCrimes%2BAgainst%2BHumanity.pdf.txt>.
105
The treaties define these crimes to include any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; and, (c) enslavement.
Others are: (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e) persecution on internationally impermissible
grounds; (f) sexual violence; (g) torture; (h) enforced disappearance; (i) apartheid, etc. See Nuremberg Charter,
supra, art 6(c); Rome Statute, supra, note 83, art 7. See also Jalloh, Charles Chernor, “What Makes a Crime Against
Humanity a Crime Against Humanity” (2013) 28:2 Am U Int‟l L Rev 381; Kress, Claus, “On the Outer Limits of
Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the
March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision” (2010) 23 Leiden JIL 855; Luban, David, “A Theory of Crimes Against
Humanity” (2004) 29 Yale J Int‟l L 85; Shaack, BV, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the
Incoherence” (1999) 37 CJTL 787.
106
See, e.g., the Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 99, principle 3 and art 7; the Rome Statute, supra, note 78, art 27.
107
Supra, note 99.
108
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, GA
Resn 95(1), (1946) of 11 December 1946, UN GAOR 5th Sess Supp 12.
109
Supra, note 1.

89

state as a rule of customary international law recognized as such.” Writing on „crimes against
humanity‟, Neil Boister and Richard Churchill 110 comment that:
Customary international law provides that crimes against humanity give
rise to the application of universal jurisdiction, avoiding the many
problems associated with limited jurisdiction over treaty crimes and the
application of treaties to the nationals of non-states parties …
Furthermore, a crime against humanity is uncontroversially international
and sovereign immunity does not apply.111
Despite this established position of international law on the two crimes, high-ranking
state officials are still granted immunity from prosecution for them before the courts of other
member states of the international community. In Belhas v Ya‟alon112, the US Court of Appeal
affirmed dismissal of criminal charges for, inter alia, war crimes and crimes against humanity
leveled against General Moshe Ya‟alon, the retired Head of Intelligence of the Israeli Defence
Forces (IDF). The charges stemmed from Ya‟alon‟s alleged involvement in the IDF‟s April 1996
shelling of a UN peacekeepers‟ compound in Qana in South Lebanon. Several hundred Lebanese
civilians were seeking shelter in the compound. The shelling killed over a hundred civilians and
injured many others, including four Fijian peacekeepers. The complainants alleged that Israeli
helicopters observed civilians in the UN compound; that their reports put General Ya‟alon on
actual notice of the civilians‟ presence; and that he failed to act to prevent the shelling. They
contended that this failure violated principles of international law and, inter alia, constituted war
crimes, extra-judicial killing and crimes against humanity, in that General Ya‟alon bore
command responsibility for the shelling. However, the District Court dismissed these charges on
110
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grounds of state immunity of General Ya‟lon. In upholding this dismissal, the Court of Appeal
held thus:
… It is not necessary for this court to reach the issue of whether the acts
alleged by the appellants constitute violations of jus cogens norms because
the FISA [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] contains no enumerated
exceptions for violations of jus cogens norms. In Princz v. Federal
Republic of Germany, we rejected this precise argument… This Court held
that “it is doubtful that any state has ever violated jus cogens norms on a
scale rivaling that of the Third Reich”, even violations of that magnitude
do not create an exception to the FISA where Congress has created none…
Although Appellants put a new twist on the argument that jus cogens
violations can never be authorized by a foreign state and so can never
cloak foreign officials in immunity – the same prohibition on creating new
exceptions to the FISA holds….113
In the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case114, the ICJ further held that the criminal immunity from
prosecution in foreign courts enjoyed by a foreign affairs minister under international law could
not be set aside by a national court by charging him with war crimes or crimes against
humanity. 115
In the light of this line of judicial decisions, one may argue that men and women in many
states of the world are not safe and secure in the hands of high-ranking state officials, no thanks
to state immunity. Again, the essence of the entrenchment of peremptory norms in the
international legal order and the prohibition of their violation may be undermined. The safety of
the international community itself is also not guaranteed, and the eradication of impunity for the
commission of these crimes by high-ranking state officials is far from near. In the end, it can
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only be said that the grant of state immunity in charges involving these crimes aggravates the
impunity with which governments and high-ranking state officials violate the peremptory norms
prohibiting their commission.

3.2.2 Violation of Other States‟ Territorial Integrity and Political Independence
Another peremptory norm that governs international relations is that of the sovereign
equality of all states (big and small, mighty and weak). This is enshrined in the UN Charter116.
Under article 2(4) of the Charter, one of the principal manifestations of this norm is that: “All
members [states] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”117
According to Malcolm Shaw, “The rules governing resort to force form a central element
within international law and, together with other principles such as territorial sovereignty and the
independence and equality of states, provide the framework for international order.”118
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is now regarded as a peremptory norm of customary
international law and, as such, is binding upon all states. 119 Consequently, the UN General
Assembly has adopted many resolutions against states resorting to use of force against one
another and, condemning any breach of this peremptory norm by any state. The Assembly‟s
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1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty120 provides, inter alia, that:
No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference
or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its
political, economic and cultural elements are condemned.
Furthermore, the Assembly, in its 1970 Declaration on the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations121, re-affirmed the “duty of states to refrain from military,
political, economic or any other form of coercion aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any state.” In similar terms, the UN General Assembly‟s Definition of
Aggression122, annexed to the General Assembly‟s Resolution on the “Definition of
Aggression”123, confirms acts of aggression as a violation of the UN Charter. The Definition of
Aggression characterizes acts of aggression “the sending by or on behalf of a state of armed
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
state.” Judicially, the ICJ has long upheld the existence of this peremptory norm in its judgment
in the Corfu Channels case (Albania v UK)124 and in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case125, respectively.
A violation of this norm amounts to committing the crime of aggression, which the
Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recently defined
120
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along the lines of the UN General Assembly‟s Definition of Aggression126. Notwithstanding this
peremptory norm, high-ranking state officials still plead state immunity to bar real or impending
charges for this crime or for other crimes arising from their acts of aggression. For example, in
February 2005, the then Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Al-Hariri, was allegedly assassinated by
foreign elements from Syria, an act that arguably amounts to aggression. The UN Independent
Investigation set up to investigate this incident found evidence of the Syrian President‟s
involvement in the assassination. 127 However, the Syrian President, Bashar Al-Assad, denied the
allegation. He suggested in an interview that he would not allow UN investigators to interrogate
him on the assassination, since he was shielded by state immunity in respect of any judicial
process arising from the said assassination. 128
In the light of the jus cogens nature of this crime, states should be favourably disposed to
exercising universal jurisdiction over international crimes arising from circumstances of
aggression, most especially now that there has been an actual definition of aggression under the
Rome Statute.129 This would go a long way to bring under check the impunity with which highranking state officials commit this internationally destructive crime. 130 As pointed out by
Patrycja Grzebyk:
Theoretically, there is … the option of bringing perpetrators of the crime
of aggression to trial in a court of a third state. It could be assumed that the
126
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crime of aggression belongs to a group of crimes that are generally
condemned under international law, and the states are allowed to invoke
the principle of universal jurisdiction towards the perpetrators of the
crime. This type of jurisdiction is contingent on the nature of the crime:
for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the place where the crime was
committed, the citizenship of the victim and the connection to the state
that exercises jurisdiction are irrelevant.131
One concern, however, that could arise from the unlimited exercise of this universal
jurisdiction over this crime is that the third state could be the victim state. In this case, the
situation may become very problematic. This is because the crime of aggression is essentially a
crime against a state. Thus, allowing the court of the victim state to try the perpetrators may raise
the question of the state trying to be a judge over its own cause – nemo judex in causa sua.
According to Grzebyk 132, the proponents of the universal jurisdiction approach usually
cite the ICJ‟s judgment in the Barcelona Traction case133, which states as follows:
In particular, an essential distinction should be drawn between the
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection.
By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
However, recent national court decisions on this subject do not really offer any ideas on
how to confront the impunity with which high-ranking state officials violate this peremptory
norm. Some national courts are still in favour of granting immunity to state officials in
circumstances which raise involvement in this crime. In McElhinney v Williams134, for example,
the Supreme Court of Ireland held that international law required that a foreign state be accorded
immunity in respect of acts jure imperii carried out by members of its armed forces, even when
in the territory of the forum state without the forum state‟s permission. In Margellos & Ors v
131
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Federal Republic of Germany135, the Greek Special Supreme Court (Anotato Eidiko Dikastirio)
stated:
… it appears that a foreign state continues to enjoy sovereign immunity in
respect of proceedings relating to a tort committed in the forum state in
which its armed forces participated, without distinction as to whether the
action at issue violated jus cogens or whether the armed forces were
participating in an armed conflict. Article 31 of the Basle Convention
[immunity in respect of acts of armed forces] is formulated in absolute
terms without any exceptions. This rule is justified by the necessity to
respect the sovereignty of foreign states. One of the main expressions of
that sovereignty is found in actions of their armed forces and such respect
is the foundation of the equality of states and the international legal order,
which the principal rules of international law are intended to serve. 136
Decisions of international judicial tribunals have also followed this approach. In
McElhinney v Ireland137, for example, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights later held that the Irish Supreme Court‟s decision in McElhinney v Williams138 reflected a
widely held view of international law. 139
Although these decisions are not directly concerned with the specific crime of aggression
and violation of other states‟ territorial sovereignty as discussed under the present sub-heading,
the decisions suggest that a state is entitled to immunity regarding these nefarious acts. As
argued earlier, this judicial position potentially increases the impunity and false sense of security
on the part of governments and high-ranking state officials who are intent on violating this norm.
Since culpable officials are protected by the state immunity rule, future violators may not be
deterred. Also, it is arguable that continued affirmation of state immunity in such circumstances
seriously undermines, if not absolutely defeats, the whole essence of the principles of
sovereignty/sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of
135
136
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states, upon which the international community and the international legal order are founded. 140
This practice adversely affects international peace and security, since officials of a stronger state
can, at any time, baselessly invade or destroy a weaker one and go free of legal responsibility. 141
As explained earlier, the US has been invading and carrying on wars on Iraq, Afghanistan
and other states.142 In Re Rumsfeld143, criminal charges against Donald Rumsfeld (a former US
Defence Secretary) in the French courts for international crimes committed in the course of these
invasions were dismissed by the Paris Prosecutors‟ Office on grounds of state immunity. Other
incidents of aggression, such as the Israeli military invasion and massive destruction of Lebanon
in 2006144, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia 145, and Syria‟s recent bombing of some parts of
neighbouring Turkey146 in the course of the ongoing Syrian civil war, also need special attention.
Unlike other types of international crimes 147, there is no specific international legal
instrument expressly authorizing national courts to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime
of aggression. 148 One implication of this is that much of the norm prohibiting aggression has
been left to the law of state responsibility. Individual culpability, e.g., for aggressive war as at
140
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Nuremberg, is very rare. This situation would have contributed to the seeming reluctance on the
part of these courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over this crime. It must have also
substantially given rise to these courts‟ ever-readiness to grant immunity to perpetrators of the
crime. However, it could be argued that the jus cogens nature of this crime, its extreme gravity,
and the fact that it has been condemned without exception by many instruments for many
decades since World War II, should have been enough to persuade all states to enact laws
conferring universal jurisdiction on their national courts to prosecute alleged offenders.
It is encouraging that five states (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and
Estonia) have already enacted such laws. 149 Eighteen other states have statutes giving their courts
universal jurisdiction generically over “offences against international law” under international
treaties and under customary international law. 150 Since aggression is universally accepted as a
serious crime under international law, the courts of these eighteen states should exercise
universal jurisdiction over it. Hopefully more states would follow these leaders to assert such
jurisdiction over aggression as an international crime. However, there is no doubt that the highlevel politics over this crime and many (especially the powerful) states‟ inclination to state
responsibility rather than individual accountability for it may continue to promote immunity for
state officials over the crime. Again, the likelihood of want of fair trial when the courts of the
victim state are to try the culpable state officials may pose another challenge.
The next sub-section considers systematic violation of human rights as another problem
emanating from the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice
system.
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3.3

Systematic Violation of Human Rights
In contemporary international law, human rights, especially those relating to physical

integrity, e.g., right to life, freedom from torture, genocide, and forced disappearance, are
universally protected. Though the exact degree of protection afforded other human rights may be
the subject of controversy151, there is widespread agreement that rights to physical integrity merit
special protection. Such rights are non-derogable, even in times of war or national emergency. 152
The norms protecting these rights are widely considered peremptory norms and their violations
are considered serious wrongs to humanity and to the international community. 153
State-initiated and condoned killings, torture and disappearances, for example, violate
specific human rights defined and protected under universally or widely accepted international
instruments. Such instruments include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the
“UDHR”)154, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights155, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 156, the American
Convention on Human Rights157 and, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights158.

151

E.g., the controversy over the extent of protection of economic, social and cultural rights, or “third generation”
rights, such as the right to development. See, e.g., Baruchello, Giorgio & Rachael Lorna Johnstone, “Rights and
Value: Construing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Civil Commons” (2011)
5:1 SSJ 91 at 93; Langford, Malcolm et al (eds), Global Justice, state Duties: The Extraterritorial Scope of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
152
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, UNTS I-14668, art 4(1); European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221, art 15;
American Convention on Human Rights,1969, 1144 UNTS 123, art 27; Wet, Erika De, “Jus Cogens and Obligations
Erga Omnes”, in Shelton, Dinah (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013) 541 at 545; Richards, L David, “An Umbrella With Holes: Respect for Non-Derogable
Human Rights During Declared States of Emergency, 1996-2004” (2012) 13 Hum Rights Rev 443.
153
Zenovic, Predrag, “Human Rights Enforcement Via Peremptory Norms – A Challenge to State Sovereignty”,
(2012, RGSL Research Papers No 6, at 9-21, online: <http://www.rgsl.edu.lv/uploads/files/RP_6_Zenovic_final.pd
f>.
154
1948, UNGA Res 217(III) of 10 December 1948, arts 3,5 and 9.
155
1966, 999 UNTS 171, arts 6, 7 and 9.
156
1950, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221, arts 1, 3 and 5.
157
1969, 1144 UNTS 123, arts 4, 5 and 7.
158
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; (1982) 21 ILM 58.

99

Furthermore, specific treaties dealing with torture159 and disappearances160, as well as judicial
decisions declaring torture161 and disappearances162 as violations of customary international law,
all point to clear prohibitions of state killing, torture, or forcibly causing the disappearance of
citizens and foreign nationals. The rights not to be subjected to torture, summary execution or
disappearance emanate from customary international law and, therefore, give rise to obligations
owed by each state to the international community as a whole. 163
Another significant problem of the application of the state immunity rule in the
international criminal justice system is that the impunity it induces in high-ranking state officials
also leads them to massive violations of these human rights. This is basically because
international criminal law and international human rights law are intertwined. Thus, the
commission of each of the core international crimes (genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, torture, and the crime of aggression) almost always implicates violations of the human
rights of individuals and groups. Consequently, where high-ranking state officials commit these
crimes, internationally protected human rights are invariably abused. This situation is made
worse by the fact that the same state immunity rule that bars foreign criminal proceedings against
state officials that perpetrate these crimes also shields them from civil actions in foreign courts
for violation of these rights.164 Examples of this abound.
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In Al-Adsani v Government of Kuwait165, the appellant (a British and Kuwaiti dual
national) brought an action in the UK High Court against Kuwait (respondent) for the
enforcement of his right to freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. The facts of this case were that in 1991, Al-Adsani travelled from the UK to Kuwait to
help repel Saddam Hussein‟s invasion of Kuwait during the Gulf War. There in Kuwait, he was
accused of releasing into general circulation sexual video tapes of Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah AlSaud Al-Sabah, a close relative of the Emir of Kuwait. After the war, the Sheikh, with the aid of
Kuwaiti government troops, exacted his revenge by breaking into Al-Adsani‟s house, beating
him up and transporting him to the Kuwaiti state prison, where his beatings continued for days.
Al-Adsani was subsequently taken at gunpoint in a government car to the palace of the Sheikh,
where his ordeal intensified. According to Al-Adsani, his head was repeatedly submerged in a
swimming pool filled with corpses, and his body was badly burned when he was forced into a
small room where the Sheikh set fire to gasoline-soaked mattresses.
Upon his return to the UK, Al-Adsani brought this suit, seeking damages for the physical
and psychological injuries that had resulted from his alleged ordeal in Kuwait. The High Court
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, holding that Kuwait was entitled to foreign state
immunity. His appeal to the UK Court of Appeal was dismissed on same grounds of state
immunity. 166 The Court of Appeal held that the UK‟s State Immunity Act167, which provides
immunity for states and their officials, do not include torture as an exception. For the Court,
there is no room for implied exceptions to the general rule, even where the violation of a jus
cogens norm (such as the prohibition of torture) is involved. The Court rejected the appellant‟s

165
166
167

(1995) 103 ILR 420.
Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait (1996) 107 ILR 536.
(1978) 17 ILM 1123.

101

argument that the term „immunity‟ means immunity from sovereign acts that were in accordance
with international law and excludes torture for which immunity could not be claimed. 168
After the UK House of Lords refused Al-Adsani leave to appeal against the judgment of
the Court of Appeal, he filed an application with the ECHR169, arguing principally that the UK
had failed to protect his right not to be tortured under the European Convention on Human
Rights170. Again, he lost on grounds of state immunity. In its judgment, the ECHR, though
recognizing that the prohibition of torture possesses a „special character‟ in international law,
still rejected Al-Adsani‟s view that violation of such a fundamental norm compels denial of state
immunity in civil suits. 171 In the words of the court:
While noting the growing recognition of the overriding importance of
the prohibition of torture, it is not established that there is yet
acceptance in international law of the proposition that states are not
entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages for alleged
torture committed outside the forum state.172
The (ECHR) further stated that it could not see from the relevant instruments “any firm
basis for concluding that as a matter of international law, a state no longer enjoys immunity from
civil suits in the courts of another state where acts of torture are alleged.”173
In Saudi Arabia v Nelson174, the respondent sued Saudi Arabia in a US court, alleging
that he was wrongfully arrested, imprisoned and tortured by the Saudi police on the orders of the
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Saudi government. His action was barred on account of the Saudi government‟s immunity. On
appeal, the US Supreme Court, while upholding the Saudi government‟s immunity, held that
although the alleged wrongful arrest, imprisonment and torture by the Saudi government would
amount to abuse of its police powers, “a foreign state‟s exercise of the power of its police has
long been understood … as peculiarly sovereign”. 175
Similarly, the Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, Canada, was of the view, in Bouzari v
Islamic Republic of Iran176, that “…regardless of the state‟s ultimate purpose, exercises of the
police, law enforcement and other security powers are inherently exercises of government
authority and sovereign”. The Court concluded that a customary norm existed to the effect that
there was an ongoing rule providing state immunity for acts of torture committed outside the
forum state. It, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff‟s argument that the Convention against Torture,
1984, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, impose an obligation
on states to create civil remedies with regard to acts of torture committed abroad, or that such an
obligation existed as a rule of jus cogens. 177 There was a similar decision by the UK House of
Lords in Holland v Lampen-Wolfe178, when the Court declined jurisdiction on grounds of state
immunity. 179
In Princz v Federal Republic of Germany180, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
dismissed, on grounds of state immunity, a case of flagrant violations of human rights against the
Federal Republic of Germany. The Court held thus:
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We think that something more clearly express is wanted before we
impute to the Congress an intention that the federal courts assume
jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases that might well be
brought by the victims of all the ruthless military juntas, presidentsfor-life, and murderous dictators of the world, from Idi Amin to Mao
Zedong. Such an expansive reading of section 1605(a)(1) [of the US
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976] would likely place an
enormous strain not only upon our courts but, more to the immediate
point, upon our country‟s diplomatic relations with any number of
foreign nations.
The ICJ‟s decision in the ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities Case 181 re-confirmed this entire
line of cases.
It could be argued that the indiscriminate application of the state immunity rule in the
international criminal justice system that impliedly results in impunity for the violation of these
rights consequently leads to an indirect breach of one of the aims of the United Nations. This
aim, as contained in the UN Charter182 to which most (if not all) sovereign states are parties, says
that the peoples of the United Nations are determined:
… to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women …
and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards
of life in larger freedom…183
The UN Charter also provides that one of the purposes of the United Nations is: “To
achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”184
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Consequently, as long as high-ranking state officials continue to enjoy immunity for
international crimes, these officials will continue to violate internationally protected rights of
individuals and groups. This having been stated the next problem stemming from the application
of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system is examined below. This is
the problem of deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟ municipal laws.

3.4

Deliberate and Indiscriminate Violation of Other States‟ Municipal Laws
One other consequence of the indiscriminate application of the state immunity rule in the

international criminal justice system is that it engenders in high-ranking state officials a special
sense of impunity and freedom to violate the municipal laws of other states. It gives rise to
situations where the officials of one state would enter into the territory of another state and
deliberately violate the national laws of the latter and hope to get away without any legal
responsibility. Since there is immunity for foreign high-ranking state officials for international
and national crimes before the forum state‟s courts, the natural tendency is that they would
continue to hide under the cloak of immunity for their deliberate violations of the forum state‟s
local laws. 185
In US v Sampol186, for instance, Chilean government officials went into the US and,
against the US penal law, ordered the assassination of Orlando Letelier, former Chilean
ambassador to the US. During their prosecution in the US courts, Chile argued, in defence, that
even if its officials‟ act violated US penal law, such an act should not be the subject of discussion
in the US courts. According to Chile, the orders to commit this act had been given in Chile and
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the accused officials were, therefore, covered by Chile‟s state immunity. This argument was
upheld by the US Court of Appeal.
The decision of the UK High Court in Alamieyeseigha v The Crown Prosecution
Service187 is also relevant in this context. In this case, a governor of Bayelsa State of Nigeria was
arrested in London, UK, and charged before the UK court for money laundering, a serious crime
under the UK‟s Proceeds of Crime Act188. This followed the discovery by the London
Metropolitan Police in the governor‟s house in London of a cash sum of £1,800,000 stolen from
the Bayelsa State treasury. The only defence put up by the governor was a plea of state
immunity. However, the UK court rejected this plea on the ground that he did not qualify as a
head of a sovereign state under international law. The decision in this case clearly suggests that if
the accused person were to qualify as a high-ranking state official, the state immunity rule would
have shielded him from prosecution for money laundering and allied crimes. This would have
been so, even though his alleged acts clearly violated the provisions of the UK law.
Consequent upon this problem of deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟
laws, it is argued that in applying the state immunity rule, reasonable equilibrium should be
maintained between two conflicting interests. These interests are those of respect for the
sovereignty of the foreign state via grant of state immunity, on the one hand, and the preservation
of the sovereignty of the forum state via respect for its municipal laws, on the other hand.
Otherwise, the concepts of equality of states in international law and respect for the territorial
integrity and political independence of other states would become meaningless. This is because
the practical advantage of these concepts in this circumstance becomes unilateral, tilting only in
favour of the foreign state and always against the forum state. Thus, high-ranking officials of one
187
188
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sovereign state who have genuine cause to be within the territory of another sovereign state
should not by any means see state immunity as a license for deliberate violation of the municipal
laws of their host state. While commenting on similar abuse of diplomatic immunities by some
of its beneficiaries in circumstances that would apply mutatis mutandis to state immunity,
Richard Gardiner pertinently affirms that:
The idea behind … immunities is not that these foreigners …, who are
present as „guests‟ within a host state, should be allowed to violate the
local law with impunity, but that they need to be protected from
interference by the police, judicial or other state action if their role is not
to be impeded, particularly at crucial moments. In exchange for this
exemption from local coercive action, international law imposes
requirements on such protected individuals to respect local laws… 189
This position should apply mutatis mutandis to all high-ranking state officials that benefit
from the state immunity rule. Although the host state may expel the culpable foreign state
official, it is argued that this, on most occasions, is not a sufficient alternative to justice,
especially when the wrongful act is a serious crime of which individuals are victims. At this
juncture, the thesis examines the next problem caused by state immunity in the international
criminal justice system: perpetuation of injustice.

3.5

Perpetuation of Injustice
It is trite that one of the primary functions of law is the administration of justice for all

and sundry without discrimination. 190 In the area of criminal law, one of the basic rationales for
the criminal justice system, international or national, is to give redress and justice to victims of

189

Gardiner, Richard K, International Law (Harlow, Essex, England: Pearson Education Ltd, 2003) at 340.
Uygur, Gulriz, “The Rule of Law: Is the Line Between the Formal and the Moral Blurred?”, in Flores, Imer B &
Kenneth E Himma (eds), Law, Liberty and the Rule of Law (Dordrecht, Germany: Springer, 2013) 103 at 108.
190

107

crimes by sanctioning the offenders.191 In its judgment in Prosecutor v Obrenovic192, the Trial
Chamber of the ICTY stated that:
Punishment must … reflect both the calls for justice from the persons who
have been victims or suffered because of the crimes, as well as respond to
the call from the international community to end impunity for human
rights violations and crimes …. Individual accountability for the crimes
committed and commensurate punishment is the aim of criminal
proceedings involving such grave crimes.
For the International Federation of Human Rights (IFHR) 193:
A key issue in any discussion about how to end impunity for human rights
crimes is the victim‟s right to, and need for, justice. It is, in fact, unusual,
if not exceptionally rare, for victims of human rights crimes to obtain
justice. Many victims find it extremely difficult even to obtain any official
acknowledgment of what was done to them. For survivors of torture and
organised violence, obtaining some form of acknowledgement … is
particularly important therapeutically. Acknowledgement generally aids
the healing process and can be key to the experience of a sense of closure.
By way of example, the response of Chilean victims to the arrest of
General Pinochet in London demonstrates the importance of justice for
victims. Even though, in that particular case, justice continues to be
denied, many Chilean torture survivors nevertheless derived great comfort
and hope that so seemingly invulnerable a criminal was brought within
the reach of the law. The extraterritorial proceedings against Pinochet
drew important public attention to the crimes he is alleged to have
committed and … on the obligation to … provide reparations to victims.194
In line with this position, the international criminal justice system, in relevant treaties
mentioned above and under international custom, prohibits international crimes and urges states

191

See McCarthy, Conor, “Victim Redress and International Criminal Justice: Competing Paradigms, or
Compatible Forms of Justice” (2012) 10:2 JICJ 351 at 352; McCarthy, Conor, Reparations and Victim Support in
the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 47-48.
192
Case No IT-02-60/2-S 9Judgment of 10 December 2003) at 13-14, paras 45-46. See also Roht-Arriaza, Naomi,
“Punishment, Redress and Pardon: Theoretical and Psychological Approaches”, in Roht-Arriaza, Naomi (ed),
Impunity and Human Rights in International Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 13 at 1718; Spiga, Valentina, “No Redress Without Justice” (2012) 10:5 JICJ 1377.
193
International Federation of Human Rights, “Legal Remedies for Victims of „International Crimes‟: Fostering an
EU Approach to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, Final Report”, The Redress, March 2004 at 2; also online:
<http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/LegalRemediesFinal.pdf>.
194
Emphasis supplied.

108

to exercise jurisdiction to try and punish the perpetrators. An objective of this is surely to give
redress and justice to the victims of such crimes.
However, today, application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal
justice system often renders this laudable objective meaningless in relation to the victims of these
crimes when they are committed by foreign high-ranking state officials. In international criminal
proceedings before foreign national courts in which state immunity is applied as a jurisdictional
bar, it is obvious that victims are denied justice. Consequently, while victims are subjected to
perpetual injustice in an international legal regime of avowed criminal justice, their malefactors
enjoy freedom from legal accountability. The above-cited cases of Re Mugabe195, Re Mofaz196,
Re Sharon and Yaron197, and Re Rumsfeld198, as well as the ICJ Arrest Warrant Case199, are
typical examples of this reality. Again, the fact that the state immunity rule also bars victims‟
actions for civil remedies against the officials and their states makes the victims‟ situation more
pitiable. The plight of these victims is substantially captured in the words of the International
Federation of Human Rights as follows:
Immunity is an expression of the principle of sovereign equality of States.
Sovereign equality, however, can come into conflict with other principles
of international law and fundamental norms of human dignity, such as
States‟ obligations to repress “international crimes.” Immunity has arisen
as a potential obstacle in numerous cases based on extraterritorial
jurisdiction. … certain … courts have ruled that immunity may prevail
even in the context of criminal liability…. 200
The need for redress and justice for victims of international crimes committed by highranking state officials drives the argument that the continued applicability of the state immunity
195

Supra, note 24.
Supra, note 25.
197
Supra, note 28.
198
Supra, note 47.
199
Supra, note 9.
200
International Federation of Human Rights, op cit, note 193 at 7-8. See also Henham, Ralph, “Some Reflections
on the Role of Victims in the International Criminal Trial Process” (2004) 11:2-3 IRV 201.
196

109

rule in international criminal proceedings before national courts requires re-consideration. This
concern is also carried forward when the observation of the state immunity rule creates the
problem of unfair social dichotomy and inequality. This latter problem is discussed next.

3.6

Creation of Unfair Social Dichotomy and Inequality
In the contemporary world, the “rule of law” is one of the few social concepts that enjoy

near universal acceptance.201 In fact, no government stands out against it and none would hate to
be associated with it.202 The rule of law concept, in its most basic form, means that no one is
above the law.203 One of the fundamental facets of this concept that runs through both
international and municipal legal systems is the principle of „equality before the law‟204. By this
principle, all men and women are equal before the law and have equal rights and obligations
under the law, notwithstanding differences in socio-political status. Thus, no one is above the
law.205 Given its near universal popularity, it could be argued that the concept of the rule of law,
together with the principle of equality before the law, belongs to the genre of “the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as one of the sources of international law
applied by the ICJ under the ICJ Statute206.
The renowned jurists, AV Dicey and Ivor Jennings, have given pertinent clues to the
implications of the principle of „equality before the law‟. For Dicey, this principle means that:
… not only that … no man is above the law, but … that … every man,
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the
realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals … every
201
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official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of
taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal
justification as any other citizen. 207
For Jennings208, equality before the law must be distinguished from economic and
political equality, for it only:
assumes that amongst equals, the law should be equal and should be
equally administered, that likes should be treated alike. The right to sue
and be sued, to prosecute and be prosecuted, for the same kind of action
should be the same for all persons of full age and understanding, and
without distinction of … social status or political influence.
As esteemed as the principle of equality before the law is, the state immunity rule
substantially undermines it in the international criminal justice system. Consequently, there is
practically no equality between ordinary individuals, on the one hand, and high-ranking state
officials, on the other, as regards legal accountability for international crimes.
The state immunity rule‟s application in the system brings about a special form of social
discrimination, inequality, and dichotomy among individuals. It creates two different classes of
persons in the society. On the one hand, it makes high-ranking state officials untouchable “sacred
cows” that can hardly ever be held legally accountable for their international crimes (no matter
how atrocious and universally devastating the crimes may be). On the other hand, it makes
ordinary individuals exemplary “scapegoats” that must bear full accountability, suffer full
punishments and make the necessary reparations for their own international crimes before
foreign judicial tribunals. A practical example of this situation is the policy of non-cooperation
and resistance towards the ICC which the AU currently maintains. 209 It should be noted that
recently, the AU obligated its member states to ensure that none of them implements the
207
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warrants of arrest issued by the ICC against some sitting African high-ranking state officials.210
No doubt, the alleged grounds for this policy, which include the ICC‟s selective justice against
African state officials and the suspicion that the ICC mechanism is a developed states‟ agent of
neo-colonialism against Africa, have some merit. 211 However, by this policy, the AU is trying to
accord these officials immunity from international criminal prosecution.
All this practice obviously runs contrary to the wishes of the founders of the international
criminal justice system, who had intended that all individuals be accountable for international
crimes, notwithstanding differences in political and allied statuses. When the institutionalization
of international criminal law began, it was debated whether holding a specific office should
exempt an individual from trial for an international crime. 212 Disgusted, however, at the nature of
weapons used and the horrors of the First World War, the Commission on the Responsibility of
the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties maintained that there should be no such
exemption. According to the Commission: “… in the hierarchy of persons in authority, there is
no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from
responsibility when that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted
tribunal. This extends even to the case of heads of states.”213
Consequently, there should be no protection under any circumstance if great outrages
against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity had occurred, because inability to
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investigate and try such outrages “would shock the conscience of civilized mankind”.214 For the
Commission215:
… the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs of war and the
laws of humanity which have been violated would be incomplete if he
[head of state] were not brought to trial and if other offenders less highly
placed were punished; moreover, the trial of the offenders might be
seriously prejudiced if they attempted and were able to plead the superior
orders of a sovereign against whom no steps had been or were being
taken.216
The Commission concluded that “All persons belonging to enemy countries, however
high their positions may have been, without distinction of rank, including Chiefs of States, who
have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war or the laws of humanity are
liable to prosecution.”217
Clearly, the Commission‟s position accords with the demands of justice. It should be
followed in contemporary international criminal proceedings before national courts. This
position affirms the inherent equality of all human beings.218 There is no justification for holding
some human beings accountable for international crimes while others are exempted on the basis
of their political status.
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The next problem arising from the application of the state immunity rule in the
international criminal justice system is that of political self-perpetuation. This is examined next.

3.7

Political Self-perpetuation
Some recent judicial decisions have begun to indicate that with regard to international

crimes, a high-ranking state official benefiting from immunity ratione personae stands to lose
that immunity once he leaves office. For instance, in the landmark decision in the Pinochet
case219, the UK House of Lords, while upholding the immunity of a serving head of state, held
that the moment the head of state leaves office, he or she is liable to prosecution for international
crimes committed before or after his or her term of office, or committed in a personal capacity
while in office.
The decisions in Re Gaddafi220, Re Castro221, Re Mugabe222, and the ICJ Arrest Warrant
Case223, also made reference to the immunity of “serving” heads of state and other high-ranking
state officials. These decisions confirm the emerging trend to not extend immunity protection to
former high-ranking state officials except for their purely official acts. In this regard, Malcolm
Shaw states that “… the immunity of a former head of state differs [from that of a serving head
of state] in that it may be seen as moving from a status immunity (ratione personae) to a
functional immunity (ratione materiae), so that immunity will only exist for official acts done
while in office …”224
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The laudable innovation introduced by this line of decisions notwithstanding, the
distinction drawn between serving and former officials could, on its own, create another social
problem for the international criminal justice system. The balance of this distinction tilts in
favour of serving officials. Consequently, the desire to enjoy international criminal immunity
forever would induce serving officials to do everything possible to remain in power for life.
Since stepping out of political power means losing immunity, while remaining in power in
perpetuity implies immunity for life, these officials would prefer to devise every imaginable
means to hang on to political power for their lifetime. An instance of this situation is provided by
allegations of many atrocities that Robert Mugabe‟s government is committing to remain in
power in Zimbabwe.225
It is, therefore, argued that the habit among some high-ranking officials in some states of
not wanting to relinquish political power, even when they have become unpopular, may not be
unconnected to the desire to enjoy state immunity for life. For example, as noted under Chapter
One, Augusto Pinochet

made himself a “Senator-for-life” with perpetual immunity from

criminal prosecution or civil action for any of his misdeeds committed before, while in power,
and after exit from power as Chilean President.226 Robert Mugabe remains, without the slightest
thought of exit, the President of Zimbabwe, as he has been since that state‟s independence in
1980.227 These and other examples show that in some states, democratic governance is a mere

225

See, e.g., Zimbabwe Situation, “UN Urged to Refer Mugabe to International Criminal Court”, August 14, 2013,
online: < http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/news/jb_un-urged-to-refer-mugabe-to-international-criminal-court/>.
226
Slapper, Gary & David Kelly, The English Legal System: 2014-2015, 15th ed (Oxford: Routledge, 2014) at 454460; Kornbluh, Peter, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New
press, 2013) at 20; Power, Robert C, “Pinochet and the Uncertain Globalization of Criminal Law” (2007) 39:1
GWILR 89 at 127-133.
227
Miller, RWR, “Final Days – The Decay of Robert Mugabe‟s Personal Rule in Zimbabwe: Sifting Through the
Rumours”, The SAGE International, 2012 at 1; also online: < file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/Owner/My
%20Documents/Downloads/Final+days.pdf>; Nzongola-Ntalaja, G, “Democratic Transitions in Africa” (2006) 1
The Constitution 1.
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fiction, as these perpetual-immunity-hungry officials manipulate the political processes of their
states to remain in power.
The foregoing problem is complemented by official corruption and bad governance,
which are next discussed.

3.8

Conclusion
As has been argued here, application of the state immunity rule gives rise to many

problems in the international criminal justice system. These problems, as discussed in this
chapter include: impunity for flagrant violation of peremptory international legal norms,
systematic violation of human rights, deliberate and indiscriminate violation of other states‟
municipal laws, and perpetuation of injustice. Others are: creation of unfair social dichotomy and
inequality, and political self-perpetuation. These problems lead to a substantial erosion of the
basic aims and objectives of the international criminal justice system and, therefore, call for an
effective solution.
To this end, the international community has adopted some legal mechanisms to respond
to

these

problems.

These

mechanisms
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are

examined

in

the

next

chapter.

CHAPTER 4
MECHANISMS OF LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE STATE
IMMUNTY RULE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
4.1

Introduction
It is trite that there are two elements of a crime: the “mens rea” (mental element) and the

“actus reus” (physical element). As a general rule, these two elements must coincide for a
particular act or omission of a person to constitute a crime. 1 Under international criminal law, it
is established that these two elements of a crime can only be completed by individuals, not by
states. Consequently, international criminal law, unlike general international law, emphasizes
individual criminal responsibility, as opposed to state responsibility (although an international
crime may sometimes necessarily implicate the responsibility of the state). 2 Thus, according to
the Nuremberg Tribunal, “Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions
of international law be enforced.”3
The fact remains that the most heinous international crimes are more likely to be
committed by high-ranking state officials who would, most probably, hide behind state immunity
to avoid personal accountability. Consequently, the international community has adopted certain
mechanisms of response, which are intended to abolish or disregard such immunity in
appropriate cases and to hold personally accountable individual state officials who commit these

1

Martin, Jacqueline & Tony Storey, Unlocking Criminal Law, 4th ed (Oxford: Routledge, 2013) at 19; Ormerod,
David, Smith and Hogan‟s Criminal Law, 13th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 103; Clarkson,
Christopher MV, Understanding Criminal Law, 4th ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005) at 15.
2
Sliedregt, Elies van, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012) at 5; Nystedt, Maria et al, A Handbook on Assisting International Criminal Investigations (Sandoverken,
Sweden: Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2012) at 32; Nollkaemper, Andre, “Systemic Effects of International
Responsibility for International Crimes” (2010) 8:1 Santa Clara JIL 313 at 313-314.
3
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), “Judgment and Sentences, October 1 1946: Judgment” (1947) 41
AJIL 172 at 221. See also Webb, Philippa, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2013) at 20.
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crimes. These mechanisms principally involve the creation of international/internationalized
criminal tribunals to try individuals accused of such crimes and inserting state-immunitystripping provisions in the enabling legal instruments of these tribunals. The operations and
jurisprudence of these tribunals have established the legal position that, unlike in national courts,
there is no immunity before international/internationalized criminal tribunals. Another
mechanism involves the popularization of the universal criminal jurisdiction principle under both
customary international law and some international treaties.
By virtue of these mechanisms, the duties and obligations imposed by international
criminal law thus bind individuals directly, regardless of their political/official statuses or the
provisions of their states‟ internal laws. These mechanisms have seen some success in holding
high-ranking state officials legally responsible for their international crimes and in reducing the
impunity with which the officials commit these crimes.
The response mechanisms are discussed in the following order: The Old Ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal, the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction, the Modern Ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunal, the Hybrid Criminal Tribunal, and the Permanent International
Criminal Court Mechanisms.

4.2

The Old Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism
At various times in history, urgent needs arose to contain adverse security situations in

some regions or states and to forestall further breaches of international peace and security. In
response, the international community, by means of relevant instruments, established or
recommended the establishment of some ad hoc international criminal tribunals 4 to try persons
4

See, e.g., Gordon, Gregory S, “The Forgotten Nuremberg Hate Speech Case: Otto Dietrich and the future of
Persecution Law” (2014) Ohio State LJ 571 at 573-593; Sievert, Ron, “A New Perspective on the International
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responsible for serious violations of international criminal law in those regions or states. 5 The
enabling legal instruments of these tribunals stipulate the international crimes over which the
tribunals could exercise jurisdiction. Most relevantly, these instruments provide, in express
terms, for the removal of the immunity of any head of state or other high-ranking state officials
charged with crimes within the jurisdictions of the tribunals. The legal regimes under this
response mechanism are as discussed below.

4.2.1 The Pre-Treaty-of-Versailles Legal Regime6
What looks like the first successful international attempt to remove the immunity of a
high-ranking state official and hold him personally accountable for his international crimes was
in recorded in the year 1474. This was done when some then European city states (who formed
the “League of Constance”) set up an ad hoc international criminal tribunal that tried Sir Peter
Von Hagenbach in the city of Breisach for atrocities he committed while serving the Duke of
Burgundy. 7 Hagenbach was tried by the tribunal for crimes in violation of the “laws of God and
man” which he committed during his reign as the governor of the Duke‟s Alsatian territories

Criminal Court: Why the Right Should Embrace the ICC and How America Can Use It” (2006) 68 University of
Pittsburgh LR 77 at 87-93; Zyberi, Gentian, “The Role of the International Courts and Tribunals in the Pursuit of
Peace, Justice and the Responsibility to Protect”, The International Law Observer, 13/12/2012, online: <
http://www.internationallawobserver.eu/2012/12/13/the-role-of-the-international-courts-and-tribunals-in-the-pursuitof-peace-justice-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/>.
5
See, e.g., Sriram, Chandra Lekha et al, “Evaluating and Comparing Strategies of Peacebuilding and
Transnational Justice”, JAD-PbP Working Paper Series, No 1, May 2009 at 15-19, also online: < http://www4.lu.se
/upload/LUPDF/Samhallsvetenskap/Just_and_Durable_Peace/Workingpaper1.pdf>; Turns, D, “War Crimes Without
War – The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Atrocities in Non- international Armed Conflicts”
(1995) 7 AJICL (Pt 4) 804 at 820.
6
This part of the thesis is partly draws from the author‟s research paper titled “The International Criminal Court
System: An Impartial or a Selective Justice Regime?”, a research paper submitted to the Schulich School of Law,
Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada, April, 2014 at 2.
7
Guerreiro, Alexandre, “From Breisach to Rome: International Court‟s Long Road” (2013) 2:24 UERJ-RFD 24 at
26; Greppi, Eduardo, “The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility under International Law” (1999) 81:835
IRRC 531 at 531.
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from 1469 to 1474.8 Despite his high-ranking official position in the Duke‟s government, his trial
took place. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed.9
However, for a couple of centuries after the Hagenbach trial, the crusade to subject to
justice high-ranking state officials who committed international crimes suffered some decreased
tempo. This might have been caused by an increased consciousness on the part of states to
jealously guard their domestic affairs and national integrity. 10
The attempt to humanize the jus ad bellum (the law of wars) after the Battle of Solferino11
in the second half of the nineteenth century gave birth to the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC)12 and the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded in Armies in the Field. 13 A further attempt to create an international criminal court to
prosecute all persons violating this Convention, however, failed.14

8

Gordon, Gregory S, “The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach: Reconciling History, Historiography and International
Criminal Law”, in Heller, Kevin Jon and Gerry Simpson (eds), The Hidden Histories of War Crimes Trials (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 13. See also Solis, Gray D, The Law of Armed Conflict: International
Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 28-30.
9
Gordon, Gregory S, “The Trial of Peter Von Hagenbach: Reconciling History, Historiography and International
Criminal Law”, op cit, note 8 at 27-37.
10
This situation must have been exacerbated by the adoption of the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, online:
http://www.avalon.yale.edu/17th_century/westphal.asp>. This Treaty is also known as the “Peace of Westphalia” or
the “Peace of Exhaustion”. It, inter alia, enunciated the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention in
domestic affairs, by virtue of which all matters within a state‟s internal affairs are no concern of another state and,
therefore, not subject to external review. See, e.g., Croxton, Derek, “The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the
Origins of Sovereignty” (1999) 21:3 Int‟l Hist Rev 569; Hassan, Daud, “The Rise of the Territorial State and the
Treaty of Westphalia” (2006) 9 YNZJ 62; Straumann, Benjamin, “The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular
Constitution” (2008) 15:2 Constellations 173; Beaulac, Stephane, “The Westphalian Model in Defining International
Law: Challenging the Myth” (2004) 7 AJLH 181; Boas, Gideon, Public International Law: Contemporary
Principles and Perspectives (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2012) at 8-9; Jackson, John H, “Sovereignty – Modern:
A New Approach to an Outdated Concept” (2003) 97 AM J Int‟l L 782 at 782; Hehir, J Bryan, “Intervention: From
Theories to Cases” (1995) 9 E&IA 1 at 2-3; Gill, Bates & James Reilly, “Sovereignty, Intervention and
Peacekeeping: The View From Beijing” (2000) 42:3 Survival 41 at 41-42.
11
The battle, which was fought on 24 July 1859 between the allied forces of France and Sardinia against the
Austrian army, left wounded and dying soldiers abandoned in the battlefield in pathetic conditions.
12
Guerreiro, Alexandre, op cit, note 7 at 28. See also Bugnion, Francois, “Geneva and the Red Cross”, in
Dembinski-Goumard, Dominique, International Geneva Yearbook 2005-2006: Organization and Activities of
International Institutions in Geneva, Vol XIX (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 5 at 5-7.
13
1864, online: <http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/geneva04.asp>.
14
See Guerreiro, op cit, note 7 at 28-29. See also Hall, Christopher Keith, “The First Proposal to Establish a
Permanent International Criminal Court”, online: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4m.ht
ml>.

120

4.2.2 The Treaty of Versailles Regime
The international community‟s anti-state-immunity response in the international criminal
justice system was rekindled in the first quarter of the twentieth century, i.e., after the First
World War.15 Disgusted at the nature of weapons used, as well as the horrors of this war, the
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties,
recommended the trial and punishment of all individuals from the enemy countries that
committed international crimes during the war. For the Commission, “…there is no reason why
rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances protect the holder of it from responsibility
when that responsibility has been established before a properly constituted tribunal. This extends
even to the case of heads of states.”

16

In conclusion, it stated that: “All persons belonging to

enemy countries, however high their position may have been, without distinction of rank,
including Chiefs of States, who have been guilty of offences against the laws and customs of war
or the laws of humanity, are liable to criminal prosecution.”17
The Paris Peace Conference that constituted the Commission on 25 January 1919 18 also
adopted the Treaty of Versailles19 (one of the peace treaties adopted at the end of the war

15

See Kirsch, Phillipe & Valerie Oosterveld, “Negotiating an Institution for the Twenty-first Century: Multilateral
Diplomacy and the International Criminal Court” (2001) 46 McGill LJ 1141 at 1143.
16
Report to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties (1920) 14 AJIL 95 at 116-117. See also Agbor, Avitus, A, Instigation to Crimes
Against Humanity: The Flawed Jurisprudence of the Trial and Appeal Chambers of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013) at 89; Simpson, Gerry, “Atrocity, Law, Humanity:
Punishing Human Rights Violators”, in Gearty, Conor & Costas, Douzinas (eds), The Cambridge Companion to
Human Rights Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 114 at 116; Meron, Theodor, The Making of
International Criminal Justice: A View from the Bench: Selected Speeches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)
at 80; Parlett, Kate, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 235.
17
Report to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War
and on Enforcement of Penalties, op cit, note 16 at 117.
18
See Firstworldwar.com, “Primary Documents – Report of Commission to Determine War Guilt”, 6 May 1999,
online: <http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/commissionwarguilt.htm>.
19
(1919) 13 AJIL 151 at 385; (1919) 225 Parry 188; (1919) 2 Bevans 235; also online: <http://www.avalon.law.yal
e.edu/imt/partvii.asp>.
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between the Allied Powers20 and the Central Powers21, especially Germany). Article 227 of this
treaty, inter alia, provided for the creation of a special international criminal tribunal to try then
German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II “for a supreme offence against international morality and
the sanctity of treaties”.22 The Emperor was proposed to be tried, notwithstanding his official
capacity as a sovereign head of state at all times relevant to the commission of his alleged
crimes. Thus, his state immunity protection was disregarded in favour of his individual
accountability for international crimes. 23
In addition, the treaty provided for the right of the Allied and associated Powers to bring
before international military tribunals persons (from the enemy states) accused of having
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. 24 This tribunal could not eventually
be set up, as the Netherlands granted asylum to the Emperor and refused to hand him over to the
Allied Powers for trial until he died in 1941. 25 However, the anti-state immunity position of this
legal regime must have laid some foundation in this regard for the legal regimes of subsequent ad
hoc tribunals, especially the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, which are examined next.
While summarizing the contributions of this treaty to the development of the international
criminal justice system, Alexandre Guerreiro is of the view that 26:
The Versailles Treaty also broke ground in International Law when it (i)
combined the principle of self-determination of peoples to the concept of
20

The Allied Powers were US, Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
The Central Powers included Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria.
22
Treaty of Versailles, supra, note 19, art 227. See also Hingsheng, Sheng, “The Evolution of Law of War” (2006) 1
CJIP 267 at 287; Penrose, Mary Magaret, “The Emperor‟s Clothes: Evaluating Head of State Immunity under
International Law” (2010) 7:2 Santa Clara JIL 85 at 99-101.
23
See, e.g., Moghalu, Kingsley Chiedu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Connecticut, USA:
Praeger Publishing, 2008) at 18-26; Laughland, John, A History of Political Trials: From Charles I to Saddam
Hussein (Oxford: Peter land Ltd, 2008) at 53-58.
24
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University of South Carolina Press, 2000) at 56-57; MacDonogh, Giles, The Last Kaiser: The Life of Wilhelm II
(New York: St Martin‟s Griffin, 2003).
26
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world peace …; (ii) inspired the tendency to abandon the notion that the
actions performed by the Head of State are acts of the State, leading to the
individual possibly being charged by his actions no matter his position in
government27; and (iii) reinforced the need to create international courts to
address violations of International Humanitarian Law, since questions
arose [as] to the ability and will of national courts to handle these matters.
The biggest contributions to International Humanitarian Law, by the
Versailles Treaty, is that it demonstrated the possibility of breaching the
primacy of state sovereignty, since it established the possibility of political
interventions in the domestic affairs of a state with the goal of protecting
human rights. It also reinforced the emergence of the individual as a
subject of international law, not only an object left to be handled on lay as
a matter of domestic law. 28
The anti-state immunity position of this regime must have laid some foundation in this
regard for the legal regimes of subsequent ad hoc tribunals, especially the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals, which are examined next.

4.2.3 The Nuremberg Charter Regime
It was not until after the World War II that the first effective anti-state-immunity
breakthrough occurred. After the war, the victorious Allied Powers29 commenced negotiations on
the establishment of an international tribunal for the trial and punishment of the German Nazis
and their allies that committed international crimes during the war. 30 In order to accomplish this
mission, part of the position advanced by these Allied Powers was that the state immunity rule
should not act as a barrier to such trials and punishments. This is clearly stated in the report to
the US President by Justice Jackson (the US representative to the International Conference on
Military Trials) on June 6, 1945. According to Jackson:
27

Emphasis supplied.
Emphasis supplied.
29
These Allied Powers included France, UK, US, USSR and China.
30
See Sadat, Leila N, “The International Criminal Court” (May 1, 2014), Washington University in St Louis Legal
Studies Research Paper No 14-05-02, online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2437441>; Hale,
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Pol‟y 429 at 442-443.
28

123

… an inescapable responsibility rests upon this country to conduct an
inquiry … in association with others … into the culpability of those whom
there is probable cause to accuse of atrocities and other crimes…. To free
them without a trial would mock the dead and make cynics of the living….
The only other course is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused
after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and horrors we deal with will
permit…. Nor should such a defense be recognized as the obsolete doctrine
that a head of state is immune from legal liability.… this idea is a relic of
the doctrine of the divine right of kings.… We do not accept the paradox
that legal responsibility should be the least where power is the greatest….
With the doctrine of immunity of a head of state ... nobody is responsible.
Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of official
irresponsibility…. We will accuse a large number of individuals and
officials who were in authority in the government, in the military
establishment …31
Accordingly, in 1945, the Allied Powers adopted the London Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis (London
Agreement)32. Annexed to the London Agreement was the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg)33 (the “IMT Charter”, the “Nuremberg Charter”, or the “Tribunal”). The
IMT Charter created the International Military Tribunal34 at Nuremberg, Germany (the “IMT” or
the “Nuremberg Tribunal”). The Nuremberg Tribunal was set up to try high-ranking Nazi
German officials for the following crimes committed during the War II: war crimes, crimes
against peace (now called crime of aggression), and crimes against humanity. 35 The Charter
empowered the IMT to impose the death penalty or any other punishment it should deem just. 36
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Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, to
the United States President, June 6 1945 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), art III, paras 1-3.
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1945, 82 UNTS 279.
33
1945, 82 UNTS 279.
34
Ibid, art 1. The Allied Powers also promulgated the Allied Control Council Law No 10, 1945 (contained in
Control Council for Germany Official Gazette, 31 January 1946 at 50) to try low-ranking Germans by lesser
tribunals for the same World War II international crimes.
35
Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 33, art 6.
36
Ibid, arts 26-27.
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One of the landmark innovations of the Charter was its abolition of the protection of state
immunity in trials for the crimes under the Charter.37 Under article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter,
“The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment.”38
On the strength of this and other relevant provisions of the Charter, the Tribunal was able
to try, convict, and sentence to various forms of punishment many high-ranking state officials of
the Nazi regime in circumstances that would have readily attracted state immunity before
national courts. For example, Karl Donitz (successor to Adolf Hitler and President of Germany
after Hitler‟s death) was sentenced to ten years‟ imprisonment. Rudolf Hess (Hitler‟s former
deputy) was sentenced to life imprisonment, and Joachim Ribbentrop (Nazi Germany‟s Minister
of Foreign Affairs) was sentenced to death.39 Thus, if Adolf Hitler (German leader of the Nazi
regime) were to be alive upon the creation of this Tribunal, state immunity could not have
protected him from trial before this Tribunal for the international crimes committed by the Nazi
regime under his leadership.
The contribution of the Nuremberg Tribunal‟s jurisprudence to the efforts at abolishing or
disregarding state immunity in the international criminal justice system cannot be
overemphasized. In fact, the Tribunal has the credit of making the first unambiguous judicial
pronouncement on the non-applicability of the state immunity rule in international criminal
37

Ibid, arts 7-8.
This position is also repeated in Principle III of the Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of
the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950) 2 YILC 374 at 375; also online: <http://legal.
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1947). See also Mettraux, Guenael (ed), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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proceedings, a pronouncement that is cited as a locus classicus today. In the trials before the
Tribunal, the accused persons argued that international law was concerned with the actions of
sovereign states, and provides no punishment for individuals. They further argued that where the
act in question is an act of the state, those who carry it out are not personally responsible, but are
protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state and, therefore, the state immunity rule. 40
In rejecting these arguments, the Tribunal held as follows 41:
That international law imposes duties and liabilities upon individuals as
well as upon states has long been recognized…. Crimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only
by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced…. The principle of international law, which
under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a state, cannot
be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official
position in order to be freed from punishment in appropriate
proceedings…. The very essence of the Charter is that individuals have
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot
obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if
the state in authorizing action moves outside its competence under
international law.42
In sum, the Nuremberg regime established that the state immunity rule could no longer be
pleaded to bar the trial and punishment of high-ranking state officials for international crimes in
international tribunals, at least. This position was reaffirmed in the legal regime of the Tokyo
Tribunal, as discussed next. It is also noteworthy that the UN General Assembly has

40

See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), “Judgment and Sentences, October 1, 1946”, op cit, note 39 at
220.
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unanimously adopted the principles of the Nuremberg Charter as forming part of customary
international law. 43

4.2.4

The Tokyo Charter Regime

One year after creating the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Allied Powers also set up the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal” or the “Khabarovsk War
Crimes Trial”). This was done through the adoption of the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East44 (“Tokyo Charter”). Like the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter
was adopted to try and punish the Far Eastern (mainly Japanese) war criminals for the same
crimes for which the Nazis were tried, namely: crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. 45 The Tokyo Charter was, therefore patterned along the lines of the
Nuremberg Charter.
With regard to the immunity of persons charged before the Tokyo Tribunal, article 6 of
the Tokyo Charter provided thus:
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an
accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of
itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime
with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so
requires.

43
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On the strength of this and other provisions of the Charter, the Tokyo Tribunal was able
to try and punish some high-ranking Japanese state officials, who would have otherwise been
protected by the state immunity rule before national courts.46

4.2.5 The Legacy of the Old Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism
One significant legacy of this mechanism is that it demystified the state immunity rule
and sought to eradicate the culture of criminal impunity among high-ranking state officials. For
once, these officials were made to understand that they were not above the law and could be
made personally accountable for their international crimes like ordinary individuals. The
jurisprudence of the tribunals under this mechanism, therefore, laid some good foundation for the
success of the efforts against state immunity. However, due, mainly, to the temporary nature of
this mechanism, the need arose for a more permanent mechanism to carry on this legacy. This
led to the re-invigoration of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, which is examined
next.

4.3

The Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism
When the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals wound up, there were no other tribunals to

administer international criminal justice on the international plane and to hold high-ranking state
officials individually accountable for their international crimes by disregarding their immunity. 47
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In order partly to avoid the resultant proliferation of impunity among the officials for the
commission of these crimes, the international community resorted to popularizing the universal
criminal jurisdiction mechanism that had already been existing under customary international
law.48
Universal criminal jurisdiction is the adjudicatory competence of national judicial
authorities of a state (as opposed to an international judicial body) with respect to international
crimes occurring outside the territory of the state and with which the state has no connection. 49
By virtue of the universal jurisdiction mechanism, all states have jurisdiction to prosecute
particular international crimes. This jurisdiction can be exercised whether the crimes are
committed within or without the prosecuting state‟s territory and regardless of the accused
person‟s nationality, state of residence, or any other relationship with the prosecuting state.50
This mechanism may also apply to non-core international crimes like piracy and slavery.
The popularization of this mechanism at this time was done through the adoption of some
instruments by the UN. The instruments affirm that the prohibitions on certain international
crimes have attained the status of international custom and, therefore, make the crimes
susceptible to the jurisdiction of the courts of all states. A leading instrument in this regard was
the UN General Assembly Resolution 95(1) of 194651. This resolution affirmed that the
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principles of international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal 52 are
international custom. It should be recalled that the principles recognized in this Charter included
the prohibitions on war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace (aggression), as
well as the abolition of the immunity rule in the trials of these crimes. This invariably implies
that pursuant to the universal jurisdiction mechanism, the state immunity rule should not bar the
prosecution of a high-ranking state official for any of these crimes before a competent national
court of another state. Another relevant instrument here is the UN General Assembly Resolution
on the Crime of Genocide53. This resolution affirms that the prohibition on the crime of genocide
has also attained international customary law status and thus renders the crime susceptible to
universal jurisdiction.
In addition to the general and unlimited form of universal jurisdiction that exists under
customary international law, some international treaties also provide for some limited universal
over specific international crimes. This treaty-based universal jurisdiction is limited because it is
only effective as between the states parties to the respective treaties. Examples of these treaties
are the Torture Convention54 and the four Geneva Conventions55. In order to actualize their
universal jurisdiction goals, these treaties impose on contracting states an aut dedire aut punire
obligation, i.e., subject to prosecutorial discretion, to prosecute or extradite an alleged offender to
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another state party which will prosecute him. 56 Following the universal jurisdiction trend, some
states have also enacted national instruments that confer universal jurisdiction over some core
international crimes upon their municipal courts.57

4.3.1 Theoretical Foundation and Importance of the Universal Criminal
Jurisdiction Mechanism in the Response against State Immunity
As already described in Chapter Three above, the theoretical foundation for universal
jurisdiction is that the relevant crimes have attained the status of jus cogens and every state,
therefore, has an entitlement erga omnes to bring their perpetrators to justice. Under this
mechanism, the prosecuting state justifies its claim to jurisdiction on the grounds that the crimes
are committed against all humanity and against the international community as a whole and are,
therefore, too grave to tolerate. 58 The individual that commits the crimes is deemed “hostis
humani generis” (enemy of all humankind) and every state has the jurisdiction to punish the
crimes. According to Kenneth Randall59:
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Violations of obligations erga omnes and jus cogens norms offend all
States, whether committed by state actors or individuals. Indeed, domestic
jurisdiction over those violations may draw support from the Barcelona
Traction case dictum, which, although not without ambiguity, may support
a type of actio popularis, enabling any state to vindicate rights common to
all…. In this way, the erga omnes and jus cogens doctrines may buttress
the universal jurisdiction of all States.60
This mechanism is a crucial tool for bringing justice to victims, deterring state officials
from committing international crimes, and establishing a minimum international rule of law by
substantially closing the “impunity gap” for international crimes. 61 One virtue of this mechanism
is that it advocates disregard for the immunity of state officials who commit international
crimes. 62 The International Council on Human Rights Policy stresses this as follows 63:
Universal jurisdiction prosecutions illustrate effectively the basic principle
that serious human rights violations are the concern of everyone, not just
the people in the country where they were committed. When a foreign
country decides to prosecute crimes that occurred in another land,
regardless of whether its own nationals were victims, it demonstrates the
international dimension to basic human rights. The very fact that these
prosecutions challenge traditional attributes of sovereignty and the
immunity of leaders to commit grave abuses within their own national
borders is a basis upon which prosecution should be advocated. 64
The mechanism‟s importance is also recognized in Amnesty International‟s document
titled “Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction”65. In particular, Principle 2 reflects the anti-immunity position of the universal
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criminal jurisdiction mechanism, and is headed “No immunity for persons in official capacity.”66
Its paragraph 1 states that “National legislatures should ensure that their national courts can
exercise jurisdiction over anyone suspected or accused of grave crimes under international law,
whatever the official capacity of the suspect or accused at the time of the alleged crime or any
time thereafter.” Under paragraph 2, “Any national law authorizing the prosecution of grave
crimes under international law should apply equally to all persons irrespective of any official or
former official capacity, be it head of state, head or member of government … or other elected or
governmental capacity.”
Similarly, Principle 5 of the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 67 provides as
follows: “With respect to serious crimes under international law …, the official position of any
accused person, whether as head of state or government or as a responsible government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”
Pursuant to this mechanism, some former high-ranking state officials have been denied
immunity before foreign courts for international crimes they committed while in office. For
example, in Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann68, Israel invoked this
mechanism and tried Adolf Eichmann, an ex-Nazi high-ranking official. Eichmann was the head
of the Jewish office of the Nazi Gestapo. He was the administrator in charge of “the Final
Solution” – the Nazi policy that led to the extermination of about 4,600,000 Jews in Europe. He
was tried for war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and crimes against humanity, the
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definitions of which were based on the Nuremberg principles. He was convicted, sentenced to
death, and executed, notwithstanding his official capacity when he committed his crimes. 69
More recently, in the Pinochet case70 earlier referred to, Augusto Pinochet was arrested in
the UK on the based on warrants issued by the Spanish courts and a Spanish extradition request.
The warrants and request arose from his prosecution in Spain for torture and other international
crimes he committed in his position as Chilean President between 1973 and 1990. He filed
applications before the UK courts to quash the warrants, arguing that as a former head of state he
was protected by the state immunity rule from foreign criminal prosecutions for acts done by him
in his official capacity as head of state. Part of the counter-arguments of the appellants‟ counsel
(Alun Jones, QC) on this position is instructive71:
The various laws of states considered in the light of the fact that every
recent human rights treaty has prohibited torture provide evidence that
customary international law prohibited torture before the Torture
Convention and that, under customary international law, torture was an
international crime if committed by a public official. There was no head of
state exception and states other than the state where the offence took place
were entitled to exercise jurisdiction…. Accordingly, either the Torture
Convention establishes that the applicant can have no immunity from
prosecution for acts of torture or alternatively the prohibition against
torture has the status of jus cogens and he can be prosecuted under
customary international law….
In a landmark judgment, the UK House of Lords held that the commission of torture
could not be regarded as an official act for which a head of state should enjoy immunity under
international law. The Court also said that such immunity was lost when Chile ratified the
Torture Convention on 30th October 1988. For the Law Lords, the moment Pinochet stepped
69

See also Mulisch, Harry, Criminal Case 40/61, The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: An Eye Witness Account
(Pennsylvania, USA: University of Pennsylvania, 2005) at 1-16; Scharf, Michael P, “Joint Criminal Enterprise, the
Nuremberg Precedent, and the Concept of Grotian Moment”, in Isaacs, Tracy & Richard Vernon (eds),
Accountability for Collective Wrongdoing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 119 at 136; Yablonka,
Hanna, The State of Israel vs Adolf Eichmann (Berlin: Schocken Books, 2004) at 1-300.
70
Supra, note 6o.
71
Ibid at 156, paras A-D.

134

down as Chilean head of state, he lost his immunity from foreign prosecution for his
international crimes, including torture, committed while in office. 72
From the judgment in the Pinochet case, it is clear that the disregard of the state
immunity rule under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism only applies to immunity
ratione materiae. Thus, immunity ratione personae of sitting high-ranking state officials from
prosecutions for international crimes is not abolished under this mechanism. Notwithstanding
this, the judgment went a long way in inducing public confidence in universal criminal
jurisdiction as a mechanism for responding to the problems arising from the application of the
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system. For once, the mechanism that
had remained ineffective was given some practical effect. This would show sitting state officials
entitled to immunity ratione personae that they are not eternally free from individual
accountability for their international crimes before foreign courts. Their charges may be waiting
for their exit from office. According to Naomi Roht-Arriaza:
The Pinochet cases established the legitimacy of transnational
prosecutions based on universal … jurisdiction, at least under some
circumstances. They showed that the existing universal jurisdiction laws
could actually be used, and touched off a new willingness by advocates
and court to use them. They made clear that there are some limits on the
immunity of government officials when hauled before national courts
accused of international crimes. … They strengthened the idea that proper
accountability for such crimes is the business of justice everywhere, and
that domestic laws enshrining unfair trials or shielding perpetrators are
subject to outside scrutiny and cannot per se bind foreign courts. They
yielded landmark jurisprudence in the highest national courts of a handful
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of countries, jurisprudence that both draws from international courts and
ideas and feeds back into them.73
Despite the recent popularization of this mechanism, it has always invariably remained
ineffective. This is due to such factors as fear of deterioration in inter-state relations and the
uncertain scopes and limits of the mechanism‟s immunity-removing regime. In order, partly, to
avoid these shortcomings and the potential abuse in remitting these matters to national courts of
dubious impartiality74, the international community re-invented the ad hoc international criminal
tribunal mechanism. This is the modern ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, and is
examined next.

4.4

The Modern Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanism
On account, inter alia, of political unwillingness by states to try high-ranking officials of

other states, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism was ineffective until recently,
becoming more so now. For decades, most high-ranking state officials who committed heinous
international crimes around the world escaped justice, and these crimes continued to flourish
with impunity among these officials. As Alexandre Guerreiro states:
Despite the acceleration in legislative activity that followed the creation of the
Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, realpolitik still loomed large over the
protection of Human Rights, in such a manner that the world witnessed, for
the first three decades of the Cold War, individuals acting blatantly against
mankind without being punished.75
In order partly to address this trend, the last decades of the twentieth century saw the
establishment by the UN Security Council of two ad hoc international criminal tribunals. This
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marked a revival of the ad hoc tribunal mechanism of international criminal justice
administration. These two tribunals were the ICTY 76 and the ICTR77. Their anti-immunity
regimes are considered below.

4.4.1

The ICTY Statute Regime

The ICTY (“Tribunal”) was created by the UN Security Council in May 1993 pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 82778. This was done in direct reaction to the systematic atrocities
being committed by all sides in the vicious conflict that was raging in the territory of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) since 1991. 79 The atrocities involved
widespread violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in the SFRY,
including the existence of concentration camps and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”80. The
ICTY is regulated by the ICTY Statute81 annexed to Security Council Resolution 827. It has
jurisdiction to try and punish grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (violations of the
laws and customs of war), genocide, and crimes against humanity that took place within the
territory of the SFRY since 1991. 82
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Established pursuant to the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1993) UN
Doc S/RES/827 (“ICTY Statute”). See Clark, Roger S & Madeleine Sann (eds), The Prosecution of International
Crimes: A Crtical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ( New Brunswick, Canada:
Transaction Publishers, 1996); ICTY, “About the ICTY”, online: < http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY>.
77
Created under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1994) UN Doc S/RES/955 (“ICTR
Statute”).
78
SC Res 827, UN Doc S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
79
See e.g., Beigbeder, Yves, International Justice Against Impunity: Progress and New Challenges (Leiden:
Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) at 69; Sikkink, Kathryn, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are
Changing World Politics (New York: WW Norton & Co, 2011) at 114; Steinberg, Richard H, “Constructing the
Legacy of the ICTY”, in Steinberg, Richard H (ed), Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff,
2011) 3 at 3-4.
80
“Ethnic Cleansing” is a modern term signifying an attempt by a particular state‟s government to use state
machinery to exterminate or obliterate members of a particular ethnic group within the state. This term originated
from the massacres in the former Yugoslavia.
81
Supra, note 76.
82
Ibid, arts 1 – 10.

137

By article 7(2) of the ICTY Statute, “The official position of any accused person, whether
as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such
person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”83 Pursuant to this provision, the
ICTY was able to successfully indict, prosecute, convict and sentence, many high-ranking state
officials of the former Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v Milosevic84, Slobodan Milosevic (who served
severally as President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Republic of Serbia, and the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia) was indicted on May 27, 1999 (while in office as President of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). His indictment was for genocide, crimes against humanity,
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions85 of 1949, and other violations of the laws and
customs of war. He, however, died in custody while standing trial.
The case of Prosecutor v Milutinovic & Ors86 was a high-profile case involving the
indictment and joint trial of five high-ranking officials of the former Yugoslavia. The accused
persons were: Milan Milutinovic (ex President of Serbia) and Sainovic Nikola (a former Deputy
Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Montenegro). Others were
Dragoljub Ojdanic (ex-Chief of General Staff of the Yugoslav Army and Minister of Defence of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Serbia and Montenegro) and three others. They were tried
for various crimes against humanity and for violations of the laws and customs of war allegedly
committed by them while in office. Milutinovic was acquitted by the Trial Chamber, Nikola was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-two years‟ imprisonment, while Ojdanic was also convicted
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but sentenced to fifteen years‟ imprisonment. The convicted persons‟ appeal is pending before
the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal. 87
In Prosecutor v Karadzic88, Radovan Karadzic, who was at all material times the
President of Bosnia, is at the time of writing being tried for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Karadzic was accused of presiding over the worst massacre in Europe since the Naziorchestrated Holocaust. He allegedly presided over the Srebrenica genocide of 1996 in which
Bosnian Serb forces slaughtered more than seven thousand, five hundred Muslim men and boys.
The Trial Chamber of the Tribunal acquitted him on one genocide charge for lack of sufficient
evidence. The Prosecutor‟s appeal against this acquittal is, however, pending before the Appeals
Chamber.89
In addition to these cases, the Tribunal has indicted and tried many other high-ranking
officials of the former Yugoslavia for international crimes committed while they were in office.
In these other cases, some of the officials have been convicted and sentenced to prison, while
some others have lodged appeals against their conviction. Others are still undergoing trial. 90

4.4.2 The ICTR Statute Regime
After the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the UN Security Council adopted the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
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Rwanda91 (“UNSC Resolution 955”). This Resolution established the ICTR or (the “Tribunal”). 92
The Resolution was, inter alia, adopted in recognition of the shocking degree of genocide and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda from January 1,
1994 to December 31, 1994.93 The purpose of the Tribunal‟s establishment was the prosecution
of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda between January 1 and December 31, 1994. 94 The
Tribunal is also empowered to try Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations in the
territories of neighbouring states. 95
The Tribunal is governed by the ICTR Statute96 annexed to UNSC Resolution 955. The
Statute confers the ICTR with jurisdiction over genocide; crimes against humanity; and
violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional
Protocol II thereto, committed within the territories of Rwanda and its neighbouring states within
the period under review. 97
Like in the ICTY Statute98, article 6(2) of the ICTR Statute expressly removes immunity
for high-ranking state officials. According to this provision, “The official status of any accused
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person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.”99
Based on these and other relevant provisions of the Statute, the ICTR has been able
indict, issue warrants of arrest against, try, convict, and sentence many high-ranking state
officials, despite their official statuses at the time of commission of their alleged crimes. These
indictments, arrest warrants, trials, convictions and sentences, it should be noted, would have
most likely been impossible before foreign judicial tribunals due to the state immunity rule, at
least while they were still sitting officials.
In Prosecutor v Kambanda100, the Tribunal indicted Jean Kambanda (former Rwandan
Prime Minister) on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. He pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. In Kambanda v Prosecutor101, his appeal against conviction and
sentence to the Tribunal‟s Appeals Chamber was dismissed. He currently serves his sentence.
In Prosecutor v Bizimungu & 3 Ors102, the 1st accused, Casmir Bizimungu, was the
Rwandan Minister of Health, while the 3rd accused, Jerome Bicamumpaka, was the Rwandan
Minister of Foreign Affairs, when their alleged crimes were committed. They were indicted and
tried, inter alia, for genocide, crimes against humanity and, war crimes. The Trial Chamber
found Bizimungu guilty, but acquitted Bicamumpaka.
Also, in Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana103, the 2nd accused person (Augustin Bizimungu)
was the Rwandan Chief of Army Staff at the time the alleged crimes were committed. He and the
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other three accused persons were charged, inter alia, for genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes. The Trial Chamber found them guilty and convicted and sentenced them to various
terms of imprisonment. In particular, Bizimungu was sentenced to thirty years‟ imprisonment.
An appeal104 is still pending before the Appeals Chamber. 105
These trials, convictions and sentences serve as a warning to other high-ranking state
officials around the world that the days of immunity from individual accountability for
international crimes are gradually coming to an end. Official state positions may, therefore, no
longer cloak them from accountability. Thus, the era of state-immunity-induced impunity, at
least for international crimes under the ad hoc tribunals‟ jurisdiction is gradually passing by.
However, the weaknesses associated with the ad hoc international criminal tribunal
mechanism, such as limited geographical/temporal jurisdictions and, at least as regards the
ICTR, alleged lack of independence and impartiality106 (which is an even bigger issue with
respect to national tribunals), led the international community to a search for other response
mechanisms. 107 One such mechanisms is the Hybrid Criminal Tribunal Mechanism, and it is
considered next.
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4.5

The Hybrid Criminal Tribunal Mechanism
More recently, a new species of criminal tribunals was ushered in. These are hybrid

tribunals established by particular states or by the international community for particular
states.108 They are hybrid or internationalized because their enabling legal instruments empower
them to exercise both international and domestic criminal jurisdictions and also to administer
both international criminal law and the domestic criminal law of the state concerned. 109 They are,
most often, staffed by both international and domestic judges and, in some cases, jointly
administered by both the international community and the government of the state concerned. 110
One remarkable and commendable feature of most of their enabling legal instruments is that they
expressly abolish state immunity protection for high-ranking state officials. The details of their
regimes against state immunity are set out below.

4.5.1 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
The UN Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established in January 2002,
pursuant to the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone111 (“SCSL Agreement”). The Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone 112 (“SCSL Statute”), which governs the operation of this Court, is
108

See, e.g., Costi, Alberto, “Hybrid Tribunals as a Valid Alternative to International Tribunals for the Prosecution
of International Crimes”, online: < https://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/centres/nzcpl/publications/human-rights-research
-journal/publications/vol-3/Costi.pdf> at 1-2.
109
OHCHR, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts (New York:
United Nations, 2008) at 1; Jain, Neha, “Conceptualisin Internationalisation in Hybrid Criminal Courts” (2008) 12
SYBIL 81 at 82.
110
See Geib, R & Bulinckx, N, “International and Internationalized Criminal Tribunals: A Synopsis” (2006)88:861
IRRC 49 at 49-50; Dickinson, LA, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts” (2003)97 AJIL 259; Rapoza, P, “Hybrid
Criminal Tribunals and the Concept of Ownership: Who Owns the Process” (2006) 21:4 AM U INT‟L L REV 525.
111
2002, 2178 UNTS 138; UN Doc. S/2002/246, appendix II. See also DiBella, Amy E, “Witnessing History:
Protective measures at the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, in Jalloh, Charles Chernor, The Sierra Leone Special
Court and Its Legacy: The Impact for Africa and International Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014) 423 at 424-425.
112
2002 2178 UNTS 138, 145; (2002) 97 AJIL 295; UN Doc. S/2002/246, appendix II.

143

annexed to the SCSL Agreement. The SCSL was created to try persons bearing the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law
committed in the territory of Sierra Leone during Sierra Leone‟s gruesome ten-year civil war.113
Article 6(1) of the SCSL Statute entrenches individual responsibility. Under article 6(2),
immunity for high-ranking state officials is abolished. According to this paragraph, “The official
position of any accused persons, whether as Head of State or Government, or as a responsible
government official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
punishment.”114 This provision has enabled the SCSL to try and punish state officials that would
otherwise have been shielded by the state immunity rule. In Prosecutor v Taylor115, the Appeals
Chamber of the SCSL held that then Liberian President, Charles Taylor, could not invoke his
head of state immunity to resist the charges against him before the Court, even though he was an
incumbent head of state at the time of his indictment on March 7, 2003. Thus, Taylor was
prosecuted, inter alia, for war crimes and crimes against humanity before the Trial Chamber of
the SCSL. He was convicted on April 26, 2012. 116 The Appeals Chamber dismissed his appeal
on September 26, 2013.117 He currently serves a fifty-year jail term in the British prisons.118
Also in Prosecutor v Norman & Ors119, Samuel Hinga Norman (a then Sierra Leonean
Deputy Defence Minister and serving Interior Minister at the time of indictment) was tried by the
SCSL for crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, he died before delivery of
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judgment in his case, which was thus terminated.120 In Prosecutor v Koroma121, Jonny Paul
Koroma (a former Sierra Leonean head of state) was indicted for crimes against humanity and
war crimes and the SCSL issued a warrant for his arrest. However, the accused fled Sierra Leone
before he could be arrested and was reported to have died in Liberia some months later. 122

4.5.2 The Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal / Law of the Iraqi Higher Criminal
Court
The Iraqi Special Tribunal (the “IST” or the “Tribunal”) was established in 2003 pursuant
to the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal123 (“IST Statute”). The IST was established through
the UN influence in order to put an end to the Ba‟ath Party‟s regime in Iraq.124
The IST has jurisdiction over Iraqi nationals and Iraqi residents accused of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.125 The Tribunal also has jurisdiction over the
following Iraqi national crimes: wastage of natural resources, manipulation of the judiciary, and
abuse of policies leading to war against Iraq‟s neighbours. The Tribunal‟s temporal and
geographical jurisdictions extend to the aforementioned crimes committed since July 17, 1968,
and up until May 1, 2003, in the territory of Iraq or elsewhere, including crimes committed in
connection with Iraq‟s wars against Iran and Kuwait. 126
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Article 15(a) of the IST Statute establishes the individual responsibility of accused
persons. Under article 15(c):
The official position of any accused person, whether as president,
prime minister, member of the cabinet, chairman or a member of the
Revolutionary Command Council, a member of the Arab Socialist
Ba‟ath Party Regional Command or Government (or an
instrumentality of either) or as a responsible Iraqi Government official
or member of the Ba‟ath Party or in any other capacity, shall not
relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
No person is entitled to any immunity with respect to any crimes. 127
In August 2005, the Iraqi Government changed the name of this Tribunal to the Iraqi
Higher Criminal Court (also known as the Iraqi Higher Tribunal - IHT) via the Law of the Iraqi
Higher Criminal Court 128 (“IHT Law”). The IHT Law repealed the IST Statute but saves all
decisions made pursuant to the IST Statute.129 The IHT Law virtually reproduces the content of
the IST Statute, including jurisdiction. It only adds that pardons issued prior to the enforcement
of the IHT Law do not apply to the accused in any of the crimes stipulated in the IHT Law. 130
Consequently, the IHT tried, convicted and sentenced many high-ranking Iraqi state
officials who were in power at the time of the commission of their alleged crimes. 131 In
Prosecutor v Hussein et al132 (“Al Dujail case”), the accused persons included Saddam Hussein
(ex Iraqi President) and Taha Yassin Ramadan (ex Iraqi Vice President and former General
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Commander of the Iraqi Popular Army). They were charged before the IHT for various crimes
against humanity, war crimes and genocide, found guilty, and sentenced to death. The IHT
Appeals Chamber dismissed their appeal and confirmed their conviction and sentence. 133 They
have since been executed.
Before the Appeals Chamber, one of Saddam Hussein‟s arguments against his conviction
and sentence by the Trial Chamber was that the acts constituting his alleged crimes were
performed in his official capacity as a head of state and were, therefore, protected by immunity
in international law. The Chamber rejected this argument and held that immunity does not
prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction. The Chamber‟s reasoning is as follows 134:
1) The law allows the trial of any person accused of committing a crime, regardless of his
official capacity, even if he was a president or a member of government or of its council.
His capacity does not excuse him from penalty and does not constitute extenuating
circumstances. Immunity is the practical immunity which is related to the position held.
Therefore, no one who committed crimes can claim that his acts are outside the law.
2) Immunity is not given to serve the interests of the person who holds the official position,
but for the welfare of society, and should not violate international penal law.
3) If immunity constitutes a protective framework against prosecution, this principle was no
longer recognized after World War II, and immunity has lost its effect since then. The
establishment of criminal courts to try international crimes is an indication of the end of
the immunity principle.
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4) Immunity should be a reason for increasing the penalty rather than its mitigation, for a
person who enjoys it usually exercises power which enables him to affect a large number
of people, which intensifies the damages and losses resulting from commission of crimes.
5) The president of the state has international responsibility for the crimes he commits
against the international community, since it is not logical and just to punish subordinates
who execute illegal orders issued by the president and his aides, and to excuse the
president who ordered and schemed for the commission of those crimes.
One interesting issue about this and similar cases is the fact that Hussein was in Iraq at
the time of his trial, which means that state immunity as an international rule would not
necessarily have been relevant. But because of the hybrid nature of the tribunal and the fact that
it is not purely an Iraqi domestic court, the rule was relevant in the circumstance. Also, in
Prosecutor v Al-Majid et al135, the IHT tried Sultan Hashim Ahmed (Iraqi Defence Minister at all
material times) for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, found him guilty and
sentenced him to death. The Appeals Chamber of the IHT also confirmed his conviction and
sentence. 136

4.5.3 The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (the “Cambodia Tribunal”, or
the “ECCC”, or the “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”) is established pursuant to the Agreement between
the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under
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Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the period of Democratic Kampuchea 137 (“UN-Cambodia
Agreement”). It was created to try the surviving most senior members of the Khmer Rouge138

regime and other persons most responsible for violations of Cambodian and international penal
law committed in Cambodia throughout this regime (between 17 April, 1975 and 6 January,
1979) and to provide justice to Cambodian victims of such violations. 139
The UN-Cambodia Agreement is implemented in Cambodia through the Law on the
Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 140 (“ECCC Law”). The ECCC
Law provides the ECCC with subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of Cambodian penal
law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by
Cambodia. It also confers on the ECCC personal jurisdiction over senior leaders of the
Democratic Kampuchea. 141
By article 9 of the UN-Cambodia Agreement142, the ECCC can, inter alia, try the
following crimes: genocide 143, crimes against humanity144 and grave breaches of the 1949
Geneva Conventions. 145 In article 29, the ECCC Law establishes the individual criminal
137
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responsibility of any suspect or accused person charged before the ECCC. It also establishes
command responsibility. 146 The second paragraph of the same article 29 provides that “The
position or rank of any suspect shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility or
mitigate punishment.”147
Consequently, the ECCC has tried a number of high-ranking state officials of the former
Khmer Rouge regime. 148 In Prosecutor v Eav149, Kaing Guek Eav (also called “Kang Kek Iew”),
who at all material times acted as the head of the Khmer Rouge internal security, was convicted
and sentenced to imprisonment for thirty-five years. His trial was for various crimes against
humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. On February 3, 2012, the
Supreme Court Chamber of the ECCC, in dismissing his appeal against conviction and sentence,
not only confirmed his conviction but also increased his sentence to life imprisonment.
Prosecutor v Sary & Ors150 deals with the trial of the following very high-ranking
officials of the former Khmer Rouge regime: Ieng Sary (a Deputy Prime Minister), Khieu
Samphan (a former President), and Noun Chea (chief ideologist of the Khmer Rouge and second
in command to the former Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot). They are accused of committing
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and genocide.
These are based on the part they played in “the killing fields” – the mass slaughter of their own
people when this regime ruled. Ieng Sary died before his conviction and sentence, and so on
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March 14, 2013, his trial was terminated by the Trial Chamber of the ECCC. 151 Khieu Samphan
and Noun Chea continue to stand trial for these crimes before the ECCC.

4.5.4 The International Crimes (Tribunal) Act in Bangladesh
The International Crimes Tribunal (the “ICT” or the “Bangladesh Tribunal”) is a hybrid
criminal tribunal in Bangladesh. It was set up in 2009 to investigate and prosecute suspects in the
genocide committed in Bangladesh in 1971 by the Pakistani Army and their Bangladeshi
collaborators during the Bangladeshi war of liberation.152 The instrument that authorized its
establishment has been in force since July 20, 1973153. However, it remained dormant, as no
tribunal was set up and no trial was conducted pursuant to it, until it was amended and
reintroduced by an Act of the Bangladeshi Parliament in 2009. 154 Today, the operations of the
Tribunal are governed by the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act155, as amended (the “ICT
Amended Act” or the “Amended Act”) after it was eventually established on March 25, 2010.156
Although the ICT is a domestic tribunal, it deals exclusively with international crimes
and in accordance with international law. The long title of the Act states its purpose as follows:
“An Act to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law”.
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By article 3(1) of the ICT Amended Act, the Tribunal has power to try any individual or
group of individuals of any nationality, who commits or has committed in Bangladesh, whether
before or after the commencement of the ICT Amended Act, any of listed international crimes.
These crimes include: crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, violation of any
humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts as laid down by the Geneva Conventions of
1949157, and any other crimes under international law.158
Article 4 affirms the individual criminal responsibility of every person charged before the
Tribunal. It also establishes command responsibility. Most interestingly, article 5(1) of the
Amended Act provides that “The official position, at any time, of an accused person shall not be
considered freeing him from responsibility or mitigating punishment.”159
Although the Tribunal has conducted a couple of trials and handed down some
convictions and sentences160, so far there have been no trials and convictions of high-ranking
state officials whose official status at the material times would have qualified them for state
immunity. However, it is possible that such trials and sentences will come along, especially
given the wide powers of the Tribunal under the ICT Amended Act. Again, the rule would not
ordinarily have applied in these cases before Bangladeshi domestic courts if not for the hybrid
status of the tribunal.
One of the major innovations introduced by the ICT Amended Act in the hybrid criminal
tribunal mechanism is the expansion of the ICT‟s substantive jurisdiction by including in the
Act‟s article 3(2)(f) a general power for the ICT to try “any other crimes under international
157
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law”161. This is unlike most other hybrid tribunals whose jurisdictions are restricted to the core
international crimes, i.e., genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (and aggression, in
some cases). It is a commendable step that a hybrid tribunal has such unlimited substantive
international criminal jurisdiction, implying that a high-ranking state official charged before it
for any international crime beyond the core ones could still be stripped of immunity and
subjected to full individual accountability.

4.5.5 The UNTAET Regulation on the Special Panels in East Timor
Upon the withdrawal of the Indonesian military forces in September 1999 from the
occupation of East Timor, the UN set up the United Nations Transitional Authority (the
“UNTAET”) to administer East Timor pending its independence in 2002.162 established an
Investigative Commission (the “Commission”).163 On 6 June 2000, the UNTAET established
the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) in East Timor. This was done through the
adoption of the UNTAET Regulation 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences164 (“UNTAET Regulation 2000/15” or “SPSC
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Regulation”). The SPSC has two sets of panels of judges: the trial Panels 165 and the appellate
Panels 166. The Panels are composed of international and East Timorese judges. 167
The SPSC Regulation confers on the SPSC substantive jurisdiction over the following
“serious offences” (crimes): genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual
offences, and torture.168 Section 14 establishes individual criminal responsibility, and section
15 totally abolishes the immunity rule in the following terms:
1. The present regulation shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in
no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under the
present regulation, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
reduction of sentence.169
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall
not bar the panels from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
Although the Special Panels have recorded some convictions 170, no high-ranking state
officials that would have benefitted from the immunity rule have so far been tried by the
Panels. 171 In any case, should they be brought to trial, it is clear in the provisions of the
Regulation that they would not enjoy immunity. These provisions of the SPSC Regulation are,
therefore, a step in the right direction in the in the fight against the evils of state immunity.
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4.5.6 The Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Courts of Senegal
The Extraordinary African Chambers within the Courts of Senegal (“African Chambers”
or the “Chambers”) is a hybrid criminal tribunal established within the national courts of
Senegal. 172 It is set up pursuant to the Statute of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the
Courts of Senegal173 (“African Chambers Statute”). The purpose of its creation is to try persons
most responsible for serious international crimes committed in the Republic of Chad between 7
June 1982 and 1 December 1990. 174 It was principally established at the behest of the AU in
order to bring to international criminal justice Hissene Habre, who was the Chadian President
during the relevant period). Habre is accused of responsibility for the deaths of more than 40,000
people and torture of more than 20,000 during his eight-year rule of Chad from 1982 to 1990.175
The Chambers were opened on February 8, 2013.176
The Chambers, which have jurisdiction over the international crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and torture177, are composed of Senegalese and non-Senegalese
judges appointed by the Senegalese government and the AU. 178 They are empowered to apply
both the Statute and Senegalese law. 179 Article 10 of the African Chambers Statute affirms the
individual criminal responsibility of accused persons, establishes the command responsibility of
superiors, and abolishes immunity and the defence of superior orders. Particularly, article 10(3)
172
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states regarding immunity that “The official position of an accused, whether as Head of State or
Government, or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve him or her of criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of
sentence.”180
These provisions have made possible the indictment and commencement of the trial of
Hissene Habre for crimes against humanity, torture, and war crimes before the Chambers. Habre,
who is also wanted by Belgium on similar charges pursuant to the universal jurisdiction
mechanism, is now in pre-trial detention. 181

4.5.7 The Legal Instruments of Other Hybrid Tribunals
Other tribunals under the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism include the War Crimes
Chambers in the Courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the War Crimes Chambers in the Courts of
Croatia, and the War Crimes Chambers in the Courts of Serbia. 182 However, the enabling legal
instruments of these tribunals (all established in the breakaway republics of the former
Yugoslavia) do not have express provisions on the abolition or disregard of the immunity rule. 183
The reason for this gap/omission may not be far-fetched. These War Crimes Chambers were
established to help relieve the ICTY of its case load by trying some mid- and lower-ranking
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accused persons that could not be tried by the ICTY, and to help continue the work of the ICTY
beyond the end of its temporal mandate in 2010.184 Thus, since the mid- and lower-ranking
persons were not entitled to immunity in the first place, there is, therefore, no immunity to
disregard.
However, this argument could still be faulted on the ground that it was not all the highranking officials indicted by the ICTY that could be tried before the ICTY completed its
temporal mandate. Some are still at large. 185 Thus, whenever they are caught and charged before
any of the War Crimes Chambers, the state immunity rule could be pleaded as a bar.
Consequently, the omission should be quickly filled in. 186

4.5.8 Overview
The foregoing examination shows that, like the ad hoc international criminal tribunal
mechanism, the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism is capable of abolishing the state immunity
rule by holding individually accountable for international crimes culpable high-ranking state
officials who would have otherwise been shielded by the rule. The trials conducted by most of
the hybrid tribunals reaffirm the position that the state immunity rule has seriously lost its
strength in the international criminal justice system. Most of the accused persons, who were
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once in absolute control of their state, are today being tried for atrocities they had committed
many decades ago when they felt they would remain perpetually untouchable. This position
shows that there is no more hiding place for persons who commit international crimes under the
cover of official capacity. If they go free today, the nets of the international criminal justice
system are likely to catch them tomorrow.
The next response mechanism is the Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism.
This is examined next.

4.6

The Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute187 (“ICC Statute” or the “Statute”) which establishes

the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or the “Court”) was adopted by the UN Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.188 The
ICC Statute came into force on July 1, 2002.189
Article 5 of the Statute vests the ICC with jurisdiction over persons responsible for “the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”190. It lists these
crimes as: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Article
27 expressly abolishes immunity for any high-ranking state official charged before the Court.
According to this article:
(1) This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as Head of
State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt
187
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a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in
and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.191
(2) Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law,
shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person. 192
Consequently, a head of state/government or any other high-ranking state official loses
his immunity (ratione personae and ratione materiae) when indicted by or charged before the
ICC. This has been described as clear confirmation of the new international law rule that
individuals (no matter how highly placed) can no longer be absolved of international criminal
responsibility (at least for the so-called “core international crimes”) by the state immunity rule.
Fred Nkusi reiterates this outcome as follows 193:
Clearly, the provision [article 27 of the Rome Statute] generally eliminates
both immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae attached
to state officials irrespective of their capacity in respect of international
crimes. The ICC Statute removes expressly immunities of State officials
including Heads of State or Government. Article 27 has become standard
in the founding legal framework of international tribunals. Paragraph (1)
of the provision does not address the issue of immunity accorded by
international law to state officials, rather it addresses the substantive
responsibility of state officials with respect to international crimes.
Paragraph (2) explicitly waives international and national immunity. On
this point, it can be underlined that immunities accorded to state officials,
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the court from
exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. Truly speaking, immunities
of state officials who are state parties to the ICC Statute are subject to the
jurisdiction of the ICC and the provision contains an automatic waiver of
immunity entitled to them….194
The prohibitions contained in article 27 against state immunity are complemented by
those of articles 59 and 89 of the same Rome Statute. Under article 59, a state party which has
191
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received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps
to arrest the person in question in accordance, inter alia, with its laws, and shall deliver him to
the ICC once he is ordered to be surrendered. By article 89, the ICC may transmit a request for
the arrest and surrender of an accused person to any state on the territory of which the person
may be found, and states parties are required to co-operate by complying with the requests. By
the combined effect of the two latter articles, a state party whose national is indicted by the ICC
or on whose territory any person so indicted is found is obligated to arrest and surrender him to
the ICC for prosecution at the ICC‟s request, notwithstanding his rank or political status. These
articles clearly constitute a commendable innovation that the ICC Statute has introduced in the
anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system. As discussed in detail in
the next chapter, however, the value of these and other commendable provisions of the Statute is
currently affected by some adverse factors, including selective justice and external political and
allied influences.
On the strength of the provisions of its Statute, the ICC has succeeded in indicting and
commencing the prosecution of high-ranking officials from many states.195 For example, in
Prosecutor v Al Bashir196, the ICC indicted Omar Hassan Al-Bashir (the incumbent President of
Sudan) for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and issued a warrant for his
arrest. His charges are still pending before the ICC. 197 Meanwhile, by virtue of the indictment,
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the ICC asks all states to arrest and extradite Al-Bashir to the Court for trial. 198 New charges
have also been leveled against him. 199
Also in Prosecutor v Gombo200, the ICC indicted and issued an arrest warrant against
Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, a former Vice President of the DRC, for crimes against humanity
and war crimes he committed in the Central African Republic. He was consequently arrested by
the Belgian authorities on May 24, 2008, and handed over to the ICC. He is currently standing
trial at the Court for these crimes.
The situation in Kenya is not different. In Prosecutor v Ruto & Anor201, the incumbent
Kenyan Vice President, William Ruto, was charged with crimes against humanity committed
during Kenya‟s post-presidential election violence of 2007. His trial is pending. Furthermore, in
Prosecutor v Kenyatta202, the Court, on March 8, 2011, issued summons to Uhuru Kenyatta,
former Deputy Prime Minister and current President of Kenya, to appear before the Court for
trial for crimes against humanity leveled against him. Kenyatta has submitted to the Court‟s
jurisdiction and his trial is scheduled to proceed on 7 October 2014.203
In Prosecutor v Gaddafi & Ors204, the Court, inter alia, issued a warrant for the arrest
and prosecution of the following high-ranking officials of Libya: Muammar Gaddafi (then
Libyan head of state) and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Libyan de facto Prime Minister). Their charges
included crimes against humanity allegedly committed against the people of Libya between 15 th
and, at least, 28th February, 2011 (during the recent “Arab Spring”) with the use of the Libyan
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state apparatus and security forces. The case against Muammar Gaddafi was, however,
terminated on November 22, 2011, following his death. 205
On November 23, 2011, the ICC, in Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo206, issued a warrant of
arrest against Laurent Gbagbo (former Prime Minister of Cote d‟Ivoire) for four counts of crimes
against humanity committed in the context of the post-electoral violence in Cote d‟Ivoire
between December 16, 2010 and April 12, 2011. According to the charges against him, Gbagbo
bears individual criminal responsibility, as an indirect co-perpetrator, for these crimes. He was
subsequently transferred to the ICC detention at the Hague by the Ivorian authorities and is now
standing trial for these crimes. 207 There are also a couple of similar cases pending before the
Court against other high-ranking state officials. 208
These cases show that the ICC mechanism‟s position against state immunity applies to
both former and sitting high-ranking state officials. For example, although Jean Pierre Gombo
and Laurent Gbagbo were charged as former officials, Muammar Gaddafi, Uhuru Kenyatta, and
Omar al Bashir, were all sitting heads of state at the time of their respective charges. The charges
against William Ruto were also brought against him as a sitting Vice President. This position
leads to a re-visit of the raging controversy, which mainly arose from Al Bashir‟s indictment, as
to whether article 27 of the Rome Statute actually ends the immunity ratione personae of state
officials. 209
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For the following reasons, this thesis argues that the article ends this class of immunity
before the ICC. First, starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal era, it has been made clear that
commission of international crimes does not qualify as an official act, and that there is no
immunity, including ratione personae, before an international criminal tribunal. Second, part of
the principal essence of the immunity ratione personae of a state official, as expressed in the
Latin maxim: “par in parem non habet imperium”, is to preserve the dignity of his state by
ensuring that its incumbent alter ego is not impleaded in the national courts of its equal. 210
However, it should be noted that the ICC is not a national court, but an international tribunal
created to administer global criminal justice. Thus, the issue of preservation of state equality and
dignity does not apply. Third, international crimes, at least the core ones, shock the whole world.
Therefore, the exemption of a single culpable state official from accountability by immunity
ratione personae should not take pre-eminence over the welfare, peace and security of the
international community as a whole.

4.7

Conclusion
The various legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to the

problems of the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system
have produced some positive results. They all denounce state immunity, and have succeeded in
establishing that immunity should no longer shield a high-ranking state official from legal
accountability for international crimes. Consequently, many high-ranking state officials, who
would have, hitherto, escaped justice for their international crimes, have been, and can be
subjected to the full wrath of international criminal law. For the future of the international
210
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criminal justice system, this means that the state immunity rule has lost its strength, and all its
vestiges will soon be obliterated, at least, before the ICC and the ad hoc/hybrid tribunals,
although immunity ratione personae still continues before national courts.
However, each of these mechanisms has some shortcomings that render it substantially
ineffective. Again, the efforts on the abolition/disregard of state immunity in the international
criminal justice system have some general shortcomings that make their objectives difficult to
fully

realize.

All

these

are

examined
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in

detail

in

the

next

chapter.

CHAPTER 5
WEAKNESSES OF THE MECHANISMS OF LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS
OF STATE IMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
5.1

Introduction
Each of the mechanisms through which the international community has responded to the

problems arising from the application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal
justice system has made a positive impact in the system. In differing ways, each mechanism has
attempted to ensure the individual criminal accountability of high-ranking state officials by the
removal of the state immunity rule in its proceedings. The mechanisms have established the
position that high-ranking state officials cannot hide under the cloak of state immunity to avoid
international criminal responsibility today. However, these mechanisms also manifest some
weaknesses, which hamper their effectiveness. The weaknesses include: selective justice;
amenability to political and allied influences; limited geographical, temporal and substantive
jurisdictional coverage; and lopsided focus on high-ranking officials of developing states. These
weaknesses, which cumulatively undermine the goals of the anti-state-immunity efforts of the
international criminal justice system, are examined in this chapter.

5.2

Weaknesses of the Ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal Mechanisms
As discussed in Chapter Four, the tribunals under this mechanism are: the International

Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) (the “Nuremberg Tribunal”), the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (the “Tokyo Tribunal”), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (the “ICTY” or the “Yugoslavia Tribunal”), and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (the “ICTR” or the “Rwanda Tribunal”).
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The positions taken against state immunity by the legal regimes of these tribunals have,
without a doubt, gone a long way in curbing international criminal impunity among high-ranking
state officials, since they enable the tribunals to try and punish these officials who would have
otherwise been shielded from personal accountability by the state immunity rule. They have also
provided justice for victims of international crimes committed by these officials within the
tribunals‟ respective geographical areas of operation. 1
These achievements notwithstanding, the ad hoc international criminal tribunal
mechanism has some patent and latent shortcomings that substantially undermine its response to
the problems of state immunity. One of these shortcomings is that only a few states (mainly the
world powers of each relevant time) have participated in the creation of the tribunals. Thus, the
tribunals could be said to represent the parochial wishes of these few states at the given time, and
not the general and democratic intention of the international community of states to bring to
justice the international crimes of high-ranking state officials. For example, the special tribunal
proposed to try Emperor Wilhelm II (ex-German Emperor) after World War I (the “Wilhelm
Tribunal”) was to be set up by the Allied and Associated Powers to try the head of state of the
leading Axis Power, Germany.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were set up by the

victorious Allied Powers after the Second World War. 2 The Yugoslavia Tribunal was created by
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the UN Security Council (with the influence of the five permanent members, namely, China,
France, Russia, UK and US), and is a subsidiary organ of the Council. 3 This is also the case with
the Rwanda Tribunal. 4
As well, the creation of the tribunals was dependent, at all times, on the political
disposition of the international community (highly influenced by the interests of the world
powers). Thus, in some cases, the international community deems it necessary to act. In others, it
is silent. Consequently, the ability of the tribunals to respond to the problems of the state
immunity rule and punish culpable high-ranking state officials so as to deter future perpetrators,
is limited to situations where international power politics favour creating such tribunals.
Therefore, when the international community does not deem it necessary to act, the crimes of
other officials go unpunished, and their ultimate victims receive no justice. 5
Furthermore, these tribunals and their enabling legal instruments are created and adopted,
respectively, after the situations they are meant to address. The instruments empower the
tribunals to try and punish crimes committed in the past.6 The tribunals apply ex post facto (afterthe-fact/event) laws, and their operation could, consequently, be seen as violating the
fundamental international human rights law principle of non-retroactivity of penal legislation,
Special Proclamation, Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946, TIAS No 1589;
Tokyo Charter, 1946, 1946, TIAS No 1589, arts 1-2.
3
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i.e., the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege principle that has become part of the customary
international law of criminal prosecution. 7 This principle requires that a person should be tried
and punished only for a crime that existed at the time of its alleged commission. In other words,
the events brought before a criminal tribunal must constitute clearly defined crimes established
in a previous law that precedes the tribunal, and the punishments for such crimes must also be
stipulated in that preceding law.8 A typical instance of this violation relates to the controversy
surrounding the jurisdiction exercised by the Nuremberg Tribunal over “crimes against
humanity” committed by the Nazis before the adoption of the Tribunal‟s legal instrument –
ahead of crimes that was then unknown in international law. 9 The danger in this practice is that
the powers establishing these tribunals may indirectly use them to target high-ranking officials of
some of their enemy states for punishment in respect of acts done in the remote past.
The allegation of retroactive criminal justice is countered on the ground that the crimes
the tribunals punish(ed) are/were already existing under customary international law, except that
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(Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 3 at 5-6. Cryer, Robert et al, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 79. See
further Baytemir, Burcu, “The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg: The Ongoing Reflections in
International Criminal Law” (2010) 3 USAK YIPL 77 at 85; Thompson, David, “Ex Post Facto Law and the
Nuremberg Trials”, Axis History Forum, 24 January 2003, online: < http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t
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See, e.g., Currie, Robert & Joseph Rikhof, International & Transnational Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin
Law Inc, 2013) at 122-123
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there were no international courts to punish them before the tribunals were created. 10 For the
modern ad hoc tribunals, this position is convincing. However, this could not be said with all
certainty in relation to crimes against humanity for which the Nazi leaders and their Japanese
allies were stripped of their immunity and tried and punished by the Nuremberg and Tokyo
Tribunals. 11
Another major weakness of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism is that
the tribunals‟ geographical jurisdictions are restricted to specific states or regions of the world.
Consequently, even the heinous international crimes that they try, if they are committed outside
the specified states or regions, do not come before them. 12 They are never meant to dispense
universal and uniform international criminal justice. Thus, in states or regions outside their
geographical jurisdictions, high-ranking state officials may continue committing international
crimes in perpetuum and hiding under the veil of state immunity.
Similarly, their temporal jurisdictions are limited to given timeframes. For example, the
Wilhelm Tribunal was intended to try Emperor Wilhelm II for international crimes committed
during World War I.13 The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were created to try international
crimes committed during the period of the Second World War - 1939 to 1945 - and no more.14
The ICTY was set up to prosecute persons most responsible for the serious international crimes
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 15, i.e., throughout the period of
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See, ICCPR, supra, note 8, art 15(2); Nsereko, Daniel D Ntanda, “The Evolution of International Criminal and the
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39 at 43.
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See Currie & Rikhof, op cit, note 9; Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008) at 106.
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See, e.g., the ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, art 8, and the ICTR Statute, supra, note 6, art 1.
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The Treaty of Versailles, supra, note 6, preamble.
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See Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 2, art 1 and Tokyo Charter, supra, note 2, art 1, respectively.
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ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, preamble and art 1. See also ICTY, “Mandate and Crimes under ICTY Jurisdiction”,
online: < http://www.icty.org/sid/320>;

169

the Balkans war. It was required to complete all investigations by the end of 2004, all first
instance trials by the end of 2008, and all work in 2010 16, although the timelines were later
extended. 17 The ICTR was specifically established to try persons responsible for genocide and
other heinous international crimes committed in Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for
such crimes in neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.18
Consequently, even during a tribunal‟s lifetime, crimes within the tribunal‟s substantive
and geographical jurisdictions that are committed by high-ranking state officials outside its
temporal mandate are no business of the tribunal. With regard to such crimes, the immunity and
impunity of such officials continue to thrive. All these mean that the tribunals do not possess the
feature of continuity and permanence. They are invented to attend to certain exigencies within
given timeframes, and their ad hoc nature renders them fugacious institutions unsuitable for a
universal and global development of international criminal law. 19
Another weakness of the mechanism is that the substantive jurisdictions of these tribunals
were dictated by the peculiar historical exigencies and circumstances of each one‟s creation and
its creators‟ mindsets at the particular point in time. Thus, substantive international crimes tried
by one tribunal may not be within another‟s jurisdiction. For example, while the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals had jurisdiction over crimes against peace 20 (aggression), the ICTY and ICTR
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lack such jurisdiction. On the other hand, the ICTY and ICTR could try the crime of genocide 21,
which had not been formulated when their Nuremberg and Tokyo counterparts were established.
Finally, most of the ad hoc tribunals are alleged to administer “victor‟s justice”. In other
words, they were/are post-conflict institutions set up by the winning parties to conflicts to try and
punish individuals of the losing parties. The tribunals were/are, therefore, enmeshed in partiality
and selective justice. As a result, the trial and punishment of high-ranking state officials do not
involve, or involve insufficiently, the victorious parties, no matter the enormity of their own
crimes. 22 For example, the Wilhelm Tribunal was proposed by the Allied and Associated Powers
specifically to try the German Emperor, the head of the vanquished Axis Powers, who was even
identified by his personal name in the enabling legal instrument of the proposed tribunal. 23 No
provision was made in this instrument for the trial of high-ranking officials of member states of
the Allied and Associated Powers, who must have also committed their own crimes in the course
of the war. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were created by the victorious Allied Powers 24
after World War II, exclusively and expressly to try and punish individuals (high-ranking
officials) belonging to the defeated Axis Powers25. High-ranking officials of the Allied and
Associated Powers (who committed terrible crimes during the war) were never brought to
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ICTY Statute, supra,note 6, art 4, and ICTR Statute, supra, note 6, art 2.
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justice.

26

Speaking of the Nuremberg trials, for instance, Burcu Baytemir 27 highlighted this

problem as follows:
… while considering the criticisms of “victor‟s justice”, it was reminded
that the judges were all nationals of the conquering nations. Moreover, the
governing law in the Chamber has not been equally applied. The standard
of guilt has been applied only to the defeated nations. For instance, the
Russians were not forced to defend their operations in Finland or Poland.
Like the Russians, the Americans were not required to justify Hiroshima.
This inequality … is the product of a primitive international order. The
victor has applied a unilateral standard in … dealing with traditional war
crimes. 28
Allegations also abound that high-ranking officials and soldiers of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) member states committed war crimes during the Yugoslavian war
that resulted in the ICTY‟s creation. 29 However, none of these NATO officials or soldiers was
ever charged by the ICTY. Only high-ranking officials of Yugoslavia were stripped of their
immunity before the Tribunal and tried and punished. 30 Also, allegations exist to the effect that
some high-ranking officials of France and the UK were involved in the Rwandan genocide that
gave rise to the creation of the ICTR. 31 Yet, none of them has ever been indicted before the
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Stam, Robert & Ella Shohat, Flagging Patriotism: Crises of Narcissism and Ant-Americanism (New York:

172

ICTR. Again, it is only high-ranking Rwandan officials who have been stripped of their
immunity by the Tribunal and tried and sentenced to various forms of punishment. 32
Besides, even among culpable officials of the losing parties, there is still selectivity as to
whom to try and punish. In some instances, a tribunal will only proceed against a party‟s official
when none of the victorious powers is interested in protecting him. Where any of the powers has
some political, economic, or allied interests in protecting him or her, he or she would be
exempted from the tribunal‟s state-immunity-removing regime and from personal accountability
for his or her alleged international crimes. For example, during World War II, Emperor Hirohito
of Japan (then Japanese head of state and Supreme Commander) was alleged to have personally
approved all his country‟s barbaric military ventures. 33 However, the Allied Powers decided to
exempt him from trial before the Tokyo Tribunal due to the interests of some members of this
group, particularly the US, while other Japanese officials were tried and punished. 34 Kingsley
Moghalu35 captures the scenario of this exemption as follows:
… The element that has chiefly triggered the ambivalence of historians
toward the Tokyo war crimes trials is the extent to which the commitment
to justice was compromised by the double standard of the political and
strategic considerations of the Allied Powers…. The Chief prosecutor of
the IMTFE … made the most important decision of the Tokyo trial
process. That decision – a deliberate and political, rather than judicial one
– was to exempt Hirohito, the emperor of Japan, from prosecution for war
crimes even as the country‟s military, the political leadership, and even
Hirohito‟s royal household faced trial. Britain supported the U.S. position,
but the Soviet Union insisted on a trial of the emperor. In Tokyo, even far
Routledge, 2007) at 204-205; Melvern, Linda R, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda‟s Genocide
(London: Zed Books, 2000).
32
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< http://www.hope-of-israel.org/hirohito.htm>; Bix, Herbert P, “Emperor Hirohito in 20th Century History: The
Debate Rekindles”, JPRI Working Paper 92 (June 2003), online; < http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/
wp92.html>.
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International, 2006) at 41-47.
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more than at Nuremberg, America was the dominant ally and its position
naturally prevailed. 36
A similar weakness is that some of the tribunals were/are influenced by external political
manipulation by the creating parties, so that they lack judicial independence. 37 This is seen in the
fact that the judges of the earlier tribunals were selected from among nationals of the victorious
powers and their allies, specifically the Wilhelm, Nuremberg, and Tokyo Tribunals. The
Wilhelm Tribunal was to be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the allied and
associated powers, namely, the US, UK, France, Italy and Japan. 38 The Nuremberg Tribunal
consisted of four members (judges), each with an alternate. One member and one alternate was
appointed by each of the signatories 39 (allied powers) to the Tribunal‟s legal instrument. 40
It is defensible to argue that the appointing powers would only appoint judges who would
act their script and do the bidding of the appointing Powers. Thus, the independence and
impartiality of these tribunals was not guaranteed. Worse, the Nuremberg Charter, for example,
makes the Nuremberg Tribunal unquestionable by providing that “Neither the tribunal, its
members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their
counsel.”41 This practice clearly breaches the fair trial rule of natural justice, in particular, the
principle of “nemo judex in causa sua” (no person can judge a case in which he or she is a party
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or in which he or she has an interest).42 By establishing these Tribunals and appointing their
nationals as the judges to try those they defeated in conflicts, the appointing states have become
judges in their own causes. Overall, one could argue that the anti-state-immunity efforts made
through some of these tribunals, by the victors, were not done in good faith.
Like the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism, the universal criminal
jurisdiction mechanism also has its peculiar weaknesses, which will be examined next.

5.3

Weaknesses of the Universal Criminal Jurisdiction Mechanism
There is no gainsaying that the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism could be the

best response to the problems of state immunity in the international criminal justice system. This
is because it offers the advantage of multiple jurisdictional choices for bringing to justice state
officials who commit international crimes. Ideally, the national courts of most states could
compete to subject culpable officials to justice: if the judicial system of one state is not ready or
able to try the officials in question, the courts of other states may be ready and able to do so.43
This is one reason supporters of universal jurisdiction maintain that such jurisdiction is needed
despite the creation of other international criminal law enforcement mechanisms. These
supporters see the ad hoc international criminal tribunals created by the UN Security Council and
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the ICC as able to try only a handful of participants in international crimes owing to the expense
of their proceedings and their limited territorial, temporal and personal jurisdictions. 44
Opponents of this broad use of universal jurisdiction contend that it has one major
potential danger. This is the likelihood of its manipulation by states against sitting high-ranking
officials of enemy states who benefit from immunity ratione personae. They argue that mere
political rivalry among states can lead to the risk of one state trying to lift the immunity of sitting
officials of another state by baselessly commencing international criminal proceedings in the
national courts of the former state.45
The advantage of multiple jurisdictional choices offered by this mechanism may
outweigh its shortcoming mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Even so, it has features that
undermine its effectiveness in confronting the problems of the state immunity rule. First, though
the legal instruments under which this mechanism is adopted disclose that state immunity should
not be a barrier to the prosecution and punishment of the crimes they prohibit, this intention is
not expressly declared in some of the instruments. National courts are thus left with the difficult
task of inferring these intentions by means of judicial interpretation. 46 This situation may lead to
inconsistent practice among national courts. Thus, in circumstances where the courts of one state
may deny immunity, the courts of another state may still grant immunity. In R v Bow Street
Stipendiary Magistrates, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte47 (No 3) (the “Pinochet case”), for example,
part of the dissenting opinion of Lord Phillips states as follows:
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Where states, by convention, agree that their national courts shall have
jurisdiction on a universal basis in respect of an international crime, such
agreement cannot implicitly remove immunities ratione personae that exist
under international law. Such immunities can only be removed by express
agreement or waiver.48 Such an agreement was incorporated in the
Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide
1948, which provides: “Persons committing genocide or any of the other
acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.”
Had the Genocide Convention not contained this provision, an issue could
have been raised as to whether the jurisdiction conferred by the
Convention was subject to state immunity….49
Secondly, although some relevant international legal instruments are intended to confer
universal jurisdiction and abolish immunity over the international crimes they prohibit, some of
them contain provisions which undermine the universal jurisdiction mission and render the antiimmunity efforts of the mechanism less effective. For instance, under article 4 of the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide50 (“Genocide
Convention”), “Persons committing genocide … shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”. However, article 6
provides that “Persons charged with genocide … shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the
State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as
may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its
jurisdiction.” By article 6, the Genocide Convention fails to even vest universal jurisdiction in
the courts of all states parties to the Convention. It vests jurisdiction over the crime only in the
territorial state.
The foregoing means that where the alleged offenders are in control of political power in
the state in which the genocide was committed, they can manipulate the state‟s judicial system
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against their prosecution. Again, where such an international penal tribunal envisaged by the
Convention (e.g., the current ICC) is established, a state party to the Genocide Convention in
whose territory genocide was committed, or whose officials committed it, may not accept the
Court‟s jurisdiction. 51 In these two scenarios, the culprits could go scot-free. In the first scenario,
there is no obligation to “prosecute or extradite” to another state for prosecution under the
Genocide Convention, and there is no will to prosecute domestically. In the second scenario, the
state involved may not be bound by the enabling statute of the penal tribunal. Thus, the immunity
and impunity of the culpable officials will continue to thrive. It may be argued that there is now
universal jurisdiction over genocide under customary international law. 52 This would compensate
for this serious weakness in the Genocide Convention. However, this may not be sufficient
compensation, given the general political unwillingness of states to employ the universal
criminal jurisdiction mechanism, even in the face of clear treaty obligations to do so. 53
The factors of lack of express provisions on disregard of state immunity and conferment
of universal jurisdiction, and self-contradictory provisions, all of which are discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, played out in Re Sharon & Yaron54. In this case, the Belgian Cour de
Cassation held that article 6 of the Genocide Convention denied Belgian courts universal
51
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jurisdiction over the first accused person‟s alleged international crimes. A number of survivors of
the 1982 massacre in Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps (Lebanon) had lodged a
criminal complaint against Ariel Sharon (Israeli Defence Minister at the time of the massacre and
Prime Minister at the time of the complaint) and Amos Yaron (commander of an Israeli army
unit at the gates of the refugee camps), accusing them of genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes. In denying jurisdiction and dismissing the case against Sharon, the Cour de
Cassation held thus:
International custom does not allow heads of state or government to be
prosecuted before criminal courts of a foreign state, absent international
rules binding upon the states concerned. Certainly, Article IV of the
Convention on Genocide provides that persons who have committed …
genocide shall be punished without taking into account their official
status. Nevertheless, Article VI … only envisages prosecution … before a
competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was
committed or before the International Criminal Court. It follows … that
immunity … is excluded before the courts referred to in Article VI, but it
is not … before a court of a third state that intends to exercise jurisdiction
not provided for in the treaty.… The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols … do not contain any provision impeding the
immunity … of which the defendant may [avail] himself before Belgian
courts….55
Thirdly, due to political, economic and allied considerations, the courts of many states
have not been willing to apply the universal jurisdiction mechanism in order to try and punish
high-ranking officials of foreign states.56 Typical examples are the numerous criminal cases
commenced in the courts of Germany, France, Argentina, Sweden, and Spain, against Donald
Rumsfeld (former US Defence Secretary), George Walker Bush (former US President) and other
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high-ranking US officials. 57 The charges indicted them for their roles in the torture of detainees
in the US‟ detention facility in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq, Afghanistan
and in secret “black sites”58 operated by the US around the globe.59 The US had failed to
prosecute these officials and so the charges were commenced pursuant to these other states‟
universal jurisdiction laws. Many of the charges have, however, been dismissed in response to
political and allied pressure from the US, while others were dismissed on grounds of state
immunity. 60
In practice, this mechanism is rarely invoked against high-ranking state officials. It is
almost exclusively employed to try and punish ordinary individuals and state officials of lower
rank.61 This habit is not unconnected to the desire of states to maintain reciprocal friendly
relations with each other.62 The result is that state immunity, together with its problems,
continues to operate in the international criminal justice system, despite the existence of the
universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism. The consequence of this situation for the world was
captured by Guerreiro who commented:
Despite the acceleration in legislative activity that followed the creation
of the Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, realpolitik still loomed large
over the protection of Human Rights, in such a manner that the world
57
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witnessed, for the first three decades of the Cold War, individuals acting
blatantly against mankind without being punished. Among the most
serious cases, the military interventions in Vietnam and the Gulf and
violations of Human Rights in Cuba, Chile, Argentina and South Africa
stand out.63
The observations of the International Council on Human Rights Policy (“ICHRP”)
express the impact of this troubling scenario on the international criminal judicial process itself.
According to the Council:
Prosecutions of current leaders should ideally be given a high priority
because they may actually stop abuses …. However, the prosecution of
serving heads of state is both legally and politically very difficult…., some
of the opinions in the House of Lords decision in the Pinochet case include
very troubling language concerning the absolute immunity of a current
head of state. Piercing the veil of immunity will undoubtedly be all the
more difficult in a case involving a sitting head of state. Indeed, the
Pinochet case illustrates how great a challenge immunity can pose even in
the case of a leader who has long been out of power. States are likely to be
all the more reluctant to prosecute (or extradite) a current leader based on
the possible foreign policy consequences of such action…. If it seems that
prosecutions are only proceeding against the small fish, then over time the
sense of unfairness, that big fish are let off the hook, will call into question
the credibility of the process….64
In essence, state practice makes the universal jurisdiction mechanism an instrument of
social dichotomy and selective justice. It is a tool used against ordinary individuals and state
officials of low rank, while high-ranking state officials who order or commit the most heinous
international crimes are often shielded from its operation. Realpolitik has thus converted this
laudable mechanism into an instrument of injustice, thereby defeating its anti-state-immunity
potential.
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Fourthly, there is lack of uniformity among states as regards national legislative
implementation of the universal criminal jurisdiction principle. As it is an international law
principle, universal jurisdiction relies on national laws and instruments for its implementation.
However, state legislative practices in this regard are inadequate and inconsistent.65 Some states
have enacted statutes with universal jurisdiction, while others have not. Even among states that
have enacted such statutes, the scope of exercise of the jurisdiction differs. Some core
international crimes are included in the statutes of some states, while other core crimes are not
covered.66 Length of punishment may also differ. Furthermore, although some states have
domesticated the international legal instruments prohibiting some international crimes, some of
the domesticating instruments fail to expressly provide for universal jurisdiction. On this, Dalila
Hoover observes that though most states accept that it is morally right to exercise universal
jurisdiction over international crimes, some of these states, citing the examples of China,
Denmark and Norway, fail to enact appropriate comprehensive legislation for the purpose. 67
Their failure arises from politics, national legal incapacity to implement the laws, and failure to
include the concept of international crimes in their criminal laws. 68
The sum effect of these inconsistencies is a fragmented situation where the national
courts of some states hold foreign high-ranking state officials accountable for international
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crimes pursuant to the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, while the courts of other states
do not.
A fifth challenging factor in the use of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism in
the fight against state immunity and its problems is found in the negative attitudes of some states.
Some states remain adamantly committed to the practice of absolute state immunity (mostly a
civil issue but with some criminal repercussions), subjection of international crimes to domestic
limitation statutes, and refusal to conclude or implement relevant extradition treaties. Once any
of these commitments holds sway, universal jurisdiction ceases to be efficacious. Under Chinese
law, for example, government officials or persons with official capacity are still granted absolute
immunity from criminal prosecution (including for heinous international crimes). 69 China‟s
negative approach is also followed by some other states.70
Under the UN Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity71 (“UN Statutory Non-Limitations Convention”)
international criminal prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity are not affected
by any limitation statute and, therefore, cannot be time-barred. However, some states observe
this rule more in the breach than in compliance. Danish national law, for instance, subjects
prosecution for international crimes to a ten-year limitation period.72 Under the French law, war
crimes are subject to statutory limitation, increased from ten to thirty years in 2010.73 The
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existence of this limitation incapacitates the use of universal jurisdiction to combat immunity and
the impunity of foreign high-ranking state officials before various national courts.
Where there is no extradition treaty between two states or where the states refuse to
respect such a treaty, attempts by one state to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction over highranking state officials within the other state‟s territory will not succeed, although this may not
affect the possibility of prosecution in other states. Dalila Hoover speaks of this situation as
follows:
… although the right to extradite for crimes exists under international law,
many States fail to have extradition laws. The Pinochet case for instance,
made clear the extent to which national laws regarding extradition can
create obstacles and delay the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In another
instance, following the amendment of its 1993 law, Belgium retained
pending cases including that of former President of Chad, Hissène Habré.
Belgium sought his extradition from Senegal where he was arrested.
However, the Senegalese court did not grant Belgium‟s request for
extradition. Instead, the court referred the matter to the African Union
which decided that the matter fell within its competence and ultimately
mandated Senegal to prosecute Hissène Habré. These two instances
illustrate how proceedings to extradite are made more difficult and are
often left to the discretion of political rather than judicial authorities. 74
Sixth, it is only immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity) of foreign state
officials that can be removed before national courts in appropriate cases pursuant to the universal
criminal jurisdiction mechanism. This is affirmed in the dissenting opinion of Lord Phillips in
the Pinochet case75. On the other hand, immunity ratione personae (personal immunity) remains
absolute and sacrosanct before a foreign court and cannot be removed or disregarded for as long
as the culpable official remains in office. In the words of Michael Tunks, “… no nation has yet
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gone so far as to actually pass judgment against a sitting head of state.” 76 This is why the
international criminal charges and/or prosecutions commenced against sitting heads of state,
heads of government, and foreign ministers, in the following cases were declared inadmissible
and dismissed on grounds of immunity ratione personae of the accused persons: Re Mugabe77,
Re Sharon & Yaron78, Re Castro79, Re Kagame80, the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11
April, 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium)81 (“ICJ Arrest Warrant Case”), and Re
Gaddafi82.
It appears that the only known case where the immunity ratione personae of a sitting
high-ranking state official (a head of state) has been denied in criminal proceedings before a
foreign court is the case of US v Noriega83. However, the denial of immunity in this case was
justified on the ground that the US government had never given any recognition to General
Manuel Noriega as the head of state of Panama. The US merely considered him as the de facto
ruler of Panama to whom the protection of state immunity did not accrue. The correctness or
otherwise of the court‟s reasoning in this case with regard to the effect of non-recognition on the
immunity of an incumbent ruler of a sovereign state is beyond the scope of this thesis. However,
the danger illustrated in subjecting to a foreign court the issue of whether Noriega was a de facto
ruler or a de jure head of state may fall within the scope of the thesis. The US court‟s ruling on
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this point was transparently bogus. The Noriega case illustrates well the other side of the
argument: use of national courts that presents problems of politics and abuse.
The seventh area of concern about this mechanism is its potential to lead to neocolonialism due to the fact that it is inherently open to abuse and national manipulation. There is
reasonable fear on the part of less developed states that a vigorous campaign of universal
jurisdiction would allow developed states to exercise undue political influence and manipulation
over the leadership of the less developed ones. This would lead to “jurisdictional imperialism” (a
form of colonialism), and worsen the current North-South divide in international relations and
politics. 84 The ICHRP frames this concern thus:
The term “jurisdictional imperialism” might be used to describe the
concern that most universal jurisdiction prosecutions are likely to take
place in North American and European courts, whereas the majority of
those prosecuted are likely to come from developing countries. This is a
real concern given that in recent years – though not before – many of the
gravest human rights crimes have occurred in developing countries. It is
also clear that western states are more likely to have the resources and
legal structures in place to support universal jurisdiction prosecutions.
This imbalance could discredit a legal process that claims to be truly
international. Were former colonial powers to take a sudden interest in
crimes committed in their former colonies, though their own colonial
record has been exempt from scrutiny, it might appear to be unfair or an
abuse of power. There is no easy answer to this problem….85
Recently, Rwanda advanced this argument in protest against the exercise of universal
jurisdiction by France and Spain, when judges from both states issued warrants of arrest against
some high-ranking Rwandan officials. 86 Rwanda described itself as a victim of abuse by the
universal jurisdiction asserted by French and Spanish judges. On similar grounds, the AU has
84
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also resisted the exercise of universal jurisdiction on nationals of AU member states by national
courts of non-AU member states.87 In fact, universal jurisdiction and the ICC are seen as “… the
new weapons of choice of former colonial powers targeting weaker African nations.” 88 Paul
Kagame (current Rwandan President) questions the justice of resort to this mechanism in the
following terms:
… lately, some in the more powerful parts of the world have given
themselves the right to extend their national jurisdiction to indict weaker
nations. This is total disregard of international justice and order. Where
does this right come from? Would the reverse apply such that a judgment
from less powerful nations indicts those from the more powerful? 89
This situation reveals that national courts may sometimes not be trusted when it comes to
fair trial of high-ranking officials of other states. The foregoing analysis, therefore, shows that
contrary to expectations, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, as it is currently
practised, is not effective enough to respond to the numerous problems arising from the
application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system. On this note,
the weaknesses of the next response mechanism – the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism – are
examined.
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5.4

Weaknesses of the Hybrid Criminal Tribunal Mechanism
The emergence of the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism in the international criminal

justice system has certainly contributed in no small measure to curbing some of the problems of
state immunity. This is seen in the good number of high-ranking state officials that have been
stripped of their immunity, tried and punished by the relevant hybrid (internationalized) criminal
tribunals examined in Chapter 4.90 Their contribution is summed up thus91:
All the … judicial institutions [hybrid tribunals] … have vigorously
emphasized the irrelevance of customary immunities and have prosecuted
many individuals regardless of their official position, thereby further
confirming that heinous and illegal actions under international law could
no longer be defended under immunity. Today, international crimes could
never be official functions and the official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government
official, shall not relieve such person from criminal responsibility nor
mitigate punishment.
Notwithstanding its usefulness in the fight against state immunity and official impunity,
the mechanism exhibits shortcomings that undermine its effectiveness. Some of these
shortcomings, associated with some of the tribunals under this mechanism, are the same as those
of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism earlier discussed in this Chapter92 and,
therefore, need no further detailed examination. They include: geographical and temporal
jurisdictional limitations, implementation of ex post facto laws, and undue influence from the
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world powers in their creation and administration, which impairs the tribunals‟ impartiality and
of independence. Some of the tribunals also administer victor‟s justice. This is specifically
alleged against the IST. While alluding to this situation about this tribunal, Robert Cryer stated:
The legitimacy of the Tribunal is … considered by some to be
compromised by the relationship between the Iraqi Governing Coalition
and the US/UK „Authority‟ in Iraq…. the ghost of victor‟s justice has been
raised again, as although Ba‟ath crimes are to be prosecuted, the
jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal is structured so that it is impossible to
try any international crimes committed by the occupying powers.”93
Again, the creation of some of them is dictated by the political whims and caprices of the
international community. Thus, some of the tribunals have been created where the international
community is favourably disposed to doing so, while other deserving situations have been
ignored. An example of such ignored situations relates to the repeated calls to establish a Sierra
Leone (SCSL) type tribunal in Sri Lanka to try the numerous international crimes allegedly
committed during the recently concluded Sri Lankan civil war. 94
The hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism also manifests some peculiar weaknesses. For
instance, most hybrid tribunals are institutionalized within the domestic court systems of the
states concerned (“host states”). These host states mostly provide the infrastructural and other
facilities needed for their functioning. Again, many of their judges are appointed and paid by the
host states. Because of these factors, there is sometimes undue interference from the host states
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in the smooth operation of some of the tribunals. 95 In some cases, the decision as to which highranking state official to proceed against is influenced by the host state, since “he who pays the
piper calls the tune”. Indeed, some heads of state and/or government of the host states have
turned the tribunals into instruments of intimidation and suppression of political opponents. This
situation impairs the independence and impartiality of the tribunals and their capacity to contend
against state immunity and impunity in the international criminal justice system. The ECCC
typifies this situation as follows 96:
Despite the fact that the ECCC was established with the intention … to try
international crimes in accordance with international standards, the result
… was the opposite; … the ECCC was infected by the shortcomings of the
Cambodian system. The Cambodian Government controls the proceedings
and nothing happens in the trial without its … consent. The international
side of the ECCC is held hostage by the Cambodian Government.
In addition97:
The influence of the Cambodian Government is very clear in cases …
which involve current generals in the Cambodian army. Obviously,
investigating the allegations against these generals would embarrass the
Cambodian Government. To avoid such embarrassment, the government
constantly interferes with the proceedings to the point that the
investigating judge was forced to resign .… In the Nuon Chea case, the
government‟s interference is more subtle but nevertheless exists. Every
time issues are raised relating to the government‟s interference the
microphones are turned off and the broadcast of the trial breaks. In
addition, the structure of the court, with a majority of Cambodian judges
proved to be disadvantageous to the defence; none of the defence requests
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during proceedings was ever accepted. The defence case cannot be
presented effectively, through witnesses and documents: new documents
cannot be used during cross-examination of witnesses, questions cannot be
raised during court hearings and everything must be done in writing. As it
normally takes a few months to receive the Court‟s reply, this is another
effective way to silence the defence. … it is clear that the proceedings are
a farce. Prime Minister Hun Sen has publicly stated that Nuon Chea
committed genocide and that he should be convicted. In the Cambodian
context this is a very clear instruction to everyone, including the judges.
This should not be the example that the international community sets for
proceedings according to international standards. …
The next mechanism whose weaknesses are examined is the Permanent International
Criminal Court mechanism.

5.5 Weaknesses of the Permanent International Criminal Court Mechanism 98
The legal regime of the International Criminal Court Mechanism – the Rome Statute99 - is
carefully designed to overcome the numerous weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunal mechanism, the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, and the hybrid criminal
tribunal mechanism. In principle, at least, it disarms some of the criticisms of earlier attempts at
responding to the problems of the state immunity rule. The International Criminal Court
mechanism (“ICC mechanism”) is intended to be a global mechanism. 100 This is seen, inter alia,
in the high number of ratifications the Rome Statute has received so far.101 Thus, in principle, it is
subject to no geographical jurisdictional limitation (though article 12 of the Rome Statute limits
its jurisdiction to the territories or nationals of party states, which is currently a practical
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limitation). Unlike the ad hoc and hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms, it was not created by, or
at the behest of the World Powers, but by a conference of sovereign states, big and small, who
willingly participated in the process. 102 To avoid the problem of limited temporal jurisdiction (as
regards future commission of international crimes), the ICC mechanism is a permanent justice
mechanism with no completion period. 103
Furthermore, the problem of ex post facto exercise of temporal jurisdiction is solved
under this mechanism by the fact that the ICC‟s temporal jurisdiction commences from the date
of entry into force of its enabling instrument.104 The ICC has no jurisdiction over crimes
committed before this date. The ICC is also not set up to administer victor‟s justice; it is not a
post-war justice institution created by the victorious party to punish the vanquished. It is created
as a mechanism to administer uniform, equal, universal, independent, and impartial justice,
devoid of political and allied manipulations. 105 Ideally, it is the most suitable mechanism for
responding to the problems of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice
system.
Although the ICC mechanism appears an attractive tool to use against the state immunity
rule and its problems, it also has some shortcomings that adversely affect its effectiveness. These
shortcomings range from selective justice to undue external influence, preservation of bilateral
immunity agreements between states, limited jurisdictional bases, and jurisdictional politics over
certain crimes. The shortcomings are examined below.
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5.5.1 Selective Justice
Currently, the ICC mechanism manifests some forms of selective justice. This selective
justice is displayed along geographic, nationality and thematic lines.
As already shown, the ICC is a court with a global mandate. Besides, in international law,
all states are equal in sovereignty. 106 Thus, the high-ranking officials of all states should be equal
before the ICC mechanism, without discrimination. Consequently, the mechanism‟s attempt at
disregarding/abolishing state immunity should not focus exclusively on the officials of some
states, while exempting those of other states. Article 27(1) of the Statute reinforces this position
thus: “The Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any discrimination …”
In practice, however, the mechanism has been highly selective of the nationalities and
regional identities of the state officials on whom its anti-state-immunity regime focuses. Despite
the high number of ratifications the Rome Statute has received from states in all geographic
regions (continents), the Court‟s efforts against state immunity are exclusively focused on
officials of African states.107
There are three ways (trigger mechanisms) by which a situation may be referred to the
ICC: voluntary referral by a state party, referral by the UN Security Council (UNSC) of a
situation in a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the ICC Prosecutor acting proprio
motu.108 Generally, situations referred to the ICC go through three phases: preliminary
examination, formal investigation, and substantive cases (including indictments, arrest
warrants/summonses to appear, and trial). After exhausting all the three trigger mechanisms,
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some high-ranking state officials (including sitting heads of state) have been subjected to the
substantive case phase. Thus, some have been indicted, others have been arrested and are
currently undergoing trials, while arrest warrants/summons to appear before the Court to answer
charges have been issued against yet others. 109 Some of the situations involving these and some
other state officials are also undergoing formal investigations. 110
However, it is worthy of note that these high-ranking officials who have been denied
immunity and subjected to investigations, indictments, arrests, and trials are all officials of
African states.111 The situations giving rise to the cases against them arose from the use of all the
three referral (trigger) mechanisms stated above. 112 Most of the situations subject to preliminary
examinations are also situations in African states113, and the state officials to be eventually
investigated and indicted in these situations will also be African state officials. These facts give
rise to the appearance that the officials of these African states have become sacrificial
“scapegoats” within the working of the ICC mechanism, while their counterparts in other regions
are untouchable “sacred cows”. This selective justice practice undermines the mechanism‟s antistate-immunity regime. It also undermines the concept of sovereign equality in international law
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(including the equality of all states‟ high-ranking officials). 114 It shows that within the ICC
mechanism, “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”. 115 The
situation raises the question as to whether the anti-state-immunity regime of the ICC mechanism
is solely meant for African state officials.
As noted by Edwin Bikundo, “The contradiction within universality is how a court set up
by the international community with the potential to cover all states whether members of the
Rome Statute or not only has African cases even after utilizing all the various means by which it
may be seized of jurisdiction.”116 Bikundo also comments117:
... In an empirical sense, Africans are the only ones currently under active
investigation and trial at the ICC. … The beings tried are broadly familiar
as sacrificial scapegoats while those doing the trying are familiar as
sovereigns. A very specific form of scapegoating is done in international
criminal law. The accused are supposed to bear the highest responsibility
for the worst crimes known to humanity. The selection of Africans
exclusively for this dubious honour, while not random, is definitely
arbitrary. It is not random because there are real prima facie grounds
indicating that persons from the region selected are responsible in some
way for the commission of absolutely heinous acts …. It is arbitrary
however because out of a total human population in the billions the few
Africans selected neither have the monopoly on international criminality
… nor can they be singled out solely as the very worst offenders.
Since the entry into force of the Rome Statute, there has been commission of crimes
under the Rome Statute by high-ranking state officials in many other regions. The ICC has not
deemed it fit to address the crimes in these other regions. 118 For example, US officials allegedly
committed/ are committing a series of crimes against humanity against persons held in the US
114
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detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Similar allegations were made against US
officials regarding detainees in the Abu Ghraib Jail in Iraq and also in Afghanistan. 119 The US
has strangely styled most of these detainees “unlawful combatants”. 120 These are in addition to
the many allegations of war crimes that US officials have committed in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in
some other states.121 Although the US is not a party to the Rome Statute, the UNSC has the
power to refer these situations to the ICC122, but has refused to do so.
Other notorious instances are the alleged war crimes and genocide committed by both
sides during the recently-concluded Sri Lankan civil war 123; alleged war crimes by UK officials
in Iraq and Afghanistan124; Russia‟s alleged “ethnic cleansing” of Georgians in South Ossetia,
Georgia125; the Tibet genocide in northern China alleged to have been committed by some
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highest-ranking Chinese state officials126; and the current Syrian civil war 127. Yet others are the
2006 Israel-Lebanon war 128, the Israel-Palestine continuous armed conflicts 129; and the ongoing
conflict situations in Burma (Myanmar), Yemen, the Philippines, Chechnya, Crimea (Ukraine),
and Mexico.130
This selective justice along geographic and nationality lines is further exacerbated by
some powers that the Rome Statute confers on the UNSC in relation to the ICC. Experience has
shown that due to the high-level politics in the UNSC, the Council would not refer to the ICC a
situation in any of its permanent member states or their allies. It would only refer situations in
less developed states in which none of the permanent members has an interest. This position is
exemplified by the fact that out of all the situations of alleged commission of grave Rome Statute
crimes by high-ranking state officials in the whole world, the Council has only managed to refer
the situations in Darfur, Sudan131 and in Libya132.
Furthermore, the power that the Rome Statute vests in the UNSC to defer (suspend) an
investigation or trial before the ICC 133 (though not yet used) stands to unduly influence the antistate-immunity effort of the ICC mechanism. By this deferral power, the UNSC powerful
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member states can perpetually frustrate the ICC‟s investigation or trial of any of their officials or
those of their allies, more so since the deferral is renewable. 134
In addition to geographic and nationality lines, the ICC mechanism also practices
selective justice along thematic lines. Regulation 33 (titled “Selection of cases within a
situation”) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor 135 gives the ICC‟s Office of the
Prosecutor a wide discretion to select “the most serious crimes” committed within a situation as
potential cases before the Court based, inter alia, on “gravity” and “the interests of justice”. 136
Neither the Regulations, nor the Rome Statute, define these terms. Pursuant to this discretion, the
ICC Prosecutor has adopted a “Thematic Approach” to investigation and prosecution of Rome
Statute crimes. The approach entails selecting or prioritizing a particular theme(s) of crimes for
investigation and prosecution and disregarding the rest that do not involve the theme(s). 137
Applying this approach, the OTP refused to investigate the situations in Iraq, Palestine, and
Venezuela, respectively. 138

The implication of this approach for the success of the ICC

mechanism‟s efforts at abolishing state immunity is that the immunity-induced impunity of highranking state officials, as regards the non-selected crimes, continues. If a culpable officer‟s
crimes do not fall within the selected theme, he goes free. The major general defect of this
134
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approach is that where state officials commit grave Rome Statute crimes that do not fall within
the selected theme(s), their victims are totally denied justice. 139 For Guerreiro140, one of the
imperfections of the ICC system is the “„principle of selective justice‟, according [to] which only
some cases can be prosecuted by the ICC.” According to him:
The use of this criterion, as a way of choosing the cases that would be
pursued by the Court affects, negatively, the mission to uphold
international law, since some cases receive more attention…. This
represents what is known as double standard ... This is a rekindling of the
criteria used by the ad hoc courts…141
Although prioritization of cases to be brought before the ICC may sometimes be
necessary, a poor and unbalanced approach to this stands to hamper the mechanism‟s efforts to
abolish state immunity.
These analyses show that the weakness of selective justice deals a serious blow to the
ICC mechanism‟s attempt at disregarding/abolishing state immunity. In addition to this is a
weakness stemming from the preservation of bilateral immunity agreements between states,
which is examined next.

5.5.2 Preservation of Bilateral Immunity Agreements
The Rome Statute contains some provisions that render the ICC mechanism‟s efforts to
abolish state immunity counter-productive. One such provision preserves the validity of bilateral
immunity agreements concluded between states. By article 27(2) of the Statute, it could be
recalled, “Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a
person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person”. The importance of this provision cannot be underestimated, as it
139
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eviscerates the cover for criminal impunity which state immunity and its allied jurisdictional
bars142 had hitherto engendered for some state officials.
However, the value of this provision is seriously undermined by a parallel provision of
the Rome Statute. Under article 98:
1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance
which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its
obligations under international law with respect to the state …
immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can
first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the
immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would
require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the
Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending
State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
States that are not parties to the Rome Statute and/or are unwilling to cooperate with the
ICC will find the provision a valuable tool for exempting their high-ranking officials from the
Court‟s reach.143 Accordingly, the US has had no hesitation in taking advantage of this provision
by using its political and economic clout to induce some other states (especially less developed
states) to conclude Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with it. Under any of these BIAs, the
other state undertakes not to surrender any national of the US to the ICC. The other state shall
also not refer to the ICC any Rome Statute crime that a US national has committed, whether
within or without the territory of this other state.144 The US has already concluded these
agreements such BIAs (also known as “Article 98 Agreements”, “Impunity Agreements”, or
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“Bilateral Non-surrender Agreements”145) with more than one hundred other states to ensure that
no US official is surrendered to the ICC. 146 Pursuant to its BIA campaign, the US has also
enacted the American Servicemembers‟ Protection Act147 (“ASPA”). Apart from vetoing any
collaboration with the ICC, the ASPA abrogates foreign economic and military support for any
state that refuses to sign a BIA with the US. 148 Above all, the ASPA authorizes the US President
to use all means to release any US personnel detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the
request of the ICC, and individuals detained or imprisoned for official actions taken on behalf of
the US.149
Clearly, the ultimate implication of the insertion of article 98 in the Rome Statute is the
weakening of the of the ICC mechanism‟s efforts to abolish state immunity and overcome its
numerous problems. 150 The outcome is the promotion and legalization of international criminal
impunity among high-ranking state officials.

5.5.3 Jurisdictional Politics as to Certain Crimes
Another weakness of the ICC mechanism is the significantly high level of politics
entrenched in the Rome Statute regarding the ICC‟s substantive, temporal, and personal
jurisdiction over some international crimes. This is mostly felt in the areas of war crimes and the
crime of aggression. These are examined below.
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5.5.3.1 Politics as to War Crimes Jurisdiction
The general rule under the Rome Statute is that the moment a state becomes a party to the
Statute by ratifying it, that state automatically accepts the Court‟s jurisdiction. 151 Thus, as from
the date of ratification, the ICC can start exercising jurisdiction over Rome Statute crimes
committed by the state‟s nationals or on its territory.
Unlike genocide and crimes against humanity over which the rule applies without further
conditions, however, the case of war crimes is different. Article 124 of the Rome Statute gives a
state the discretion, upon becoming a party to the Statute, to declare that for a period of seven
years after the entry into force of the Statute for that state, it does not accept the Court‟s
jurisdiction with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory.
This is to say that a state can “opt-out” of the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes by its nationals
or on its territory for a transitional period of seven years from the date of its ratification of the
Rome Statute. France and Colombia have made such declarations. 152
Technically, it is very difficult to understand the practical importance of the inclusion of
this article in the Rome Statute, since it is capable of weakening the ICC with respect to certain
war crimes situations. Upon a critical look, however, it appears that it was inserted to serve some
political interests153, i.e., to exempt from the ICC‟s jurisdiction, at least temporarily, the powerful
states‟ high-ranking officials and those of their allies who have become more notorious for war
crimes, although any state party may take advantage of the provision. By this provision, the ICC
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cannot try officials who are shielded from trial by their deferring states. The intriguing puzzle is
expressed by William Schabas154 who questions:
… If a State declares that it does not accept the Court‟s jurisdiction over
war crimes, does this mean that its nationals [officials] cannot be
prosecuted, even if the crime is committed on the territory of another State
Party, as would ordinarily be the case? Does article 124 allow the creation
of a privileged group of nationals [state officials] who are insulated from
prosecution by the Court for war crimes, wherever they are committed? …
Whatever the motive, the outcome is a weakness of the ICC mechanism whose presence
and functioning leaves room for immunity to subsist and allows criminal impunity among highranking state officials to persist.

5.5.3.2 Politics of Jurisdiction as to the Crime of Aggression
For all other crimes contained in the Rome Statute, the commencement of the ICC‟s
jurisdiction was upon entry into force of the Statute.155 For the crime of aggression, on the other
hand, commencement of the Court‟s jurisdiction was postponed indefinitely – pending the
adoption by a Review Conference of states parties to the Statute of a provision defining the crime
and stipulating the conditions for exercise of jurisdiction over it.156
The consequence of this jurisdictional postponement for the ICC mechanism‟s regime
against state immunity was that pending the adoption of the definition, high-ranking state
officials perpetrating this crime could not be stripped of their immunity and prosecuted before
the ICC. This means that, as regards the crime of aggression, the ICC mechanism could not

154

Schabas, William A, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010) at 1193.
155
The Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002. See United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court”, online: < http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html>; The Peace and Justice Initiative, “When Does the ICC
Statute Enter Into Force?”, online: < http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-resources/when-doe
s-the-icc-statute-enter-into-force>.
156
See the Rome Statute supra, note 51, arts 5(2), 121 and 123.

203

respond to the problems of the state immunity rule. This position undermines the mechanism,
more so, given the extreme gravity of the crime in international law. Thus, culpable state
officials would continue to evade legal accountability, and their impunity in relation to this crime
would flourish, while justice continues to elude their victims.
According to some sources, the fundamental reason for this jurisdictional postponement
over this crime was that, during the negotiation of the Rome Statute, there was no agreement on
how the crime should be defined. 157 Upon a critical appraisal, however, it could again be argued
that this jurisdictional postponement was politically motivated 158 to shield from the ICC‟s
jurisdiction high-ranking officials of some states, more especially the powerful. It was not
necessarily based on non-existence of an acceptable definition, since various international
instruments159contained definitions of the crime of aggression before the negotiation of the Rome
Statute, although it was possible to have a valid divergence of views.
Eventually, a definition of this crime was adopted by a Review Conference in 2010. 160
Under this amendment, the jurisdictional politics still continues. The actual commencement of
the Court‟s jurisdiction over the crime was again postponed to the future.161 Even then, discretion
is given to a state party to accept or refuse the Court‟s jurisdiction when aggression is committed
by its officials or agents162, and the Court cannot try aggression when it is committed by the
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officials/agents or on the territory of a state non-state party to the Rome Statute.163 Above all, the
Court cannot try aggression unless the UNSC first determines that a situation of aggression
exists.164 This, in reality, is a recognition of the high politics nature of this crime.
The ultimate implication of all of this political furor over the crime of aggression, it could
be argued, is to further weaken the ICC mechanism as to curbing state immunity in this matter.
The abolition of the state immunity rule over the crime under this mechanism is a mere sham.
The Court is tactically denied the power to lift the cloak of the immunity of high-ranking state
officials who commit this crime and to hold them individually accountable for it. Essentially,
culpable state officials may continue to commit this crime with impunity and their victims may
hope for but would not find justice. Thus, this is one area where some of the difficulty arises
from the fact that state responsibility may be the more appropriate (or at least more practical)
avenue for redress.
All these politics go a long way to re-affirm the position that states, especially the
powerful ones, are tenaciously inclined to allow aggression to retain its original status as a state
crime that is subject to the regime of state responsibility, as opposed to individual responsibility,
since the crime is essentially committed against the territorial integrity and political
independence of a state and not against individuals. However, this inclination could be attacked
on the ground that, like other international crimes, aggression is a crime against international law
and is also planned and executed (even if to a lesser degree) by individuals. Thus, the individual
officials that plan and execute it should not be allowed to hide under the cover of state
responsibility to avoid personal accountability, when their counterparts who commit other (and
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even less grave) species of international crimes are stripped of their immunity and held
personally accountable.

5.6

Overview
In addition to the specific shortcomings of each of the response mechanisms earlier

discussed, some general weaknesses are common to all of them. First, all the mechanisms are
focused exclusively on what are referred to as the “core international crimes” 165, including
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity (including torture), and the crime of
aggression.166 Thus, other international crimes that do not belong to this category do not come
under the radar of the anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system.
For example, neither of the ad hoc/hybrid tribunals, nor the ICC, has jurisdiction over the
international crime of piracy. 167 Thus, none of these tribunals can lift the immunity of a culpable
high-ranking state official to be tried for this crime.
Overall, the commission of international crimes that do not belong to the “core crimes”
category is likely to continue with impunity by state officials, and their victims will remain
165

See, e.g., the Rome Statute, supra, note 51, art 5; ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, arts 2-5; the ICTR Statute, supra,
note 6, arts 2-4; the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL Statute”), 2002, 2178 UNTS 138, arts 2-4;
the Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution
of
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, (the “ECCC Law”) 2001, as amended on 27
October, 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006, also online: < http://www.eccc. gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_
Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf>, arts 3-7; the Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST Statute”), 2003
(2004) 42 ILM 231, supra, art 1; UNTAET Regulation No 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive
Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences (East Timor), UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June, 2000), s 1.3; the
Nuremberg Charter, supra, note 2, art 6; and the Tokyo Charter, supra, note 2, art 5.
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2013, online: <http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/news/2013/05/redrawing-line-international-crimes-beyond-romestatu
te>; Choi, Tae Hyun, “Nationalized International Criminal Law: Genocidal Intent, Command Responsibility, and an
Overview of the South Korean Implementing Legislation of the ICC Statute” (2011) 19:3 Michigan State JIL 589 at
590; Natarajan, Mangai, “Introduction”, in Natarajan, Mangai (ed), International Crime and Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011) xxiii at xxvi.
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See, e.g., Einersen, Terje, “New Frontiers of International Criminal Law: Towards a Concept of Universal
Crimes” (2013) 1:1 BJCLCJ 1 at 4-5; Bo Marta, “Emerging Voices: Piracy vs. Core Crimes – Assessing the
Consequences of the Juxtaposition between Transnational and International Crimes”, Opinio Juris, 6 September
2013, online: <http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/09/emerging-voices-piracy-vs-core-crimes-assessing-the-consequences
-of-the-juxtaposition-between-transnational-and-international-crimes/>.
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without remedy. It appears that the only possible exception to this practice is the universal
criminal jurisdiction mechanism where a high-ranking state official could be denied immunity
and tried for any other crime for which universal jurisdiction is available under customary
international law, but only if there is political will on the part of the forum state to do so. The
prioritization may be justified, inter alia, on limited resources and the need not to congest the
tribunals and the ICC with cases. But the level of injustice that victims stand to suffer for the
non-inclusion of these other crimes in the jurisdiction of these tribunals and the ICC may
necessitate a reappraisal of the prioritization.
The second and most significant weakness is that the efforts of the international criminal
justice system to disregard/abolish state immunity are generally directed at weaker states. This is
more visible in the ad hoc international criminal tribunal, the hybrid tribunal, and the
International Criminal Court mechanisms. Since the latter part of the twentieth century, the only
ad hoc international criminal tribunals that have been established by the United Nations Security
Council are the ICTY and ICTR. As earlier noted, the overturning of the immunity of state
officials under the constitutive instruments of these tribunals has been done in regard to the weak
break-away states of the former Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe and Rwanda in Africa,
respectively. 168 There is no doubt that deserving situations in some weaker states like Syria,
Yemen and Sri Lanka have not been addressed. However, the fact that only officials of weaker
states have so far been deprived of their immunity, when there is also strong evidence of
culpability of their counterparts of the stronger states, goes to show this lopsidedness.
As for the hybrid tribunals, the Iraqi Special Tribunal/Iraqi Higher Criminal Court was
created, inter alia, to try and punish high-ranking Iraqi state officials. 169 The anti-immunity
168
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See the ICTY Statute, supra, note 6, arts 1, 7-8; the ICTR Statute, supra, note 6, arts 1, 6-7.
IST Statute, supra, note 165, arts 1 and 15.
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regimes of the legal instruments of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 170,
the Bangladesh Tribunal171, the Special Court for Sierra Leone172, the East Timor Serious Crimes
Panels 173, and the Senegalese Extraordinary African Chambers 174 target Asian and African
officials, while no such regimes have been created to address similar crimes committed in or by
officials of the developed states. As already shown, the ICC mechanism, although intended to be
universal, has so far been implemented exclusively against officials of African states.
This lopsided practice raises the question whether officials of these less developed states
have a monopoly over the commission of international crimes. The answer to this question is in
the negative. 175 There have always been situations in all parts of the world where high-ranking
state officials commit grave international crimes.176 For instance, apart from the fact that the ICC
has a potentially global mandate to try these crimes but fails to act, some of the crimes are
committed by officials of the powerful states within the geographical and temporal jurisdictions
of some of the existing ad hoc and hybrid tribunals. None of these officials has ever been
deprived of his immunity and tried before any of the tribunals. Nor has any such tribunal been
established in any of the powerful states to try the international crimes that may have been
committed within their territories by their high-ranking officials.
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5.7 Conclusion
Each of the mechanisms of response to the problems arising from the application of the
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system contributes to ensuring individual
criminal accountability for high-ranking state officials. These mechanisms show that all
individuals, irrespective of political status, are formally equal in the international criminal justice
system. However, each mechanism has shortcomings that render it substantially ineffective in the
crusade to remove state immunity as a cover for international crimes.
The creation of the ad hoc international/ hybrid criminal tribunal mechanisms is highly
influenced by the interests of the developed states (especially the world powers of the relevant
times). The geographical and temporal jurisdictions of the tribunals created under these two
mechanisms are very limited. Their legal regimes lack substantive jurisdictional uniformity, as
the substantive jurisdiction of each tribunal is dictated by the peculiar historical exigencies and
circumstances of a given place at a given time. Above all, these mechanisms either administer
victor‟s justice or have problems with independence and impartiality. The latter defect, for some
of the hybrid tribunals, partly arises from their being established within the local court systems of
the respective host states that also fund and staff them. As such, these host states wield undue
influence over their operations.
As to the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, it is susceptible to political abuse,
as some states could employ it against the officials of enemy states. Again, economic/political
and allied factors, and the desire to maintain friendly international relations, make most states
reluctant to apply the mechanism against officials of friendly foreign states. Some of the legal
instruments adopted pursuant to this mechanism do not confer universal jurisdiction and/or
abolish state immunity in express terms. Some that expressly abolish state immunity
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simultaneously provide for limitations on their enforcement, rendering the abolition a nullity.
Also, state practice as regards national legislative enforcement of this mechanism is inconsistent.
While some states have statutes conferring on their national courts universal jurisdiction over
international crimes, others do not. Some states still adhere to the absolute immunity rule in
international criminal proceedings before their national courts, while others subject international
crimes to their municipal statutes of limitation. The need for extradition treaties between states
also hampers the effectiveness of the mechanism. Above all, the anti-state-immunity regime of
this mechanism is restricted to immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity), but allows
immunity ratione personae (personal immunity). Thus sitting high-ranking state officials cannot
lose their immunity under this mechanism.
One major weakness of the ICC mechanism is selective justice. It has, so far,
geographically concentrated on Africa to the exclusion of deserving situations in other regions of
the world. The selective justice is also seen in the nationalities of state officials whom the
mechanism is, in practice, inclined to proceed against. Officials of the developed states and their
close allies do not come onto the ICC‟s radar, despite the gravity of their crimes (although
culpable officials of a few developing states, like Yemen and Sri Lanka, have also ignored). The
mechanism is also selective as to the heads of crimes it addresses. The ICC‟s OTP has an unduly
wide discretion to pick and chose the situations and categories of Rome Statute crimes over
which the ICC will exercise jurisdiction. Furthermore, the UN Security Council unduly
influences this mechanism. This is done by its permanent member states‟ self-interested exercise
of the powers the Council has under the Rome Statute to refer situations to the ICC. Also, the
Council‟s power to defer investigations or trials by the ICC, although not yet exercised, is
potentially a problem. These permanent member states abuse the former power by using it to
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shield their officials and those of their allies from the ICC, and could likely abuse the latter
power the same way.
In addition, the mechanism‟s provision for bilateral immunity agreements (BIAs)
concluded between states essentially stands to defeat its efforts to abolish state immunity. In fact,
the US takes advantage of these BIAs to shield its officials from the ICC‟s jurisdiction.
Furthermore, although all the Rome Statute crimes are also customary international crimes
susceptible to universal jurisdiction, the ICC has no universal jurisdiction over them. Thus,
where they are committed within the territory, or by the officials of, a non-state party to the
Rome Statute, the ICC ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to try them. States parties to the Rome Statute
have some discretion to defer the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes and the crime of aggression
committed on their territories, or by their officials. Moreover, a state party has the discretion to
reject the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression committed by its officials.
Finally, besides these peculiar weaknesses, all the mechanisms have two major
common shortcomings. The first is that almost all these mechanisms‟ efforts against state
immunity are restricted to the “core international crimes” (genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and the crime of aggression). While this may be a necessity in view of limited
resources and the need for non-saturation of the relevant tribunals and courts with cases, the
disadvantage is that other species of international crimes committed by state officials may be left
unaddressed and their victims denied justice. The second is that this crusade is lopsided against
high-ranking officials of the weaker states and in favour of those of the powerful states.
The overall implication of all these weaknesses of the mechanisms is that the whole legal
response to the problems arising from the application of the state immunity rule in the
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international criminal justice system remains weak. Consequently, the problems sought to be
overcome by the mechanisms may continue to flourish.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1

Introduction
This thesis has examined the problems arising from the application of the state immunity

rule in the international criminal justice system and the achievements and weaknesses of the
legal mechanisms adopted by the international community to respond to these problems. This
chapter summarizes the results of this research by setting out findings, suggestions and
conclusion.

6.2

Findings
State Immunity Rule:
1) The state immunity rule evolved to guarantee the sovereign equality of all states, big

and small, mighty and weak, by ensuring that no one state or its high-ranking officials are
unnecessarily brought into litigation in the courts of another state. This rule is also meant to
ensure that the smooth governance of states is not hampered or distracted by judicial
proceedings, civil and criminal, against their high-ranking officials before foreign courts.
2) Application of the state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system leads
to many problems which contradict the rationales for the rule and undermines the individual
accountability and administration of justice missions of the international criminal justice system.
One of these problems is that the protection accorded by the rule induces among some highranking state officials a culture of impunity as regards violation of peremptory international legal
norms. This impunity is manifest in the officials‟ habit of systematic commission of heinous
international crimes, such as genocide, torture, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity. It also manifests in their violation of other states‟ territorial integrity and political
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independence by means of senseless wars and other acts of aggression, which erodes the
sovereign equality rationale behind the rule. Other problems arising from the application of the
rule include perpetuation of injustice against victims of international crimes committed by highranking state officials, creation of social inequality between state officials and ordinary
individuals as regards legal accountability for international crimes, political self-perpetuation,
and bad governance.
Due to the foregoing problems, the state immunity rule has become unpopular in the
international criminal justice system. Some high-ranking state officials have converted it into a
means by which they avoid individual accountability for their international crimes, in which
cases the international criminal justice system is effective only against individuals not protected
by this immunity. The application of this rule, therefore, defeats its object and purpose, weakens
the international criminal justice system, and undermines public confidence in its ability to
dispense justice.
Mechanisms of Legal Response:
3) In response to these problems, the international community, among other reasons, has
created various legal mechanisms to abolish or avoid the application of the immunity rule in the
international criminal justice system. These mechanisms are the old ad hoc international criminal
tribunal, the use of universal criminal jurisdiction, the modern ad hoc international criminal
tribunal, the hybrid/internationalized criminal tribunal, and the permanent international criminal
court.
Under the two ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanisms (old and modern), the
international community establishes ad hoc tribunals with international status to try persons who
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commit stipulated international crimes within given states/regions during specific time frames. 1
The practice under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism is that customary international
law confers on all states jurisdiction to try perpetrators of certain international crimes in their
national courts, despite their official status, nationalities, place of commission of the crimes, or
absence of other jurisdictional connections. This jurisdiction is conferred and exercised on the
ground that the prohibitions of these crimes (e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, aggression, and torture) have attained the status of jus cogens or peremptory norms. 2
Due to this status, perpetrators of the crimes are deemed hostis humani generis (enemies of all
humankind), since the crimes shock the conscience of humanity and affect the international
community as a whole. Consequently, every state has a powerful duty erga omnes (owed to the
whole world), if not necessarily a hard legal obligation in every case, to bring the perpetrators to
justice. This customary international law practice is complemented by treaties concluded by
states on some specific crimes, which impose on the states parties an obligation aut judicare aut
dedere – to prosecute or extradite the offender to another state party which is willing to prosecute
him or her.
Under the hybrid/internationalized criminal tribunal mechanism, some judicial tribunals
are created in some states, often by or at the behest of the international community via the UN,
and empowered to try individuals for both domestic and international crimes committed within
the territories of the given states at particular points in time. 3 The permanent international
criminal court mechanism is represented by the current ICC established to administer a
globalized international criminal justice on a non-temporary basis. One common denominator of
1

See the detailed account of these tribunals in Chapters 4 and 5 herein.
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [“Pinochet case”] (2000) 1
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2
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the international-level mechanisms is that immunity is not a bar to the prosecution and
punishment of any individual for an international crime before an international criminal tribunal
or a competent national court. While immunity does still operate before the courts of states
utilizing universal jurisdiction, its application has dwindled as regards international crimes,
particularly immunity ratione materiae.
4) Pursuant to the anti-state-immunity regimes of these mechanisms, some high-ranking
state officials, who would have otherwise been shielded from trials and punishments for
international crimes before foreign courts, are today tried and punished for these crimes.
Consequently, the state immunity rule has lost its strength in the international criminal justice
system.
These mechanisms are commendable, as they ensure equality of all persons, high-ranking
state officials and ordinary individuals alike, in international criminal law. They make state
officials to understand that they can be subjected to the full weight of international criminal law
despite their official positions, and that official status should not be a license to commit
international crimes. The mechanisms reduce the impunity with which these officials commit
these crimes. They also afford some justice to victims of the crimes who would have otherwise
been denied such justice. On the whole, the mechanisms seek to strengthen the international
criminal justice system and induce public confidence in it.
Weaknesses in the Response Mechanisms:
5) Despite the usefulness of these mechanisms, each has some shortcomings that
undermine its effectiveness in combating the problems associated with the application of the
state immunity rule. As a result, high-ranking state officials who commit international crimes
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may still go free from legal accountability, and their victims still suffer injustice. On the whole,
the shortcomings weaken the anti-state-immunity efforts. The major shortcomings are as follows:
First, Many of the tribunals under the ad hoc international criminal tribunal mechanism
and some of those under the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism were created by a few states –
always powerful states, and sometimes states which had emerged as wartime victors. The antistate-immunity provisions of the legal instruments of these tribunals were made by the world
powers of the relevant periods in world history, while most other states had no input, which
weakens their legitimacy.
Second, although the ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals served some good
purpose in the absence of a universal criminal court, the geographical and temporal jurisdictions
of each tribunal operating under the ad hoc international criminal tribunal and the hybrid
criminal tribunal mechanisms are very limited. In fact, as regards temporal jurisdiction, each
tribunal is a temporary judicial institution and has a completion period beyond which it will not
continue to operate. Thus, all international crimes within the tribunal‟s substantive jurisdiction
that are committed outside the stated geographical and/or temporal coverage cannot be tried by
the tribunal. Therefore, the immunity of a high-ranking state official who commits these crimes
remains unaffected. Furthermore, the tribunals‟ creation is dependent on the political disposition
of the international community at a given time, again highly influenced by the self interest of the
world powers. Thus, such tribunals were created in some situations, but not in other deserving
situations. Consequently, the immunity of state officials who commit grave international crimes,
at times and in places regarding which the international community is not favourably disposed to
act, remains intact.
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Third, some of these tribunals administer “victor‟s justice”. They are judicial institutions
created after conflict situations by the victorious parties to try and punish officials of the
vanquished parties. Culpable officials of the victorious parties are hardly subjected to trials
before them. In addition, the victorious powers appoint their loyalists as judges of some of the
tribunals to try their enemies. All these taint the anti-state immunity regimes of some of the
tribunals established under these two mechanisms with selective justice, partiality, and lack of
independence from external influences. These make the regimes look more like a vendetta
mission.
Fourth, with particular regard to the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism, the fact that
most of the tribunals are located within the domestic judicial structure of the state concerned, and
are funded by the same state, has in some situations subjected the tribunals to undue external
influence from the host state, including using them against their political opponents When there
is need to disregard the immunity of a high-ranking official of the incumbent government and try
him before the tribunal, the influence of the government in power may stifle the attempt.
Fifth, under the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism, some relevant treaties do not
expressly abolish immunity. Some states also fail to expressly vest in national courts the
universal jurisdiction which either the treaties or the customary norms are intended to confer.
Consequently, national courts are left with the difficult task of inferring the intentions of states
parties when interpreting the treaties as regards their anti-state-immunity positions. This situation
leads to inconsistency in judicial interpretations in that, while the courts of one state may be
prepared to disregard immunity in a given circumstance, the courts of another state may not be
so prepared. Moreover, political and diplomatic considerations make national courts of states
unwilling to invoke this mechanism against high-ranking officials of friendly states. In practice,
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the mechanism is sometimes employed only against ordinary individuals and low-ranking
officials who are not entitled to state immunity protection, at least ratione personae in the case of
the later. Similarly, inconsistent legislative practice among states also bedevils the effectiveness
of this. Some states have statutes conferring on their national courts universal jurisdiction over
international crimes, while others do not. Among states that have enacted such statutes, the
categories of international crimes covered and the scopes of punishment differ. Some states also
subject international crimes to their municipal limitation statutes. As well, absence of an
extradition treaty between two states could stultify the effectiveness of the mechanism, even
when the two states are parties to a treaty providing for or intending universal jurisdiction. This
is because some universal criminal jurisdiction treaties have no provisions on extradition.
Sixth, the anti-state-immunity regime of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism is
restricted to immunity ratione materiae (functional immunity). Immunity ratione personae
(personal immunity) survives intact under this mechanism. Thus, where a high-ranking official
entitled to immunity ratione personae and a low-ranking official that has only immunity ratione
materiae jointly commit an international crime, the later could be deprived of immunity and
punished, while the former may continue to be free forever.
Seventh, this mechanism is prone to abuse by states. While there is fear that the
developed states could turn it into an instrument of neo-colonialism and use it to exercise some
political influence and manipulation over the leadership of the less developed ones, there is also
the fear that developing states could turn it into a machinery for retaliation against the developed
states. Thus, the use of this mechanism is not likely to guarantee fair trial of other states‟
officials, especially those of enemy states.
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Eight, the ICC mechanism has, thus far, suffered from practising selective justice. After
utilizing all the three referral (trigger) mechanisms available to the Court, all the high-ranking
state officials so far denied immunity under the ICC mechanism are those of African states,
despite deserving situations in some other regions. Nor is it willing (in some cases) or
jurisdictionally able (in most others) to operate against high-ranking officials of the powerful
states and their allies who have allegedly committed grave crimes. It is also selective in regard to
the situations and heads of crimes it handles. This approach undermines the credibility of the
mechanism, especially in the eyes of African states.
The ICC mechanism is unduly influenced by the UN Security Council and its permanent
members. This is most visible in the Council‟s powers under the Rome Statute4 to refer to the
ICC situations in states not parties to the Statute. The Council can also defer (suspend)
investigations or trials before the ICC 5, although it has not yet exercised this power. In fact, the
Council and its permanent members have used the referral power to protect their interests and
those of their allies, and to act against weaker states in which they have no interests. Thus far, the
Council has only exercised the referral powers against high-ranking officials of Sudan and Libya.
Another weakness bedeviling the ICC mechanism is its preservation of bilateral
immunity agreements (BIAs) between states. On the one hand, the Rome Statute abolishes the
immunity of state officials regarding crimes falling under ICC jurisdiction. 6 On the other hand, it
recognizes the validity of BIAs.7 A BIA bars a state party to it from surrendering to the ICC for
prosecution or investigation a national of the other state party, and from co-operating with the
ICC as regards such prosecution or investigation. The US, has been using BIAs extensively to
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1998, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90, art 13(b).
Ibid, art 16.
Ibid, art 27.
Ibid, art 98.
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exempt their high-ranking officials, and in fact all its nationals and foreign contractors working
for it, from the ICC mechanism and to frustrate the mechanism‟s anti-state-immunity efforts.
The ICC mechanism is also weakened by limited jurisdictional bases. Out of the five
recognized bases of criminal jurisdiction in international law (i.e., the territorial, nationality,
protective, passive personality, and universal bases), the Court‟s jurisdiction is essentially
restricted to two (the territoriality and nationality bases). 8 In particular, the ICC, a notionally
universal court that is created to try crimes susceptible to universal jurisdiction (genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and aggression), does not itself have universal jurisdiction over
these crimes. The Court can only proceed against a high-ranking state official if such an official
is a national of a state party to the Rome Statute or if his or her alleged crimes are committed
within the territory of a state party to the Statute.9 Thus, where the crimes are committed by state
officials who are not nationals of a state party and/or the crimes in the territory of a non-stateparty, the ICC cannot lift the officials‟ immunity and try and punish them, unless the UN
Security Council rarely decides to refer the situation to the Court.
Another factor that undermines the ICC mechanism‟s capacity to effectively combat the
problems of state immunity is jurisdictional politics over certain crimes. First, on becoming a
party to the Rome Statute, a state still retains the discretion to defer the Court‟s jurisdiction for
seven years with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory.10
Although this has not been a major problem because most states parties have not taken advantage
of it, its retention in the Rome Statute poses a potential problem. Second, there is some
controversy concerning the ICC‟s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Although a Review
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Conference on the Rome Statute has eventually defined aggression11, a state party could reject
the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression that its officials have committed. 12 Also, the ICC lacks
jurisdiction over aggression committed by nationals or on the territory of a non-state party.13
Above all, even where a state party has accepted the ICC‟s jurisdiction over aggression, the
Court‟s exercise of it is still at the mercies of the UN Security Council. The ICC Prosecutor may
not proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression committed by a state party‟s
high-ranking officials, unless the Security Council has first made a determination of an act of
aggression so committed by that states‟ officials. 14
The implications of these jurisdictional politics for the mechanism‟s anti-state-immunity
regime are twofold. First, where a state party defers or rejects ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes
or aggression, as the case may be, committed by its officials or by the officials of another state
within the former state‟s territory, the ICC cannot disregard the immunity of these officials and
hold them accountable. Second, where the Security Council, in the case of aggression, is
politically motivated to refuse to make a determination that the officials of a state have
committed aggression, the ICC cannot disregard the immunity of the officials and try them, even
when there is clear and irresistible evidence of their culpability.
Finally, besides these lapses of the respective mechanisms, the efforts of the international
criminal justice system to combat the problems of the state immunity rule have two major
general weaknesses. The first (especially as regards the ad hoc international/ hybrid tribunal and
ICC mechanisms) is that it is restricted to the “core international crimes”, i.e., genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. Other international crimes that fall
11
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outside this category, such as aggression and slavery, are not covered, and the immunity of state
officials in respect of the latter crimes may, therefore, continue. The second is that the efforts are
lopsided against developing states and in favour of developed ones. So far, it is only highranking officials of developing states that have lost their immunity and been tried and punished
under the various response mechanisms (although there are culpable officials of some developing
states that have not been proceeded against).
The need to correct the foregoing weaknesses of the various response mechanisms and
better overcome the various problems arising from the application of the state immunity rule in
the international criminal justice system, therefore, gives rise to the suggestions made in this
thesis. These are reviewed below.

6.3

Suggestions
In view of the foregoing findings, the following suggestions are made with a view to

strengthening the anti-state-immunity crusade of the international criminal justice system:
1) All international treaties that confer universal international criminal jurisdiction on the
national courts of states but which fail to expressly abolish the state immunity rule as a
jurisdictional bar should be amended to abolish this rule. By so doing, the difficulties and
inconsistencies of judicial interpretation before national courts as to the anti-immunity position
of these treaties will be avoided. This will help to make the anti-state immunity position of the
universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism consistent, certain and predictable, although some
overzealous national courts may still try to abuse it.
2) States should clearly and unambiguously implement the extradite-or-prosecute
obligation from universal-jurisdiction-conferring treaties into their national laws, and other states
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parties should hold them accountable if they do not. Moreover, if the universal jurisdiction in
question is customary, then states should make sure it is present in their laws. Although the latter
suggestion may be harder because customary universal jurisdiction is permissive and not
mandatory, states, in the interest of a better and improved international criminal justice system,
are urged to implement same. Again, this will help to obviate the interpretational difficulties and
inconsistencies which national courts encounter and display when trying to infer the intentions of
states parties to relevant treaties and state practice in customary international law as regards
universal jurisdiction. Again, states should be encouraged not to subject international crimes to
their municipal statutes of limitation. If these suggestions and that in (1) above are implemented,
the anti-state-immunity crusade via the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism will be
strengthened.
3) Given the fact that there is universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide under
customary international law, an effort should be made to amend the Genocide Convention15 so as
to provide an obligatory universal jurisdiction. This will be more necessary in order to bring the
Convention in line with other criminal suppression treaties. By so doing, the anti-immunity
provision16 of the Convention will become more meaningful and result-oriented.
4) National criminal prosecution authorities should eschew political, economic, and allied
considerations in their decisions as to prosecution of foreign high-ranking state officials before
their national courts for international crimes. There is no doubt that the desire by states to
maintain friendly international relations will make constitute a challenge in this regard. However,
due to the fact that systematic commission of international crimes by high-ranking state officials
has the effect of destabilizing international peace and security and adversely affects the socio-

15
16

1948, 78 UNTS 277.
Ibid, art 4.
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economic and allied well-being of many states, including the forum state, states should increase
their willingness to prosecute. To this end, it is further suggested that an international conference
on the use of the universal criminal jurisdiction mechanism should be organized, perhaps by the
UN, to sensitize states to the numerous advantages of this mechanism in the international
criminal justice delivery system and to encourage them to intensify their application of it. In
order, however, to allay the fears of abuse of the mechanism by some states, the conference
should establish a committee that will ensure fairness in the application of the mechanism by
states. Interestingly, a similar was recently convened between the African Union (AU) and the
European Union (EU).17 In view of the global importance of the universal jurisdiction issue, it is
strongly suggested that the UN should emulate this AU-EU example.
5) In the light of the numerous weaknesses of the ad hoc international criminal tribunal
mechanism and the hybrid criminal tribunal mechanism, it is suggested that the two mechanisms
be scrapped. In their place, there should be uniformly and concurrently established by the UN, in
conjunction with relevant regional18 and sub-regional19 international organizations, permanent
regional and sub-regional international criminal tribunal mechanisms. This will be similar to the
practice in the international human rights system where there are permanent global international

17

Here, the 10th and 11th meetings of the AU-EU Ministerial Troika held in 2009 addressed the issue of universal
jurisdiction in the context of the relationship between the AU and the EU. The meeting discussed and underlined the
necessity to fight impunity in the framework of international law to ensure that individuals who commit grave
offences such as war crimes and crimes against humanity are brought to justice. The African side stated that there
are abusive applications if the principle which could endanger international law and expressed concerns over it. In
the end, the two bodies issued a joint communiqué and “… agreed to continue discussions on the issue and to set up
a technical ad hoc expert group to clarify the respective understanding on the African and European side on the
principle of universal jurisdiction …”. See EU Council Secretariat, The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of
Universal Jurisdiction, Council of the European Union, Doc 8672/1/09 REV 1 (16 April 2009).
18
E.g., the Council of Europe, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS).
19
E.g., the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Arab League, the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations, the South African Development Community, the Andean Community, and the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS).
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human rights protection and enforcement institutions 20, as well as those operating at the
regional21 and sub-regional22 levels of international co-operation. In this regard, the effort by the
AU to establish a standing African criminal court may be relevant. It should be noted that out of
disenchantment with the ICC mechanism‟s exclusive focus on African leaders, in particular, and
Africans, in general, the AU has resolved to create a criminal chamber within the upcoming
African Court of Justice and Human Rights by vesting this court with jurisdiction over
international crimes committed by Africans or in Africa. 23 However, the good faith or bad faith
of this step by the AU is yet to be clearly determined. In the light of the controversy, it is
suggested that the UN itself should be in charge of the creation of such permanent regional and
sub-regional international criminal tribunals.
The advantages of the suggested permanent regional and sub-regional international
criminal tribunal mechanisms are multifarious. First, the allegation that the ad hoc international
and mechanism, for example, was created by a few powerful states when other states had no
input, will be overcome, since the new mechanisms will be created with the participation of most
states and will better represent the intent of the wider international community. Second, their
geographical jurisdictions will be much wider, their temporal jurisdictions non-temporary, and
their substantive jurisdictions (if they are created concurrently) uniform and consistent. Third,
20

E.g., the Human Rights Committee. See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999
UNTS 171, art 28.
21
E.g., the European Court of Human Rights, the African Court of Human and Peoples‟ Rights, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. See the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, ETS 5, art 19; the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights on
the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, 1998, OAU Doc
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art 1; and, the American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 1144 UNTS
123, art 33(b).
22
E.g., the Community Court of justice of the Economic Community of West African States. See the Economic
Community of West African States‟ Protocol on the Community Court of Justice, 1991, A/P.I/7/91, art 2.
23
See Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights, 2012, EXP/Min/IV/Rev.7. See also Otieno, Mbori, “The Merged African Court of Justice and Human Rights
(ACJ&HR) as a Better Criminal Justice System Than the ICC: Are We Finding African Solution to African
Problems or Creating African Problems without Solutions?” (June 3 2014) online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2445
344>.
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the tribunals under these mechanisms will be only empowered to try crimes committed after the
adoption of their enabling legal instruments and, thus, avoid the weakness of administration of ex
post facto laws associated with the current ad hoc and hybrid tribunal mechanisms. Fourth, there
will be no administration of victor‟s justice, nor an undue focus on weaker and developing states,
since the new mechanisms will be permanent and empowered to try crimes committed in both
peacetime and armed conflict situations by officials of all states and will operate in all regions
and sub-regions. Finally, they will experience much less undue external influence which now
bedevils the ad hoc international and hybrid tribunal mechanisms.
6) The selective justice practice of the ICC mechanism should be discontinued. The ICC
should extend its anti-immunity efforts to all alleged Rome Statute crimes that are committed by
high-ranking officials of all states, developed and less developed, in all regions of the world, and
in all deserving situations. Thus, the current concentration on African officials and situations
must end. In the operation of the mechanism, there should be neither untouchable “sacred cows”
nor exemplary “scapegoats”. Furthermore, the OTP‟s thematic approach, whereby priority of
investigation and prosecution is given to some heads of Rome Statute crimes as opposed to
others, should be abolished. All international crimes within the Rome Statute‟s purview are very
grave. The injustice meted out to victims of the neglected crimes is also devastating, and the nonsubjection to justice of the culpable state officials aggravates their impunity and sends the wrong
signal to society.
7) The undue external influence which the UN Security Council and its permanent
members wield over the ICC mechanism should be abolished. This should be done in three ways.
First, the provision of the Rome Statute24 which empowers the Council to refer situations to the
ICC should be repealed, since the Council‟s permanent members are highly selective about the
24

Supra, note 4, art 13(b).
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states whose situations they refer to the Court. No doubt, the repeal of this provision will imply
that the ICC will no more have any jurisdiction over heinous international crimes committed in
the territories of non-member states of the Rome Statute when such crimes threaten international
peace and security. However, this imminent lacuna can be easily filled by further amending the
Rome Statute and expanding its jurisdiction by conferring on the Court universal jurisdiction
over all Rome Statute crimes. This change is readily supported by the fact that all the crimes
within the ICC‟s jurisdiction are already customary international law crimes that are susceptible
to universal jurisdiction.25 There is also no doubt that this conferment of universal jurisdiction
will raise, on a rather massive scale, the feared problem of imposing a treaty on non-party states.
Again, this fear is somewhat misconceived. Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties26 clearly provides that although a treaty does not bind a third state without its consent,
“Nothing … precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a
customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”27
Secondly, the provision of the Rome Statute that empowers the Council to defer
(suspend) investigations or trials by the ICC 28 should also be repealed. This provision seriously
undermines the mechanism‟s independence in its fight against the problems of state immunity.
Thirdly, the new provision introduced into the Rome Statute by the Kampala Accord29
(“Kampala Amendment”) whereby the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to proceed with an
investigation of a situation of alleged aggression depends on a prior determination by the Council

25

See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, GA
Res 95(1), 1946 (of 11 December, 1946); UN General Assembly Resolution on the Crime of Genocide, GA Res
96(1), 1946 (of 11 December, 1946).
26
1969, 1155 UNTS 331.
27
Emphasis supplied.
28
Rome Statute, supra, note 4, art 16.
29
Supra, note 11, para 3(6)-(8).
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of the existence of a situation of aggression should also be abolished. This provision leaves the
ICC mechanism at the mercies of the Council when it is alleged that aggression has occurred.
8) The provision of the Rome Statute which preserves the validity of BIAs concluded
between states30 should be repealed outright. This provision obviously undermines the whole
anti-state-immunity regime of the ICC mechanism, and the US has turned it into an instrument
for the promotion of impunity among its high-ranking officials. 31 If the anti-state-immunity
mission of this mechanism is to be realized, the immunity rule should be abolished without
exception.
9) Also the temporal jurisdictional politics over war crimes and the crimes of aggression
under the ICC mechanism should be eradicated. The discretion given to a state, upon becoming a
party to the Rome Statute, to defer the commencement of the ICC‟s jurisdiction for seven years
with respect to war crimes allegedly committed by its nationals or on its territory 32 should be
abolished outright. In fact, the ICC‟s jurisdiction over war crimes committed within the territory
or by the officials of any state should commence from the date of entry into force of the Rome
Statute.33 A similar discretion regarding the crime of aggression 34 should also be eradicated.
These discretions only increase the impunity of high-ranking state officials in respect of these
crimes.
10) More generally, the current practice of restricting the anti-state-immunity disposition
to the “core international crimes”, i.e., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the
crime of aggression, should be discontinued. The crusade should extend to all other species of
30

Rome Statute, supra, note 4, art 98.
See, e.g., the American Servicemembers‟ Protection Act, Pub L No 107-206, 116 Stat 820 (2002), ss 2004-2008;
AMICC, “US & ICC: Congressional Update: Anti-ICC Legislation”, online: < http://www. amicc.org/usicc/legislati
on>.
32
The Rome Statute, supra, note 4, art 124.
33
i.e., July 1, 2002.
34
See the Kampala Amendment, supra, note 11, para 3(4).
31
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international crimes, such as piracy and slave trade 35. By doing this, the impunity of state
officials regarding these presently uncovered crimes may reduce.
11) Finally, the present lopsided nature of efforts to disregard/abolish state immunity in
the international criminal justice system whereby only officials of less developed states are
stripped of their immunity and tried and punished should be changed. All existing response
mechanisms should extend their anti-immunity efforts to high-ranking officials of all states,
strong or weak, who commit international crimes. This would supplement the suggestion in (5)
above as to the establishment of permanent and jurisdictionally harmonized international
criminal tribunal mechanisms in all regions (and, if possible, sub-regions) of the world.

6.4

Conclusion
The state immunity rule evolved in international law principally to promote mutual

respect for the sovereign equality and political independence of all states by ensuring that no one
state or any of its high-ranking officials is impleaded before the municipal tribunals of another
state without the consent of the former. From the examination of this rule, it is evident that its
application in the international criminal justice system results in significant social, political,
economic, and other problems that outweigh its benefits. Many high-ranking state officials who
benefit from the rule abuse it, so that many of its commendable rationales are substantially
defeated.
The desire to overcome these problems and to ensure individual accountability and
justice in the international criminal justice system led the international community to create

35

Although these two mentioned crimes may be unlikely committed by state officials, it is the possibility is not
completely ruled out that a state official can unexpectedly involve in any of them. Thus, if the anti-state-immunity
regimes of these mechanisms are not extended to them, there is the likelihood that the culpable state official will be
shielded from accountability before national courts by the state immunity rule.
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various legal mechanisms to disregard or abolish the immunity of officials in relevant
international criminal proceedings. Consequently, today, high-ranking officials of a state
(including its past or incumbent heads of state and/or government) can be tried and punished by
competent foreign or international judicial tribunals for some international crimes committed in
the abusive exercise of their state‟s official /public powers. Many of these officials have already
been so tried and punished, and others are currently undergoing their trials. Thus, the strength of
the state immunity rule has weakened. It is no more a rule that affords high-ranking state
officials absolute and unquestionable protection or exemption from external judicial scrutiny of
their international crimes.
However, the effectiveness of the anti-state-immunity efforts is bedeviled by many
weaknesses associated with the different response mechanisms. The combined effect of these
weaknesses is that many culpable high-ranking state officials still escape individual
accountability for their international crimes, and the problems arising from the application of the
state immunity rule in the international criminal justice system invariably continue. This thesis,
therefore, suggests various reforms to the mechanisms. The major impact of these suggested
reforms is that they will enable the mechanisms overcome the weaknesses and become effective
in responding to the problems of the state immunity rule. If the suggestions are followed, the
administration of international criminal justice involving state officials will contribute to
accomplishing the individual accountability and justice missions of the international criminal
justice system and maintain public confidence in the system.
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